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CHAPTER

Introduction
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education, a
panel of distinguished educators appointed by Secretary of Education
Terence Bell, released a report on the condition of American education
entitled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. The
provocative message of the report—that if a foreign power had tried to
impose on America the mediocre educational performance of our
schools, we might well have regarded it as an act of war—set off a
debate about the nation's schools that continues today.

Teacher Quality

Not the least of the commission's concerns centered on the quality
of teaching. Among their claims were the following:
1. Too many teachers had been poor students themselves.
2. Programs of teacher education placed too much emphasis on
courses in educational methods, too little on the subjects to be
taught.
3. There were severe shortages of qualified teachers in certain sub
ject areas, such as mathematics and science.
4. Too many newly employed teachers were not qualified to teach
the subjects they were assigned.
These concerns were not new. In 1963 the president of the Council
for Basic Education described teacher education in the following
terms: "A weak faculty operates a weak program that attracts weak stu
dents" (Koerner 1963). Researchers reported that SAT scores of educa-
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tion majors ranked near the bottom of all college graduates (Weaver
1983). Subsequent developments confirmed these criticisms, as sub
stantial proportions of the workforce and even larger percentages of
new teacher trainees were unable to pass teacher examinations that
amounted to little more than tests of basic literacy (Toch 1991).
Worse still, there were signs in the early 1980s that the quality of the
teaching workforce was deteriorating. The decline in the average SAT
scores of high school seniors intending to major in education had out
paced the drop in scores among college-bound students in general. A
similar pattern was found in an analysis of IQ scores of college gradu
ates who entered teaching: in 1967, graduates with IQ scores of 100
and 130 were about equally likely to become teachers; by 1980, the
ratio was 4:1 (Murnane et al. 1991).
Problems in teacher recruitment were exacerbated by two other
trends. One, women were finding new careers open to them and no
longer entered education in the same numbers. This was especially true
of bright, capable women who had formerly provided public school
systems with a low-cost pool of talented teachers. Second, by the early
1980s, the decline in school enrollments that had marked the previous
decade was coming to an end; enrollments began to rise again in the
lower elementary grades. Thus policy makers foresaw not only a sus
tained decline in teacher quality, but an absolute shortage of trained
instructors, particularly in critical areas such as mathematics and sci
ence (Darling-Hammond 1984).

The Response
By one count, A Nation at Risk was followed by more than two hun
dred reports on American education, each setting out recommendations
for educational reform (Wayson 1988). Many proposed to improve
teaching effectiveness by raising standards for teacher education and
licensing. Such reforms included higher admissions standards for
teacher education programs; more rigorous course content in teacher
education, with increased emphasis on subject matter; and basic skills
and subject matter competency testing for teacher certification. These
reforms were, however, unlikely to accomplish much alone. In the

Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality 3

words of one of the most prominent studies of the teaching workforce:
"It will do little good to raise the standards for entry into the profession
of teaching and greatly improve the professional preparation of teach
ers if nothing is done to make teaching a more attractive career" (Carn
egie Forum on Education and the Economy 1986).
The leading reports dealing with teachers were unanimous in regard
to one recommendation: in order to attract more capable persons into
the profession, salaries needed to be raised (Boyer 1983; The Holmes
Group 1986; Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy 1986;
National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). Over and
again it was pointed out that teachers' salaries ranked below those of
most occupations requiring a college degree. Moreover, while teaching
had never been regarded as a well-paid career, during the 1970s teach
ers had lost ground. In the ten years that followed the 1971-72 school
year, average teacher salaries fell more than 10 percent in constant dol
lars (U.S. Department of Education 1993). The fact that this decline
paralleled a drop in academic ability among new teachers enhanced the
case for higher pay.
As state legislatures and local school districts responded to the rec
ommendations of the commissions, a few dissenting voices questioned
the accuracy of the diagnosis and efficacy of the cure. It was argued
that teachers were not as poorly paid as alleged. Teacher salaries had
been understated. 1 In addition, most interoccupational comparisons of
salaries omit fringe benefits. Since teachers, like other public sector
employees, receive more generous benefits than most private sector
workers, this omission led to an understatement of their relative com
pensation. Finally, teachers also work shorter years than most other
Americans; earnings during summer vacations (or the value of leisure)
further increase teachers' total income.
More important, there had been no analysis of the teacher labor mar
ket to support the recommended salary increases. "[N]o one seems to
have any idea of either how much additional teacher talent would be
attracted by increases in teacher compensation, or how much students
would learn if teachers were paid more" (Lieberman 1986). Indeed, the
notion that increasing spending on schools would improve educational
outcomes was (and remains) a contentious one, with a substantial body
of research failing to detect a strong relationship between per-pupil
expenditures and student achievement (Hanushek 1986).
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In addition, some doubted that the nation was prepared to spend the
sums of money proposed to make teaching competitive with other
careers. By one reckoning, the suggestion of the president of the Carn
egie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to raise teacher sala
ries by 25 percent after inflation would cost the nation $9 billion
annually, not including the cost of additional pension benefits or the
increases for others in the education system (such as administrators
and clerical staff) that were likely to ensue (Lieberman 1986).
In one respect, at any rate, the skeptics were wrong: the nation
proved willing after all to commit vast additional sums to teacher com
pensation. Although there were large differences across states in the
rate of salary growth, on the whole the United States came close to
implementing the proposed 25 percent raise. Between 1979 and 1989,
teachers' average salaries rose 20 percent after inflation. In some states
real increases were extraordinary: 36 percent in New Hampshire, 35
percent in Virginia, 52 percent in Connecticut (U.S. Department of
Education 1993).
Increases in salaries for beginning public school teachers substan
tially restored the competitiveness of teaching vis-a-vis other careers.
Between 1979 and 1989, salaries for new teachers rose 13 percent.
Average earnings in entry-level positions for all college graduates
increased by only 3.5 percent over the same period. 2 By 1991 the ratio
of teachers' starting salaries to those of other graduates had reached
.86, exceeding the 1976 ratio of 83 percent.
Rather surprisingly, there has been little effort to assess the results
of this policy. Surveys conducted by the National Center for Education
Statistics now provide more detailed information about the teaching
workforce than ever before available, yet no analysis of these data
attempting to relate changes in teacher recruitment to salary growth has
appeared. Previous scholarly work has focused on pieces of the story
(e.g., the relationship between salaries and teacher retention). The
analysis of the teacher labor market that would provide the foundation
for the formulation of effective policy remains to be done.
In the meantime, the debate over teacher salaries has grown more
acrimonious. Voters who have witnessed dramatic increases in teacher
compensation without seeing commensurate improvements (at least in
their view) in the education provided their children have elected school
boards that now pressure teacher unions for salary concessions; teach-
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ers are striking because boards have reneged on earlier agreements.
Adding to the clamor are the voices of those who believe that teacher
salaries are still too low, that we have not done enough to make the pro
fession attractive, and of their opponents who see no point in providing
additional funds to an educational system that has demonstrably failed
the nation's children and wonder why many of our school systems
must now spend upwards of $7,000 per pupil when many private
schools cost substantially less.
This monograph is an attempt to clarify the facts as well as the
underlying issues in this debate. We ask a simple question: have higher
salaries improved the quality of newly recruited teachers? Since we
find little evidence to support an affirmative response, we ask two more
questions. First, what went wrong? Second, which reforms are likely
to meet with more success? To answer these questions, we review data
on the characteristics of newly recruited teachers. We also show how
important features of the labor market for teachers systematically
undermine efforts to improve teacher quality. Finally, we undertake a
comparison of personnel policies and staffing patterns in public and
private schools, an exercise that sheds light on what can be accom
plished by lifting some of the regulatory (and other) constraints now
imposed on public school administrators.

Organization of the Book
The remainder of the text is divided into six chapters. In chapter 2,
we take up an important preliminary question—how to measure
teacher quality. We select several indicators of quality, which are then
used in chapter 3 to assess the evidence on salary growth and teacher
recruitment. Chapter 4 offers an analysis of the operation of the teacher
labor market that explains our findings, while chapter 5 reviews the
implications for teacher recruitment of various other reforms of current
interest. Chapter 6 looks at teacher salaries and personnel policies in
the private sector to see whether private schools offer a model for
reforming public education. Our main points are summarized in the
final chapter.
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NOTES
1. As Myron Lieberman (1986) points out, A Nation at Risk understated the average teacher
salary in 1981-82 by 13 percent.
2. Data on real salary growth are from the Surveys of Recent College Graduates, adjusted for
changes in the Consumer Price Index. Salary gains by new teachers exceeded those of nonteaching graduates in the humanities (2.6 percent), in the social sciences (5.7 percent), and in science,
mathematics, and computer science (11.5 percent).
Various other data are available on salaries of new college graduates. Some of them offer a dif
ferent picture of the relative wages of teachers. We have used the data that seem to be most
broadly representative of the jobs taken by new graduates. An alternative series prepared by the
College Placement Council is based on information provided by placement offices. These data are
heavily influenced by the results of on-campus recruitment and are not intended to represent the
experience of new graduates generally (College Placement Council 1994). Surveys of entry-level
salaries at major corporations are even less representative.
Academic studies have also made varying claims about teachers' relative salaries. While there
seems to be no dispute that teachers' pay rose in real terms during the 1980s, different claims have
been advanced regarding the salaries of teachers relative to college graduates in other occupations.
Examining data from the National Longitudinal Survey and the Current Population Surveys, Flyer
and Rosen (1996) conclude that relative salaries, while improving during the 1980s, did not
recover to the level of the mid-1960s, controlling for teacher education and experience. Hanushek,
Rivkin, and Jamison (1992) analyzed data from the Census of Population and concluded that
while relative pay improved for male teachers between 1980 and 1990, it fell for women, again
conditioning on education and experience.
Some caution is called for when interpreting these numbers. Census and Current Population
Survey data provide only rough measures of workforce experience, generally age minus years of
education. This is a notoriously poor proxy for the work experience of female teachers, many of
whom spend years away from teaching in order to raise families. In addition, while many teachers
hold master's degrees, one may reasonably question whether this investment in advanced training
is comparable to the additional education represented by other professional degrees.
We do not pursue this question further, since it has no real importance for the thesis of this
book. Whether or not teachers' relative pay recovered to earlier levels during the 1980s for the
nation as a whole, there is no doubt that salary growth varied considerably across states, both in
real and relative terms. It is this variation we examine in chapter 3 to ascertain whether higher pay
led to improvements in teacher recruitment.

CHAPTER

Indicators of Teacher Quality
This research examines the relationship between teacher salaries
and the quality of newly recruited teachers. An important preliminary
question is how we intend to measure improvements in the teaching
workforce.

Student Achievement
Perhaps the surest sign that schools have been hiring more effective
teachers would be improvement in student achievement. Unfortunately,
several conceptual and practical difficulties prevent our using such an
indicator. (We ignore the question whether standardized tests or some
other assessment best measures student learning, since sufficiently
many problems arise on other grounds.)
In the first place, it takes time to renew the workforce. Teacher sala
ries began to rise at the beginning of the 1980s, with the most rapid
increase between 1983 and 1986, after the appearance of A Nation at
Risk. Given the time it takes prospective teachers to react to salary
developments and to complete a teacher education program, it is
unlikely that much change could have occurred in the quality of new
teacher recruits before the middle of the decade. Throughout this
period, moreover, new entrants in any given year comprised no more
than 5 percent of all teachers. Low rates of entry, coupled with high
rates of attrition among new instructors, have kept the share of recently
recruited teachers down. Thus in 1991, teachers with no more than
three years' experience comprised only 9.7 percent of the workforce
(U.S. Department of Education 1993). As a result, it is unlikely that
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students were exposed to enough newly recruited teachers—even if the
latter were, on average, superior to teachers hired earlier—to affect the
statistical relationship between teacher salaries and aggregate measures
of student performance.
Even if this difficulty could be resolved, any such study faces the
problem of distinguishing the impact of new teachers' superior abilities
(if such they are) from the fact that inexperience per se reduces their
effectiveness. This considerably complicates the investigators' task
even when disaggregated data are available, as in the National Educa
tional Longitudinal Study begun in 1988 (NELS-88).

Teacher Attributes
In chapter 1 we reviewed the recommendations of several commis
sions and task forces concerning teacher recruitment and teacher sala
ries. Virtually all reports expressed concern about the academic ability
of the workforce: the general level of teachers' cognitive skills as well
as specific subject-area knowledge. The near-unanimity of these
reports suggests that a reasonable assessment of the effect of salary
reforms would examine the academic backgrounds of persons newly
recruited into teaching. We employ the following indicators:
1. The quality of the college or university that awarded the teacher's
bachelor degree, as indicated by the "selectiveness" of the insti
tution, according to Barton's Profiles of American Colleges. Rat
ings are based on entering classes' college board scores and high
school records, as well as the percentage of applicants admitted. 1
2. A degree in an academic subject rather than in education (appli
cable only to teachers in secondary schools).
3. An undergraduate major in mathematics or science (secondary
school teachers only).
4. Undergraduate GPA.
5. SAT scores of prospective education majors.
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We do not suppose that these indicators cover all the qualities that
contribute to effective teaching or that someone cannot be a good
teacher who fares poorly by these measures. Indeed, this much was
acknowledged by the task forces and commissions cited above. How
ever, it would seem to be a fair test of salary reform that it improve the
workforce where it has been found wanting. In the words of a former
assistant secretary of education:
What I hear from principals is that teachers coming in do not have
content background. They have compassion and sensitivity, but
they lack the content background to be great teachers (Diane Ravitch, quoted in The Washington Times, May 18, 1994).

Even if there were not this consensus among the commissions about
the needs of our educational system, a strong case can be made for
using these indicators of teacher quality. In the first place, the notion
that brighter individuals make better teachers is inherently plausible.
Teachers should have a good grasp of the ways in which all kinds
of physical and social systems work; a feeling for what data are
and the uses to which they can be put, an ability to help students
see patterns of meaning where others see only confusion.... They
must be able to learn all the time, as the knowledge required to do
their work twists and turns with new challenges and the progress
of science and technology. . . . We are describing people of sub
stantial intellectual accomplishment" (Carnegie Forum for Educa
tion and the Economy 1986, p. 25)

The research literature also lends support to the proposition that
instructors with stronger academic backgrounds are, other things being
equal, more effective teachers. Analyzing data on reading achievement
of elementary school students in southern California, Winkler (1975)
found a positive association between test score gains and the "prestigiousness" of the teacher's undergraduate college. (Prestigious institu
tions included Stanford and the University of California system;
nonprestigious were represented primarily by the California state col
lege system.) In a study of Philadelphia schools, Summers and Wolfe
(1977) found that student test score gains between third and sixth grade
varied positively with the quality of their teacher's undergraduate col
lege. An analysis of data from High School and Beyond found a posi
tive association between student test score gains from tenth to twelfth
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grades and the selectiveness of the colleges attended by teachers at
their school, as rated by Barren's Profiles (Ehrenberg and Brewer
1994). The sources of this influence are probably severalfold: the fact
that more selective colleges screen applicants on the basis of measures
of scholastic aptitude, the higher quality of the education they provide
undergraduates (not least of which is a peer effect), and the possibility
that these higher achieving students are more enthusiastic about the
subjects they teach. Indeed, it has been shown that secondary school
teachers who graduated from selective colleges or who majored in the
subject they teach assign homework more frequently and put in longer
hours grading papers and preparing lessons (Ballou and Podgursky
1995a).
In addition, unless teaching requires a very idiosyncratic set of
skills, characteristics that predict success in other fields should help to
identify effective teachers as well. Studies of human capital have found
a positive relationship between earnings and the quality of the college
attended (James et al. 1989; Solmon 1975).2 College quality also has a
positive impact on the likelihood that a new graduate finds a job in the
field for which he or she trained (Ballou 1996).
Other research with access to teacher test scores has confirmed the
importance of teachers' verbal ability. Several of these studies ana
lyzed data collected by the Office of Equality of Educational Opportu
nity (OEEO) in the mid-1960s, made famous by the Coleman Report
(Coleman et al. 1966): Hanushek (1970); Bowles and Levin (1968);
and most recently, Ehrenberg and Brewer (1993). Hanushek (1971)
investigated the relationship between the achievement of California
third graders and the characteristics of their second and third grade
teachers, including experience, hours of graduate education, and scores
on a test of verbal ability with more discriminating power than the
OEEO exam. Of all teacher characteristics, scores on this exam were
the most important determinants of student learning. Webster (1988)
found a significant positive correlation between teachers' scores on the
Wesman Personnel Classification test, a test of verbal and quantitative
ability, and scores of middle school students on the Iowa Tests of Basic
Skills as well as the scores of secondary students on the Iowa Tests of
Educational Development. Ferguson (1991) reported that student
achievement was positively related to district average scores on the
Texas Examination of Current Teachers and Administrators (TECAT).
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Using data from the Longitudinal Survey of American Youth, Monk
(1994) found a strong positive association between the subject matter
preparation (college course work) of high school mathematics and sci
ence teachers and their students' achievement test scores. The fact that
researchers employing a variety of data sets and test instruments have
found a positive association between teachers' tested ability and stu
dent learning attests to the robustness of this relationship.
It should be noted that not all studies replicate these findings. In par
ticular, some researchers have found that performance on the National
Teachers' Examination (NTE) appears to be a poor predictor of teach
ing ability (Haney et al. 1987). However, Strauss and Sawyer (1986)
found that higher NTE scores among North Carolina teachers were
inversely related to student failure rates on a standardized competency
examination, with a 1 percent increase in teacher quality accompanied
by a 5 percent decline in failures. Since the impact of NTE scores on
mean student achievement was much weaker, this study reveals the
importance of examining more than one outcome measure.
In summary, the link between teachers' cognitive abilities and stu
dent learning stands out in a literature that frequently fails to find sig
nificant relationships between other teacher attributes and student
achievement: "The only reasonably consistent finding seems to be that
'smarter' teachers do better in terms of student achievement."
(Hanushek 1981). Moreover, evidence is not limited to scholarly
research. An incidental demonstration of the relationship between aca
demic ability and teaching effectiveness occurred during implementa
tion of the Florida master teacher program. Two instruments were used
to evaluate teachers: a written test of subject matter knowledge and
classroom observation. Participants had to score in the top quartile on
both instruments in order to qualify as master teachers. The proportion
of successful applicants was one in six (Brandt 1990). Although this
figure is sometimes cited as evidence of the low correlation between
effective teaching behavior and subject matter knowledge, it demon
strates, of course, precisely the opposite: two-thirds of the teachers
who satisfied one criterion also met the other.
Finally, the criteria we propose are currently used by other research
ers and policy makers to assess the efficacy of educational reforms.
Our choice of indicators is therefore far from idiosyncratic. Changes in
SAT scores among prospective education majors have been adduced as
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evidence that teacher quality is responding to improvements in salary
(Kirst and Kelley 1993). The Connecticut State Board of Education
cites the percentage of new teachers who graduated from more selec
tive colleges—as rated by Barren's Profiles—to demonstrate that
higher salaries combined with more rigorous academic standards for
new teachers have raised the quality of its teaching workforce (Beaudin, various years). A study of mathematics and science education
commissioned by the National Science Foundation recommended that
the federal government use the following indicators to monitor the
quality of the teaching workforce: undergraduate major, test scores,
GPA, and subject area certification (Shavelson et al. 1989). In recent
years, states have strengthened requirements in subject area prepara
tion; several now require secondary school teachers to major in the
subject they will teach (NASDTEC 1991).

Principals© Ratings of Their Staffs
While we believe that the indicators we have chosen represent rea
sonable criteria for judging the impact of salary reforms, we are aware
that there exist differences of opinion over the importance of these
measures. Many educators and researchers deny that there is an impor
tant link between what teachers know and how well they teach. The
following is a strong but probably fair statement of what many educa
tors believe about the importance of teachers' cognitive ability:
Given prevailing methods of training and selecting teachers, char
acteristics such as basic communication skills, general knowl
edge, professional knowledge, and even knowledge of subject
matter taught have small relationship to teaching effectiveness.
Whatever the power of such cognitive aspects of teacher qualifica
tions to predict teaching effectiveness, it appears to be no more
than that associated with aspects of personality, attitudes, and per
sonal habits (Haney et al. 1987).

This view is not, of course, universal among educators. Indeed, claims
that teachers' tested knowledge and academic preparation are unrelated
to their ability to teach have been termed preposterous by the president
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of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (Wise
1992).
Since opinion is divided, we also include an indicator of teacher
quality that is not tied to any particular view of pedagogy but rather
reflects the views held by educational practitioners, whatever they may
be. The Schools and Staffing Survey of 1990-91 contained an item ask
ing each school principal to rate the quality of his staff. Separate
assessments were obtained for new teachers (no more than three years'
experience) and experienced staff. This breakdown makes it possible to
compare new teachers to experienced teachers, and to measure this
change against salary growth. Since the criteria used for these assess
ments are determined by principals themselves, the relationship
between ratings and teacher salaries signals whether principals have
been able to recruit staffs that meet their needs, however they conceive
them.

Other Indicators
There are two widely used indicators of teacher quality that we do
not employ—the percentage of teachers who hold advanced degrees
and teachers' experience. Although teacher compensation is generally
based on these factors, their demonstrated relationship to teacher qual
ity is slight or nonexistent. Advanced degrees have not been found to
improve teacher effectiveness, while the contribution of experience
appears weak, at best, and limited to the first few years of teaching
(Hanushek 1986). To the extent that higher salaries have raised the pro
portion of teachers who have taught long enough to become effective,
our investigation will understate the consequences of salary reform.
(See, however, the discussion of turnover in chapter 4.) Given the over
riding importance of recruiting more capable persons into teaching, it
seems reasonable to focus on the attributes they bring to their jobs.
To summarize, by the early 1980s, it was widely reported that many
of the nation's teachers had weak cognitive skills and poor preparation
in their subjects. Such findings prompted recommendations that sala
ries be raised (along with other measures to improve teacher profes
sionalism). It would seem of considerable interest, then, to learn
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whether these policies have produced improvements of the kind
desired.
NOTES
1. Colleges ranked in the top two categories ("most competitive" and "highly competitive")
have been reassigned to a single group ("selective"). At the other end of the scale, colleges rated
"less competitive" or "noncompetitive" have also been grouped together ("below average").
2. We use college quality as a broader indicator than do some of the researchers we cite, who
ask whether college quality contributes to earnings after one controls for individual ability, family
background, etc. The latter question concerns the value added by a college education. By contrast,
we use college quality for all that it might represent—as a proxy for higher ability, family inputs,
etc., and as a measure of value added during one's undergraduate years. While some of the litera
ture suggests there is little value added from attending a more selective institution, selectivity in
the broad sense in which we use it is correlated with subsequent earnings and career opportunities.

CHAPTER

Teacher Pay and Recruitment
In this chapter, we investigate the effect that higher salaries have had
on the quality of the teaching workforce. This is not the first study to
examine the relationship of teacher quality to salaries. Earlier research,
exploiting variation in cross-sectional data, has found a modest but sta
tistically significant association between pay and indicators of quality
similar to ours. This may indicate that better-paying districts enjoy an
advantage in recruitment, though it is also possible that more qualified
teachers are drawn to these districts for other reasons (for example,
they may be more likely to live in them). 1 While these findings are of
interest for some purposes (e.g., assessing effects of disparities in
school financing), they primarily reflect the way the market sorts teach
ers across districts and, as such, say little about the question that con
cerns us. The commissions and task forces that recommended raising
teacher salaries in the early 1980s were not interested in one district's
gain at the expense of another, but in the possibility of recruiting into
education persons who would otherwise choose more attractive and
remunerative careers. Salary coefficients in such studies overstate the
increase in teacher quality that results when salaries rise in all schools
simultaneously.
This problem does not entirely disappear, of course, at higher levels
of aggregation, since high-wage states can recruit teachers away from
states with lower levels of pay. However, the evidence on teachers'
interstate mobility presented below suggests that using the state as the
unit of analysis substantially reduces this bias. And at the national
level, no such problem arises. We therefore focus on the relationship
between teacher salaries and quality at the state and national levels,
beginning with national trends.
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National Trends in Teacher Recruitment
We examine data from three sources: SAT scores from the College
Board, the Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS) of 1987-88 and 199091, and the Surveys of Recent College Graduates (SRCG), conducted
four times between 1981 and 1991. All reported statistics are weighted
to take account of stratification and clustering in sample designs.
Descriptions of these data sources are provided in appendix 3A.
SAT Scores

We begin with SAT scores of college-bound seniors (College
Entrance Examination Board, various years). If recent salary increases
have attracted brighter individuals into teaching, evidence to that effect
will likely appear in SAT scores of students intending to major in edu
cation.2 Indeed, board scores among prospective education majors have
risen. In 1980, combined SAT verbal and math scores among would-be
teachers averaged 807, compared to 890 among all examinees. In
1992, the corresponding averages were 850 and 899. Thus over twelve
years the gap between prospective education majors and others closed
by 50 percent. The number of prospective teachers also rose. In 1980,
6.1 percent of SAT test-takers declared an intention to major in educa
tion. By 1992 this proportion had risen to 8 percent.
Quality of College

Figure 3.1 presents information from the 1987-88 SASS on the
quality of the institution awarding the teacher's undergraduate degree.
The SASS provides a snap-shot of the workforce at a point in time, not
a profile over time. To investigate changes in the workforce, we sepa
rate full-time public school teachers into two categories: new (less than
three years' experience) and experienced. As figure 3.1 shows, there
was no pronounced difference between these two groups with respect
to the quality of the colleges attended. The proportion of new teachers
who graduated from colleges rated selective or above average was
slightly higher than the corresponding share among experienced
instructors. In the above-average category this difference is statistically
significant at 10 percent. However, this artificial "before and after"

Figure 3.1 Changes in the Workforce: College Attended
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comparison makes no allowance for the effects of attrition. Earlier
studies have found that teachers with stronger cognitive skills are more
likely to quit teaching (Schlechty and Vance 1981; Murnane and Olsen
1990). If so, the proportion of experienced teachers from better col
leges will fall below the share among new instructors, even without
increases in pay. Thus the modest "improvement" shown in figure 3.1
overstates the true gain.
Math and Science Teachers

The picture is decidedly more positive when it comes to the recruit
ment of teachers with bachelor's degrees in mathematics or science.
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of such individuals among new and
experienced teachers at the secondary level. 3 Math and science majors
rose to 9.9 percent of the new recruits in 1987-88 and to 11.7 percent in
1990-91—statistically significant gains.
Secondary School Instructors with Academic Majors

Progress was also made in this area, though it was neither as dra
matic nor as sustained as in the recruitment of math and science
majors. As shown in figure 3.2, in 1987-88, new secondary school
teachers were more likely than experienced teachers to have an aca
demic major. The trend appears to have reversed in 1990-91, though
one should be cautious comparing results across surveys. Changes on
the survey format may well have increased the number of miscoded
responses.
Undergraduate GPA

Grades of new graduates entering teaching (as reported to the Sur
veys of Recent College Graduates) are displayed in figure 3.3. The pro
portion of graduates who by their own report earned mostly A's in
college has held steady. The same is largely true of those with lower
grades, except for the sharp drop in the 1991 cohort. This drop is
almost certainly due to changes in the way data were collected. In a
departure from earlier practice, the 1991 survey was conducted by tele
phone. Inflated responses appear to have been more common under
these conditions. A cautious reading of the evidence from the SRCG

Figure 3.2 Changes in the Workforce: Subject Matter Preparation
<3yrs experience in 1991
<3 yrs experience in 1988
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would therefore suggest that little change has occurred in the distribu
tion of grades among new teachers.
To summarize, the evidence reviewed here indicates that the quality
of new recruits to teaching improved modestly during the 1980s. The
strongest sign of improvement is the rising share of teachers who have
majored in mathematics or science. SAT scores have also risen among
high school seniors who intend to major in education. Evidence that
more secondary school teachers have majored in academic disciplines
is weaker, as is the evidence that more teachers attended highly rated
colleges and universities. There has been no gain in the proportion of
top students, as measured by self-reported GPA, who become public
school teachers.

Recruitment and Salaries
None of the analysis to this point indicates whether these changes
were caused by increases in salary. To investigate this question, we
compare recruitment to salary growth at the state level.
As noted in chapter 1, teacher salaries rose an average of 20 percent
after inflation during the 1980s. While this is a substantial real
increase, it should be measured against the gains for college-educated
workers in general over the same period. Increases were particularly
pronounced among women, as entry barriers in other professions con
tinued to fall. Our measure of teacher salaries is therefore the ratio of
teacher pay to a gender-weighted average of the earnings of collegeeducated workers.4 Even by this measure, teacher salaries rose in all
but five states. In most states gains exceeded 10 percent (figure 3.4).
More important for our purposes, there was considerable variation
across states in real salary growth. This cross-sectional variation fur
nishes us with an opportunity to see whether improvements in recruit
ment were associated with higher salaries.
We begin by exploring the relationship between salary changes and
the SAT scores of prospective education majors. Since state universi
ties in many western and southern states require the ACT rather than
the SAT, skewing the population of SAT examinees, we have restricted
the sample to states where at least 40 percent of graduating seniors
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took the SAT. Figure 3.5 shows that there is essentially no relationship
between state-level changes in teacher salaries and SAT scores
between 1979 and 1989. Neither is there a strong relationship between
salary increases and changes in the share of high school students
intending to major in education. The slope of a regression line through
the latter data is positive but statistically insignificant (figure 3.6).
Figure 3.4 Changes in Relative Teacher Salaries by State
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While figure 3.5 seems to show that salary changes are not responsi
ble for test score gains among prospective education majors, this con
clusion is valid only to the extent that these students plan to make their
careers in their home states. Although we are unable to test this expla
nation directly, we find that new teachers do not exhibit a great deal of
mobility. According to the SRCG, more than 80 percent of newly
trained teachers take jobs in the states where they attended college.
This fraction is highest among graduates of state universities, lowest
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Figure 3.5 Relative SAT Scores of Education Majors and Teacher Pay
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among persons who attended prestigious colleges. Since many of the
latter presumably return to their home states after graduation, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the career plans of high school seniors, if
they are influenced by teacher salaries at all, will be most responsive to
trends in their home states.
Since the 1987-88 and 1990-91 SASS report the state in which each
teacher is employed, mismatches of this kind are not an issue. Unfortu
nately, state-level analyses of the SASS are of questionable validity,
given the small sample sizes for most states. (In most states there are
fewer than one hundred surveyed teachers who qualify as "new" by our
definition.) We therefore adopt the expedient of classifying states into
three groups: the top third, where the growth in relative teacher pay
was highest (increases of 18.6 percent or more), those where growth
was moderate (between 8.7 percent and 18.6 percent), and the bottom
third, with increases of less than 8.7 percent.5 While there is some loss
of information from grouping states in this fashion, the loss does not
obscure the answer to a simple yes or no question. If higher salaries
have improved teacher recruitment, it should be evident when we con
trast outcomes across these three groups.
The geographical distribution of high-, moderate-, and low-growth
states is depicted in figure 3.7. There is a concentration of high-growth
states in the northern plains (though lower population density in this
area means the geographical distribution of teachers in high-growth
states is considerably less concentrated). It should be remembered that
salary growth is a relative measure, so that states awarding substantial
increases in teacher pay are not necessarily high-growth states, if these
increases only managed to match gains for other college-educated
workers. Although there is some evidence that states in the highgrowth category began the decade with lower levels of teacher quality
(see below), we implicitly control for such differences by comparing
new teachers to experienced teachers within each category. Other con
founding influences (e.g., differential rates of teacher attrition) are dis
cussed below.
We begin by revisiting the question of college quality. There is no
evidence that raising teacher pay attracted more graduates of selective
colleges into teaching (figure 3.8). The relationship between salary
changes and the improvement in the workforce is not monotonic.
Instead, the moderate-growth states appear to have gained the most. 6

Figure 3.7 Growth in Relative Teaching Salaries

Growth Rate
High
Low
Moderate

Figure 3.8 Teachers Who Attended Most Selective Colleges
Percent
12 _
<3 yrs experience
10
>3 yrs experience
8.7(1.1)

7.3 (.71)

4.1 (.36)

High

Middle
Change in relative salaries, 1979-1989

Low

Figure 3.9 Teachers Who Attended Least Selective Colleges

<3 yrs experience

>3 yrs experience

High

Middle
Change in relative salaries, 1979-1989

Low

Figure 3.10 Secondary School Teachers with Bachelor's Degrees in Math or Science

Percent
14 I—

<3 yrs experience in 1991

12
<3 yrs experience in 1988

10
>3 yrs experience in 1988

High

Middle
Change in relative salaries, 1979-1989

Low

Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality

29

Similar remarks apply to other indicators of quality: graduates of the
least selective colleges (figure 3.9), teachers with math and science
degrees (figure 3.10), and instructors with academic majors (figure
3.11). In none of these cases do the data support the hypothesis that
improvements in teacher recruitment, such as they are, have resulted
from salary increases.7
The absence of any relationship between salary changes and the
quality of new recruits is surprising, though it is not difficult to find
other explanations for the modest improvement among new teacher
recruits in the 1980s. These include the wide publicity given an
impending "teacher shortage," a signal that job opportunities were
about to increase. In addition, many states and districts placed new
emphasis on recruiting teachers with better subject area preparation.
Still, our negative finding is so unsuspected that it is worth pausing to
consider whether it could be due to limitations of the data or faulty
analysis. We discuss two of the more likely possibilities.
Measurement Error in Salaries

Average teaching salaries at the state level are compiled by the
National Education Association from a survey of State Departments of
Education. These state-level averages reflect changes in the composi
tion of the workforce. This means that measured salary is not a pure
price. Since teachers are rewarded for education and experience, a shift
toward more experienced and better-educated teachers can cause aver
age pay to rise even when there has been no change in underlying sal
ary schedules. Thus part of the variation in state salaries may be
irrelevant to career decisions, if the latter depend on salary schedule
levels as opposed to movements along given schedules.
Changes in teachers' experience and education are not easily
obtained at the state level, making it difficult to remove these effects
from the salary series. However, since the SASS was administered
twice, first in 1987-88 and again in 1990-91, it is possible to examine
the sources of salary growth between those years. As shown in appen
dix 3B, 95 percent of the variation in state-level salary growth between
these years can be explained by upward shifts in schedules. (Changes
in the education and experience of states' teachers alone explain no
more than 20 percent of this variation.) Unless these three years are

Figure 3.11 Secondary School Teachers with Academic Majors
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highly atypical, it is therefore quite unlikely that our three-way classifi
cation of states by salary growth would be altered in any significant
way by taking into account teachers' accumulation of additional
degrees and experience.
A rise in the salary schedule need not occur evenly. Some districts
may award larger raises to starting teachers (frontloading); in other dis
tricts, experienced teachers may benefit most (backloading). Since new
teachers are presumably not indifferent to the distribution of increases
over the life cycle, state average pay may not accurately capture the
incentives they face.
Unfortunately, there is little hard evidence about the extent of backloading. Detailed analysis has been done for only a few states. Jacobson (1988) and Lankford and Wyckoff (1994) found that most districts
in New York State have backloaded teachers' raises over the past
twenty-five years. According to an analysis of district pay scales in
Michigan, during the economic decline of the 1970s and early 1980s,
salaries offered beginning teachers fell more (in percentage terms) than
did salaries at the top of the schedules (Murnane et al. 1987). However,
when district salaries were weighted by the number of teachers
employed, no such pattern was evident.
Even if more data on the prevalence of backloading were readily
available, we strongly suspect it would not make any great difference
to the analysis here. Backloading matters only to the extent that its
incidence varies systematically across high-, moderate-, and lowgrowth states. Thus, if high-growth states also practiced more backloading, this might account for the fact that teacher recruitment in these
states improved no more than it did elsewhere. In fact, since backload
ing appears to result from the influence of strong teacher unions on
contracts, it is likely that precisely the opposite relationship holds. An
inspection of figure 3.7 shows that many of the low-growth states (New
York, New Jersey, Illinois) have strong teacher unions, while high- and
moderate-growth states are concentrated in regions with weaker
unions.
Job Growth in Undesirable Locations

Success in recruiting new teachers depends not just on salary but
also on working conditions in the schools where vacancies occur.
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When job openings are concentrated in less-desirable school systems,
recruitment will suffer. Perhaps, then, salary growth was greatest
where new jobs were hardest to fill.
To explore this hypothesis, we compare the characteristics of dis
tricts in which new and experienced teachers worked. These character
istics include the percentage of students at each school eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch (a proxy for the poverty rate), the percentage of
black and Hispanic students, and indicators of a less-desirable location
(urban or rural as opposed to small town or suburb). We also compare
salaries of teachers with a BA and no experience to see whether job
openings have been concentrated among poorer-paying districts.
The comparison of experienced to new teachers in the 1987-88
SASS shows that experienced teachers were, indeed, more likely to
hold jobs in districts with attractive characteristics (table 3.1). It does
not appear, however, that this pattern varies systematically with salary
growth. For example, the gap between new and experienced teachers
with respect to poverty rates and the percentage of minority students at
their schools was greatest in the moderate growth states which
enjoyed, by and large, the largest improvement in teacher recruitment.
Compared to the 1987-88 workforce, new teachers in 1990-91 were
somewhat more likely to work in districts with high poverty rates, less
likely to take jobs in schools with high percentages of minority stu
dents. These differences probably reflect economic recession and
demographic changes in student enrollments, since the same trends are
apparent among experienced teachers. However, some statistics offer
support for the hypothesis under consideration. New teachers in low
salary growth states were less likely to hold jobs in large central city
school systems than were experienced teachers in the same states. In
addition, while new teachers were more often employed in rural dis
tricts in all three categories, the percentage was particularly high (com
pared to experienced teachers) in those states with the highest rates of
salary growth. If inner city and rural jobs are less attractive, states with
high salary growth may have been at a relative disadvantage in filling
vacant positions.
The disadvantage is unlikely to have had a pronounced effect on our
findings, as a few calculations will show. First, the difference between
the shares of new teachers and experienced teachers in rural districts
never exceeds more than about 10 percentage points. Even if a rural

Table 3.1 Characteristics of School Systems in which New and Experienced Teachers Work
New 90-91

Exper. 90-91

New 87-88

Exper. 87-88
High

Mid

Low

High

Mid

Low

High

Mid

Low

High

Mid

Low

Poverty rate

23.8
(.48)

29.0
(.55)

28.4
(.55)

27.4
(1.1)

32.9
(.93)

30.0
(1.1)

25.9
(.67)

33.9
(-81)

31.8
(.56)

30.7
(-95)

39.7
(1.2)

35.0
(1-3)

Percent black
& Hispanic

14.1
(.48)

32.9
(.57)

29.0
(.55)

16.0
(.83)

37.6
(1.2)

30.2
(1.5)

12.7
(-51)

21.5
(.74)

25.3
(.57)

14.0
(1.7)

36.3
(1.1)

25.7
(1.4)

Large city

2.8
(.37)

7.3
(.42)

8.0
(.43)

3.2
(1.1)

7.8
(1.1)

8.9
(1.1)

—

—

—

—

—

—

Mid-sized
city

7.9
(.45)

10.1
(.64)

9.0
(.52)

6.2
(.77)

8.7
(.98)

8.9
(1.2)

—

—

—

—

—

—

Large central
city

—

—

—

—

—

—

5.5
(.64)

11.7
(.60)

13.3
(.77)

5.7
(1.2)

13.0
(1.0)

8.1
(1.6)

Mid-sized
central city

—

—

—

—

—

—

17.0
(.75)

17.8
(.72)

14.0
(.63)

14.
(1-4)

18.3
(1.3)

15.4
(1.7)

Rural

30.5
(1.2)

22.3
(.74)

19.0
(.73)

39.9
(1.9)

24.3
(1.5)

25.2
(1.6)

26.2
(.93)

16.1
(.55)

16.0
(.76)

38.2
(1.6)

16.9
(1.1)

21.1
(1.7)

Starting pay
($1,000)

17.5
(.03)

18.3
(.04)

18.9
(-04)

17.3
(.07)

18.2
(.07)

19.1
(.07)

20.0
(.05)

22.0
(.08)

21.7
(.08)

19.8
(.12)

21.9
(.11)

20.8
(.13)

SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Surveys, 1987-88 and 1990-91. Experienced teachers in 1987-88 = more than three years' experience; in 1990-91, more
than six years' experience. New teachers = three or fewer years' experience in both samples. Standard errors in parentheses.
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teacher is only half as likely to be of high quality (by whatever indica
tor), the difference would cause the representation of high-quality
teachers in the new workforce (vis-a-vis the experienced workforce) to
fall by only 5 percent (= 50 percent of .10). This would reduce their
share of the workforce from, say, 20 percent to 19 percent. Thus, the
fact that more job opportunities in high-growth states arose in rural dis
tricts would have, by itself, only a very small effect on the measured
quality of new recruits. Moreover, this illustrative calculation probably
overstates the true impact. The incidence of most of our quality indica
tors varies only slightly from rural to nonrural districts: ratios are
nearer 1:1 than 1:2. Recruitment effects involving such minute frac
tions of the workforce cannot explain our findings.
We note finally that there are virtually no differences between expe
rienced and new teachers with respect to district starting salaries. New
teachers have not been channeled into jobs in the lowest-paying dis
tricts.
Teacher Salaries and the Ratings Principals Give Their Staffs

It remains possible, of course, that higher salaries have improved
teacher recruitment in ways unrelated to these indicators of teacher
quality. As noted in chapter 2, the 1990-91 SASS requested principals
to rate the quality of their teaching staffs on a five-point scale (poor =
1, excellent = 5). Principals were free to evaluate teachers by whatever
criteria they chose and presumably selected those most relevant to the
needs of their schools as they saw them. A particularly valuable feature
of the survey was the inclusion of separate ratings for experienced
teachers (more than three years' experience) and new staff.
Overall, experienced teachers received higher ratings than new staff.
The question of interest is whether the difference diminishes in states
that raised salaries the most. Figure 3.12 depicts the ratings of new and
experienced staff, by state salary growth. While ratings given experi
enced staff were quite similar across all three groups, new teachers
were, indeed, more likely to be rated "excellent" in states with high
salary growth.
Since ratings were obtained from each school in the SASS, it is pos
sible to explore this relationship in greater detail. We estimate two
models. In the first, the ratings given new teachers are assumed to be a
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Figure 3.12 Principals© Ratings of Their Staffs, by Salary Growth
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function of the relative growth of teacher salaries at the state level and
the rating given the school's experienced staff. Because there are more
than 8,000 public schools in the sample, we are able to use the actual
measure of salary growth within the state rather than a three-way clas
sification. This allows us to estimate with greater precision the contri
bution of salary growth to new teacher ratings. By including the ratings
given experienced teachers in the same school, we implicitly control
for other factors that influence ratings, including idiosyncrasies in the
standards of the evaluator. In our second model, we include as addi
tional background controls the school and community characteristics
examined in table 3.1.
The resulting estimates confirm the impression given by figure 3.12.
(Details appear in appendix 3C.) Other things equal, new teachers are
more often rated "excellent" in the states that have raised relative sala
ries the most. Yet while the effect of salary growth is in the right direc
tion, it is not statistically significant. In addition, the effect is modest. A
20 percent increase in relative pay raises the estimated proportion of
schools in which new teachers are rated "excellent" by less than 2 per
centage points.

Testing for Bias and Robustness
Our analysis has shown that while the quality of new teacher
recruits improved somewhat during the 1980s, this improvement had
little or nothing to do with increases in teacher pay. These findings are
disappointing from a policy standpoint. They are also surprising from
the perspective of economic theory, since one would expect higher sal
aries to affect career choices. This suggests that we would do well to
consider sources of possible bias. In particular, our assessment of the
impact of higher salaries has been based almost entirely on a compari
son of new teachers to experienced teachers. For several reasons, one
might suspect that this comparison will not reveal what it is intended
to.
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Resumed Careers

Our experienced teacher category has included persons who
recently resumed teaching careers. If higher salaries induced these per
sons to take up teaching again, it would make more sense to group
returning teachers with new entrants into the profession. To see
whether this matters, we reclassify former teachers who reentered the
profession after 1984 as "new" teachers. 8 This change has virtually no
effect on the measured incidence of our quality indicators. Our analysis
continues to show as much improvement in states with low and moder
ate salary growth as in states where teacher pay rose the most.
Cohort Effects

Many experienced instructors started teaching well before the
decline in teacher salaries during the late 1970s. Since these persons
might not resemble teachers who entered when salaries were low, their
inclusion with other experienced teachers skews the comparison we
wish to make. A fairer test would exclude them.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to construct precisely this
comparison group. Instead, we exclude all persons who had ten or
more years' experience in 1987-88. This will screen out most teachers
who began their careers before the downturn in salaries. Moreover,
those who slip through this screen are unlikely to have begun teaching
much earlier than the mid-70s, since relatively few persons return to
teaching after long interruptions (Murnane et al. 1991).
This change has a substantial effect on only one indicator, the per
centage of experienced secondary school teachers with an academic
major, which falls by 3 to 5 percentage points. Since the magnitude of
this decline is independent of salary growth, our earlier conclusions
stand.
Out of State Recruits

Teachers may move from states that have not raised pay to those that
have. If better teachers tend to be more mobile, the quality of the expe
rienced workforce rises in the recipient state and falls in the donor
state. Both responses obscure the consequences of salary growth by
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shifting the quality of the experienced workforce in the same hypothe
sized direction as the quality of new recruits.
It turns out, however, that the number of teachers who move across
state boundaries is too small to affect our findings. Fewer than 2 per
cent of the experienced teachers in 1987-88 gave up a teaching position
in another state to begin their current jobs. Moreover, this figure
includes all moves, not merely those subsequent to the onset of salary
reforms. When we test the explanatory power of this hypothesis by
excluding out-of-state movers from the comparison groups, there are
virtually no changes in the values of our quality indicators.
Attrition Bias

Higher pay lowers attrition. If better teachers are more sensitive to
salary levels in deciding whether to quit, their share of the experienced
workforce will rise. This, of course, makes it more difficult to detect a
relative improvement in the quality of new recruits.
Could this explain why high growth states do not appear to have had
more success recruiting new teachers? Note that our experienced
teachers were all hired before the 1985-86 school year. For salary
reforms that began in the early 1980s to have much impact on the com
position of this group via differential attrition, quit rates of better
teachers must be considerably more salary-sensitive than those of other
instructors. Yet Murnane and Olsen (1990) found that the exit decisions
of North Carolina teachers with high scores on the National Teachers
Examination were actually less responsive to salary than were the deci
sions of teachers with lower scores. Our own investigation of data from
the SASS Teacher Follow-Up Survey finds no statistically significant
difference between the exit elasticities of teachers who attended selec
tive colleges and others (Ballou and Podgursky 1993a).
In addition, attrition among experienced teachers is not very large.
Even if wage elasticities did vary by teacher quality, the base quit rate
is too low to produce a significant impact on the workforce in a span of
three to four years.
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Omitted Policy Variables
Pay raises were not the only education reforms undertaken during
the 1980s. Many states also raised standards for teacher training and
certification. Thus states that did not increase salaries may have
improved recruitment through other means. This would be particularly
likely if policy makers tended to view pay raises and higher standards
as alternatives, with some states choosing the first route, others the sec
ond.
Several states now require that secondary school teachers have an
undergraduate major in their principal subject area (NASDTEC 1991).
To see whether the impact of this change could be confounded with
that of salary growth, we sort states into two new classifications, those
where such a requirement was in place in 1990-91, and the rest.
Although salary growth was somewhat higher among the latter, the dif
ference was not great (13 percent versus 10 percent). Thus it does not
appear that salary reforms/higher standards constituted an either-or
choice. Just as important, these requirements have had little effect on
the qualifications of new teachers. The percentage of new secondary
school teachers in the 1990-91 SASS who majored in an academic sub
ject in college was virtually identical across the two groups: 41.6 per
cent and 41.5 percent, respectively. Whether this is the result of weak
enforcement or the slow phasing-in of new requirements, it does not
appear that omitting this policy reform from the analysis has biased our
earlier findings.
We also test whether our results are sensitive to changes in classifi
cation schemes and definitions. We begin with salary growth. In our
first test, teacher salaries are measured relative to a simple average (not
a gender-weighted average) of the salaries of college graduates. This
has little effect on measured growth rates. As a second alternative, we
measure the growth in teacher salaries relative to the national Con
sumer Price Index. These calculations are of particular interest if the
decision to enter teaching is based not on a comparison of relative
earnings but on the ability to attain a target standard of living. Measur
ing the growth in teaching salaries this way considerably alters the
classification of states by "high," "moderate," and "low" rates of salary
growth. However, there is still no evidence that high growth states have
systematically outperformed others.
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Reverting to the original measure of relative salary, we alter the endpoints of the interval over which we measure salary changes, in the one
case using 1978 and 1990, in the other, 1980 and 1988.9 These changes
make only slight differences to our results. Next, we restrict the cate
gory of new teachers in 1987-88 to persons with no more than two
years' experience. We then expand this category to include persons
with four years' experience. Finally, we restrict the experienced group
to persons with seven or more years' experience in 1990-91.
Results are generally quite robust to these respecifications. In the
few cases where measures of teacher quality change significantly, these
changes do not systematically favor the high growth states.

Conclusion
The evidence reviewed here indicates that the quality of new recruits
to teaching improved during the 1980s. SAT scores rose among high
school seniors intending to major in education. New teachers hired
during this decade were more likely to have majored in an academic
subject, especially mathematics or science. However, there was little if
any gain by other indicators, among them teachers' undergraduate
GPA and the quality of the colleges they attended.
These improvements do not appear to be related to salary increases.
By virtually all indicators, progress has been independent of the rate of
salary growth at the state level. The single exception is provided by
principals' ratings of the staffs in the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing
Survey. Even in this case, however, the practical import of this relation
ship is limited: a 20 percent increase in teachers' salaries raises the
share of schools with "excellent" new teachers by less than 2 percent
age points—a statistically insignificant effect.
We have subjected our findings to a number of specification tests.
The results indicate that our conclusions are not the result of obvious
biases that might have affected the statistical analysis. Our findings
also appear to be robust to alternative measurements of salary trends
and to various ways of defining who is to be counted as an experienced
teacher or a new teacher.
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It is possible, of course, that better analytical techniques might
detect a positive relationship between salary growth and the quality of
new teachers. In particular, it might be wondered if we have not placed
too much emphasis on state variation in salary growth. After all, pro
spective teachers may have responded to salary growth in other states,
anticipating that their own state would follow. If so, the national trend
in teacher pay may have had an important influence on career deci
sions. This argument could also account for the fact that the quality of
newly recruited teachers improved nationwide during the 1980s.
There may be some truth to this claim, but we do not believe it pro
vides an adequate explanation for the near absence of a correlation at
the state level between salary growth and improvements in the work
force. Even if prospective teachers thought it likely that their state
would match the growth in salaries elsewhere, one would still expect
an actual boost in pay to carry more weight than one that remained
speculative. Moreover, as time passed, it became clear that not all
states were acting in the same manner.
As for the improvement in teacher quality nationwide, alternative
explanations seem more compelling. In the first place, the job market
improved for teachers during the 1980s. Indeed, there was a well-pub
licized threat of a teacher shortage that probably led many to believe it
would be easier to find a teaching job than it proved to be. In addition,
by the end of this decade, virtually all states had raised standards for
admission to teacher education programs and teacher certification.
Finally, public education received a great deal of attention in the
national media. This may have influenced career decisions.
This is not to say that the analysis presented here will have satisfied
all skeptics. However, we do not believe that much can be gained by
sifting the data further in an effort to confirm or refute our conclusions.
Rather, we would argue that our findings raise, at the very least, serious
doubts about the policy many states have followed. Certainly it would
be unwise simply to assume that raising pay will improve teacher qual
ity. That it should be so difficult to detect any gains from the salary
increases of the 1980s suggests that we need to take a closer look at
what happens in teacher labor markets when salaries rise.
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NOTES
1. Results of this kind have been found in studies using measures of teacher quality similar to
ours (Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994; Ferguson 1991; Chambers 1985). Estimates of hedonic wage
equations for teachers have also shown that teachers with more coursework in their subject areas
(Smith and Lee 1990) and higher scores on a test of verbal ability (Antes and Rosen 1975) earn
more, though the returns are quite modest.(For example, Antos and Rosen found that teachers
who missed 50 percent or more of the test questions earned almost as much (96 percent) as
higher-scoring instructors.) Other research has explored the relationship between teacher salaries
and students' educational outcomes. These studies form part of a much larger literature that
debates the relationship between spending on education and educational outcomes; much of this
literature yields negative conclusions. For a review, see Hanushek (1986).
2. This is not to say that only and all of those high school seniors who intend to major in edu
cation will ultimately become teachers. Indeed, evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey
of 1972 reveals that many of these persons pursued other careers, while many who had different
plans in high school became teachers, at least for a time (Vance and Schlechty 1982). Nonethe
less, even though final career decisions are uncertain, changes in board scores should signal
whether higher salaries have led better students to consider careers in education.
3. We express math and science majors as a percentage of all secondary school teachers, not as
a percentage of those teaching math or science, since the number of math and science teachers is
strongly influenced by policies governing the assignment of teachers outside their areas of certifi
cation. In any event, if there is excess demand for such personnel, a simple measure of their repre
sentation in the workforce should indicate whether recruitment has improved.
4. To obtain these figures, average teachers salaries in each state were divided by a weighted
average of the earnings of full-time workers with four years of college, as reported in the decen
nial census (published statistics for 1980, 5 percent public use sample for 1990). Since teacher
contracts typically run from September to September, academic years 1978-79 and 1988-89 pro
vide the greatest overlap with the periods covered by the census (incomes for 1979 and 1989,
respectively). Teacher salaries are from the Digest of Education Statistics. Weights are derived
from the 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey and reflect the proportions of men and women in
the teaching force of each state in that year.
5. To facilitate comparisons, this tripartite classification is based on relative salary changes
from school years 1978-79 to 1988-89, even though the first SASS was conducted in 1987. The
ranking of states as "high," "middle," or "low" is virtually the same when based on salary changes
through 1987, leaving our conclusions unaltered.
6. Recall that data on teachers' undergraduate colleges are available for the 1987-88 school
years but not for 1990-91. One might wonder if 1987 was too soon after the onset of salary reform
for a response to be apparent. Fortunately, recently released data from the Schools and Staffing
Survey of 1993-94 allow us to check this possibility, since the item on teachers' undergraduate
colleges was restored in the 1992-94 SASS. Although these data arrived too late for us to include
a full analysis of them in this monograph, we have used them to explore the possibility that
improvement appeared with a lag.
Following the analysis for earlier years, we distinguish teachers who were new in 1993-94 (no
more than three years' experience) from those who were experienced. There is no evidence that
states that boosted pay the most over the 1980s benefited from a lagged effect on recruitment in
the early 1990s. For example, among high-growth states, teachers from selective colleges made up
5.1 percent of the new workforce, compared to 4.2 percent of the experienced workforce. But the
difference was just as great in the states with moderate salary growth and substantially greater in
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states with low salary growth, where 11.7 percent of new teachers came from these colleges, com
pared to 7.2 percent of the experienced workforce. (Omitted from this analysis are teachers who
graduated from colleges not in the 1987-88 analysis; this is, however, a negligible proportion of
the workforce, comprising for the most part graduates of foreign universities or small, obscure
American colleges.)
As an alternative check on our findings, we dispense with the new/experienced breakdown and
simply compare the 1993-94 workforce to the 1987-88 workforce. We find very little change in
the composition of the workforce. Two statistics indicate a positive relationship between salary
changes and teacher quality. Among states with low salary growth, the share of teachers from
selective colleges fell from 8.8 to 7.7 percent (significant at 10 percent). In high-growth states, the
proportion of the workforce from above-average colleges grew from 12.3 to 13.7 percent (signifi
cant at 5 percent). There were no other statistically significant changes. Overall there was very lit
tle alteration in the makeup of the workforce between the two surveys. And, of course, these
changes take everything into account: retirement, in-migration, and retention, as well as recruit
ment of new graduates.
7. Because the samples are smaller and more sensitive to sample design, we do not report a
comparable breakdown on GPA data from the SRCG. Our attempts to conduct such an analysis
found that statistics fluctuated implausibly with small changes in the classification of states as
"high," "middle," or "low," and in the period over which relative salary changes are measured.
This was not the case with the data from the SASS.
8. By "former teachers" we mean persons who took up another occupation during the inter
vening years. This includes homemakers but not persons who attended school, since many teach
ers who study during leaves or sabbaticals are pursuing professional development and intend to
return to teaching afterward.
9. For this purpose, we extrapolate earnings of college graduates at the state level beyond the
census year. Extrapolation is based on the rate of change of earnings at the state-level from
Employment and Earnings, Annual State Averages. These data represent earnings of all types of
workers, college-educated and noncollege-educated alike. Nonetheless, year-to-year changes
should reflect local differences in economic conditions affecting economic prospects for all resi
dents of the state.

Appendix 3A
Data Sources
The principal sources of data for this study were the two Schools and Staff
ing Surveys, conducted during the 1987-88 and 1990-91 academic years, and
the series of Surveys of Recent College Graduates, conducted in 1976, 1978,
1981, 1985, and 1991. The purpose of this appendix is not to provide an ex
haustive description of these data, but rather to highlight features of these data
sources of particular importance for this study. Readers desiring more informa
tion about either series may wish to consult the following publications of the
National Center for Education Statistics: Choy et al., Schools and Staffing in
the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1987-88 (NCES 92-120); Choy et al.,
Schools and Staffing in the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1990-91 (NCES
93-146); Frankel and Stowe, New Teachers in the Job Market, 1987 Update
(NCES 90-336).
The Schools and Staffing Surveys
Each Schools and Staffing Survey comprised four questionnaires: (1) a dis
trict (LEA) questionnaire, sent to approximately 5500 public school district of
fices chosen through stratified sampling; (2) a school questionnaire, sent to
selected schools within these districts; (3) an administrator questionnaire, sent
to the principal or headmaster of each of these schools; (4) a teacher question
naire, sent to several teachers at these schools. The number of teachers selected
was a function of school size and grade level. On average, four to six teachers
were sampled per school. For stand-alone private schools, the 1987-88 district
questionnaire was also sent to the school. In the 1990-91 SASS, the district and
school questionnaires were collapsed into one.
In both years surveys were sent to more than 9,000 public and 3,000 private
schools. Response rates were high, averaging more than 90 percent of public
schools and 80 percent of private schools. Just over 56,000 public school teach
ers were surveyed in each year. The 1987-88 sample of private school teachers
was slightly larger, at 11,529, than was the 1990-91 survey, at 9,166. Response
rates among teachers ranged between 80 and 90 percent.
In 1987-88 the teacher questionnaire obtained information on the institution
that awarded the teacher's undergraduate degree and the major program of
study. The first of these items was dropped from the 1990-91 survey. No infor
mation was obtained on other measures of academic achievement, such as un
dergraduate grades and test scores.
In chapter 3 we assess the effect of salary increases on recruitment by com
paring the characteristics of new public school teachers to those of experienced
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teachers. Full-time teachers only are used, thus excluding part-time instructors
and persons who served part-time as administrators. Unfortunately, the number
of new teachers surveyed in a given state tended to be small (often less than
100). As a result, state-level, aggregates are far too noisy to conduct analysis at
this level. Instead, we group states into those that experienced high growth,
moderate growth, and low growth in teacher salaries.
The school component of the SASS provides information on student and
community characteristics, which we use as indicators of job attractiveness in
table 3.1.
We also make considerable use of the SASS in chapter 6, to compare com
pensation and personnel policies across public and private schools. On virtual
ly every point of interest, inconsistencies in the items covered between survey
years generally prevented us from pooling data from the two surveys. Even so,
estimates are generally precise enough to provide a clear picture of differences
between the two sectors.
Surveys of Recent College Graduates
Six surveys were conducted at irregular intervals between the years 1976
and 1991. Surveys were conducted in spring of the year following graduation.
Thus, respondents to the 1976 survey were individuals who graduated between
July 1, 1974 and June 30, 1975. Only recipients of bachelor's and master's de
grees were surveyed. Our analysis uses responses of the former. The number
of respondents varied from a low of 4,350 in the first year of the survey to a
high of 17,276 in 1987. Teachers were oversampled, since a principal purpose
of these surveys was to investigate the flow of newly trained teachers onto the
job market.
The SRCG sample was obtained first by selecting a group of colleges and
universities, who provided a list of recent graduates from which the survey
sample was chosen. In 1987 and 1991, for example, 400 institutions were cho
sen. Earlier waves of the survey used fewer schools. As a result of this survey
design, the SRCG samples exhibit strong effects of clustering. Changes in the
list of institutions surveyed can have a considerable impact on statistics com
puted from the data. One must be very cautious in interpreting trends in the data
for graduates who have come from a small set of schools. Statistics like the pro
portion of newly trained teachers who graduated from selective colleges are en
tirely unreliable at the state level; even for groups of states, estimates are
sensitive to the way the group is defined (for example, states experiencing high
growth in teacher pay). Because the estimates are not robust to fairly minor
changes in the composition of groups, we do not report data from the SRCG at
this level.
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Undergraduate GPA is self-reported on an interval scale, giving rise to ques
tions about its reliability on two counts. Of the two problems, the one stemming
from recall bias (or a tendency to enhance one's self-image) appears to be
greater than the measurement error induced by mapping interval responses
back onto a four-point scale. Access to transcript data for the 1987 survey co
hort made it possible to check the accuracy of these self-reported data. We
found a pronounced upward bias (except, of course, for the very best students,
who could not overstate their grades). This effect was greater, the lower a stu
dent's actual grades. As a result, two sorts of measurement error are present.
Imprecision in the responses, particularly when converted to a numerical fourpoint scale, creates a classical errors-in-variables problem, tending to lower the
coefficient on GPA in a regression analysis. However, the fact that the mea
surement error is largely one-sided and inversely correlated with true GPA im
parts an offsetting bias. Analyses of the effects of GPA (and other individual
attributes) on subsequent earnings, one using reported GPA, the other actual
GPA, showed that these effects were almost exactly offsetting, at least in this
particular context.
There were many inconsistencies in the wording of survey items and the
coding of responses from one survey to the next. We briefly review those
which were most important for this study.
In all years but one (1985), new graduates were asked if they had earned a
teaching certificate and, if not, whether they were eligible for a certificate
(meaning, presumably, that they had completed the necessary course work and
student teaching). In 1985 survey subjects were asked only if they were certi
fied or eligible for certification; consequently, we have collapsed the two into
a single category in order to preserve consistency of the data across all survey
years. Where we write of "certified graduates," it should be understood that it
includes persons who may not hold a certificate. This slight ambiguity should
not cause great concern, however, since those with certificates are by far the
larger group. The 1991 survey, for example, found 3,111 certified graduates
and only 127 additional persons who indicated they were eligible but not cer
tified.
Graduates who were certified or eligible for certification were also asked
whether they had applied for a teaching job since or just prior to graduating.
They were not asked whether this was their first choice or whether they had
turned down a teaching position to take a preferred job or to continue their ed
ucation. In order to avoid false inferences that might arise from taking this re
sponse at face-value, we have used other survey items to determine whether an
individual was likely to have turned down a teaching position, as explained in
chapter 4.
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The SRCG inquired whether a teacher worked in a public or a private school
and what grade levels and subjects were taught. Otherwise, no information was
obtained about school characteristics or even school location. Indeed, in only
about one-half of the survey years was the state in which the respondent
worked reported. In other years, only the location of the college they had at
tended was available. To preserve consistency across survey years, college lo
cation is therefore used to place graduates within a state or region. Statements
in the text about new graduates' mobility are based on an analysis of the sur
veys that reported both college and job location.
Survey Design
Both the SASS and SRCG sampling designs exhibit stratification and clus
tering. The SASS particularly oversampled small schools and rural schools. In
addition, the SRCG is a choice-based sample, since new graduates who had
completed a program of teacher education were more likely to be surveyed. Ex
cept where otherwise noted, all statistics reported in this book are computed us
ing sampling weights equal to the inverse probability of selection
Standard errors calculated on the assumption of simple random sampling
are biased if observations from the same stratum or cluster exhibit residual cor
relation. In complex survey designs, it is difficult to specify apriori the covariance matrix of the observations. Instead, resampling techniques can be used to
estimate standard errors of parameter estimates. For statistics obtained from the
Schools and Staffing Surveys, we use the method of balanced repeated replica
tions (Wolter 1985). The only exception is table 6.7, where we report standard
errors obtained from the conventional weighted least squares formula. Levels
of statistical significance are so great in this table that allowing for design ef
fects or heteroscedasticity would not change any of our inferences.
For various reasons, some rather technical, it was not possible to follow the
same procedure for statistics obtained from the Surveys of Recent College
Graduates. Standard errors reported in chapter 4 are obtained from the weight
ed information matrix for maximum likelihood estimates (under the assump
tion of independent observations) or, in the case of linear models, the
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator described in White
(1980). These estimates of standard errors are likely to be biased downward.
This is not as great a cause for concern as might initially appear. Most of our
findings are negative in character—that is, variables that one would have ex
pected to matter are not found to have a statistically significant influence on
outcomes of interest. This would not change if standard errors were corrected
for downward bias. In addition, we are careful not to place great weight in our
argument on statistical results of marginal significance.

Appendix 3B
Components of State-Level Salary Growth
We begin our analysis of state-level changes in teacher salaries by specify
ing a micro-level model of teacher pay:
CD

Wist = t>st + bit NOBAist + b2t MAist + b3t MAPLUSist
+ b4t EXPERist + eist

where wist is the annual base salary received by teacher i in state s and year t,
and
NOB A
MA
MAPLUS
EXPER

= 1 if the teacher does not hold a bachelor's degree;
= 0 otherwise
= 1 if the teacher's holds a master's degree, but nothing
higher;
= 0 otherwise
= 1 if the teacher holds a degree above the master's level;
= 0 otherwise
= years of teaching experience, if < 20;
= 20 if years of experience >20

EXPER is censored at 20 since salary schedules commonly top out after 15-20
years of service.
Equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least squares with data from the 198788 SASS and from the 1990-91 SASS. These results can be used to express
mean teacher pay in each state as
(2) WS)87 = bS;87 + B 87 Xs>87
and
Ws,90 = bs,90 + B 90 Xs,90

in which Xs represents the mean of the regressor vector for state S and Bt the
vector of coefficients in year t. Mean salary growth between 1987 and 1990 can
therefore be decomposed into changes in state intercepts, teacher education and
experience, and coefficients on education and experience:
Ws,90' Ws>87 = (bS)9o-bs>87) + B90 (Xs 90-XS)87) + (B90-B 87) XS)87 .
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Of the three components on the right-hand side of this decomposition, the
change in state means has by far the greatest explanatory power. A regression
of mean salary changes on the change in state intercepts yields an R2 of .95.
This increases to .98 when the second term is added to the model; however, a
regression of mean salary changes on (Xs 90 -XS 87) alone explains only 20 per
cent of the variation in Ws 90 - Ws 87 . We conclude that our three-way classi
fication of states would scarcely be affected if we were to control for state-level
changes in teacher experience and education.
These results also indicate that by far the greater part of the increase in av
erage teacher pay between 1987 and 1990 resulted from upward shifts in salary
schedules and not from movements along existing schedules to higher levels of
teacher education and experience. We expect the same was true of the entire
decade. Data from the quinquennial survey of NEA members (NEA 1992) in
dicate that there was little change in the proportion of teachers with master's
degrees, at least nationally: 49.3 percent of respondents held master's degrees
in 1981, a number that had grown to only 52.6 percent by 1991. Mean years of
experience rose from 13 in 1981 to 15 in 1986, where it remained in 1991.
Since salary regressions indicate that teachers' pay increases by 2.5 to 3 per
cent for each additional year of experience, these data suggest that rising levels
of work force experience could have raised teacher compensation by 5 to 6 per
centage points over this interval (out of a total real increase of 16.5 percent).
However, this calculation substantially overstates the portion of salary growth
due to changes in experience, since much of the increase in the latter occurred
among older career teachers who had already reached the top of their districts'
schedules.

Appendix 3C
Ratings of New Teachers
We assume that principals' underlying assessments of their staffs vary con
tinuously. Survey responses are recorded on a five-point scale, however. The
mapping from the real line to a five-point scale is determined by the position
of the continuous assessment vis-a-vis certain thresholds to be estimated. Thus,
an assessment below the lowest threshold results in a rating of "1," whereas a
latent assessment above the highest of the thresholds yields a rating of "5."
Other ratings correspond to intermediate values. In the first formulation of the
model, only state-level salary growth and the ratings given experienced teach
ers influence the continuous assessment. In the second formulation, the contin
uous assessment is a function of the other school-level variables examined in
table 3.1 as well. By including the ratings given experienced teachers among
the explanatory variables, we effectively ask the same question we have asked
elsewhere in this chapter: to what extent is the quality of new teachers a func
tion of salary growth, given the quality of experienced teachers. Finally, we as
sume that the continuous assessment is also a function of a logistically
distributed error term. The resulting estimator is known as an ordered logit
model, differing from the usual, binary logit in that the dependent variable falls
into one of several ordered categories.
We report two sets of estimates below. To interpret the coefficients, note
that the probability that new teachers receive a rating below "5" is given by
l/[l+exp(-Xb-t4)], where Xb is the inner product of the coefficients and the
explanatory variables and t4 is the highest of four thresholds. Hence a nega
tive component of Xb raises the probability of the highest rating, "5." The
negative coefficient on relative salary growth therefore indicates that new
teachers are more often rated "excellent" in the states that have raised relative
salaries the most. The effect is not, however, statistically significant. Other
variables behave largely as one would expect. High rates of poverty and con
centrations of black and Hispanic students make it more difficult to recruit
good teachers, though the effect of poverty is not statistically significant. Lo
cation in a large central city or a rural area also impairs recruitment. The
starting salary offered teachers with a bachelor's degree and no prior experi
ence has a strong, positive effect on new teacher ratings. This confirms that
higher paying districts have an advantage in teacher recruitment, though as
we remarked above, these gains come at the expense of other districts.
By substituting different values for salary growth into Xb, it is possible to
predict changes in the probability that new teachers receive an excellent rating.
The magnitude of the predicted change depends on the other elements of X. To
obtain the figure reported in the text, we evaluated all X at their actual values
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(except for the hypothesized change in salary growth) and averaged the result
ing changes in the probability that a rating of "5" was given.
Appendix Table 3C.1 Influence of Salary Growth on Principals© Ratings
of New Teachers
(1)

(2)

-.449
(.378)

-.428
(.395)

Explanatory variables
Proportional growth in relative teacher salary, 19801990
Experienced teachers rated 1

-.083
(1.41)

Experienced teachers rated 2

1.03
(.249)

.903
(.289)

Experienced teachers rated 3

1.12
(.091)

1.039
(.100)

Experienced teachers rated 4

1.08
(.068)
—

1.063
(.071)

Proportion of students eligible for free or reduced
price lunch

—

.096
(.188)

Proportion of students who are black or Hispanic

—

1.134
(.146)

Large central city

—

.492
(-120)

Mid-sized central city

—

-.032
(.079)

Rural

—

.393
(.083)

Starting salary for BA, no experience

-.587
(1.20)

-.051
(.014)

Location

Thresholds

Number of observations
-2 Log likelihood

-5.425

-4.913

-3.607

-3.029

-1.625

-1.038

.566

1.260

8,249

7,397

168,034.9

148,166.5

SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey, 1990-91. Standard errors in parentheses.

CHAPTER

What Went Wrong
Attrition, Vacancies, and the Supply of New Teachers

There is little evidence that higher salaries have raised the quality of
newly hired teachers, at least by the indicators of teacher quality we
have examined. This calls for an explanation.
One obvious possibility is that teacher labor supply is simply unre
sponsive to wages. This explanation derives some support from the
small percentage of former teachers who cite low pay as their main
reason for leaving the position (Choy et al. 1992). Nonetheless, we
doubt that the wage elasticity is near zero. Teaching is among the most
highly unionized occupations in the United States, a fact that suggests
compensation is important to many teachers. 1 Fewer than one-half of
the 1987-88 SASS respondents agreed with the statement, "I am satis
fied with my salary." Salaries have been found to have a significant
effect on teacher attrition (Murnane et al. 1991; Mont and Rees 1996).
We present evidence below that salaries also affect the supply of new
teachers.
As we will argue in this chapter, the failure of a high-salary policy
has its origin in certain key features of the labor market for teachers.
These features are the institution of tenure and other forms of job secu
rity, the absence of merit pay or other systems for discriminating
among teachers when awarding pay raises, costly barriers to entering
the profession in the form of certification requirements, and procedures
for screening and hiring job applicants that overlook valuable signals
of teaching effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to describe
how these features of the market systematically interact to thwart pol
icy objectives.
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Teaching Careers: Preparation, Entry, Tenure
America obtains its public school teachers from the ranks of the col
lege-educated who hold teaching certificates. While certification
requirements vary from state to state, as a rule prospective teachers
must complete a specified number of credit hours in the subjects for
which they seek certification and in pedagogical theory and practice.
Prospective teachers are also required to complete a practicum or stu
dent teaching experience under the guidance of an established teacher.
While the majority of newly certified teachers satisfy these require
ments by completing bachelor's degrees in education, this is not the
only program of study that leads to certification. College students who
major in an academic subject (e.g., history) can meet certification
requirements by taking additional courses from a department or school
of education. Since the requirements for a major generally exceed the
subject-area preparation needed for a certificate, the incremental cost
of certification for such individuals is represented by course work in
pedagogy (often known as "professional education") and student
teaching. There are usually twelve to fifteen semester hours of the
former (more for elementary school certification), while student teach
ing often lasts the better part of a semester.
These are not the only routes into the teaching profession. Persons
who have had no undergraduate training in education can become cer
tified in a postgraduate program. Such programs also last a year; many
award a master's degree. In recent years, approximately one-ninth of
newly certified teachers have come onto the market with master's
degrees (Frankel and Stowe 1990). In addition, many states have set up
alternative certification routes, typically to facilitate the entry of older
persons with work histories outside education. These programs allow
such individuals to bypass, or at least postpone, some of the course
work associated with certification. Paid internships or other forms of
probationary employment generally replace the student teaching
practicum. To date these alternative programs have supplied only a
small fraction of the nation's newly hired teachers. We discuss them at
greater length in the next chapter. 2
Virtually all states now test teachers. Some tests are a prerequisite
for admission to a teacher education program, while others are needed
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for certification. Many states use tests at both stages. On the whole,
passing rates appear to be quite high (80-90 percent), though data are
not reported on a consistent basis for all states (Childs and Rudner
1990).
New public school teachers are hired on a probationary status. After
a specified period, typically two or three years, teachers who continue
to be employed by the same district are granted tenure. While the pre
cise significance of tenure varies with state law and the provisions of
collectively bargained contracts, tenure confers important job rights
and makes it difficult and expensive for administrators to remove
instructors on grounds of incompetence. Other laws and contract provi
sions also protect more senior teachers against layoffs.
Virtually all public school districts use salary schedules to determine
teacher compensation. A schedule is essentially a grid specifying sal
ary as a function of experience and education (degrees or credits). All
teachers employed in a district, regardless of grade level or subject
matter, are paid on this basis, hence the term, "single salary schedule."
Teachers typically reach the top of a district's schedule after fifteen to
twenty years' service, though they will continue to receive raises as the
entire schedule shifts upward. Teachers who leave one district to take a
job in another may or may not be credited in full for prior experience
when placed on their new employer's salary schedule; there is consid
erable variation in local practice here, and it can matter whether the
move is within state or across state lines.
Various efforts have been made to change the basis of teacher com
pensation by introducing performance incentives like merit pay. These
reforms have usually been resisted by teacher unions. As a result, merit
pay plans tend to be short-lived. Only about 12 percent of public
school districts use merit pay, and the amounts at stake appear to be
quite small, approximately 2 percent of base pay. (For additional dis
cussion of incentive pay, see chapter 6).
Several features of this career path affect the relationship between
salaries and recruitment. First is the single salary schedule, which
ensures that when teacher salaries are raised to attract more capable
individuals into the profession, all teachers gain.
Second, the institution of tenure and the use of seniority to deter
mine layoffs mean that experienced teachers retain their jobs virtually
at will. If higher pay prolongs their careers, there will be fewer job
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opportunities for newly certified graduates. Note that this is not a
purely transitory phenomenon: the steady-state composition of the
workforce tilts towards older teachers. There are fewer entry-level jobs
in perpetuity.
Third, prospective teachers must invest in an occupation-specific
credential that has no market value outside the teaching profession.
They must do this before knowing whether they will find a job. As a
result, job prospects for new teachers become a relevant consideration
when individuals decide whether to undertake teacher training.

Vacancy Rates and the Supply of New Teachers
Figure 4.1 depicts the flow of newly certified teachers onto the labor
market between 1976 and 1991, during the years in which the Survey
of Recent College Graduates was administered. Flows are measured as
a proportion of all new bachelor's degree recipients to control for cycli
cal fluctuations in the size of the college-age population. Certification
rates fell from 1976 through 1981, stabilized in the mid-1980s, and
turned up again in the late-1980s. Also shown are the percentage of
new graduates employed as full-time public school teachers and the
ratio of their salaries to those of other new graduates working full time.
Certification rates appear to track employment opportunities more
closely than relative pay. Though relative salaries began to rise at the
beginning of the 1980s, the percentage of graduates obtaining teaching
certificates did not increase until more jobs became available. A cur
sory inspection of figure 4.1 suggests, then, that employment opportu
nities are at least as important, and quite possibly more important, than
relative salaries in determining the supply of newly certified teachers.
Figure 4.1 also shows that the number of newly certified graduates
has exceeded the number hired by public schools in every year of the
survey. Although not all newly certified individuals look for teaching
jobs, the number of applicants also exceeds the number hired, pointing
up an important fact: for all the publicity given to teacher shortages,
teacher labor markets typically exhibit excess supply. 3 (There is an
excellent discussion of this issue, including the reasons so many fore
casts were inaccurate, in Barro 1992.) Because there are fewer vacan-

Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality

57

cies than applicants, prospective teachers are not assured of obtaining a
job. The probability of obtaining a job therefore becomes a relevant
consideration when deciding whether to invest time and money com
pleting a program of teacher education.
Figure 4.1 Teacher Pay and Entry into Teaching
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In order to see how large this effect is, we have estimated a probit
model of the supply of newly certified graduates as reported by the
Surveys of Recent College Graduates. The probability that a graduate
has completed a program of teacher education leading to certification
is assumed to be a function of job availability, relative salary, and a
vector of individual attributes (sex, age, race, marital status, and qual
ity indicators). To measure relative salary, we divide the average salary
of new public school teachers by the mean earnings of nonteachers in
the same survey cohort. Since state-level means are very noisy, aver
ages are computed for each census region in each survey year. Due to
data limitations, region corresponds to the location of the college rather
than the graduate's residence or workplace. This ratio may not be the
appropriate measure for persons who relocate after completing school,
though the fact that the great majority of students remain in the same
region suggests that the resulting bias will be slight.4 Intraregional vari
ation in salaries is also omitted from this measure. Lagged rather than
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current values enter the model, as the decision to pursue a program of
teacher education often predates employment by two years or more.
We expect enrollment in teacher education to fall when jobs are hard
to find. Labor market slack is measured as the proportion of applicants
who failed to obtain full-time public school positions in the previous
wave of the survey. Again, this proportion is calculated at the regional
level. Lagged (previous survey) values are used, since prospective
teachers must commit themselves to a program of teacher training
before the market conditions they will face are revealed. 5 Because this
is a regional rather than state-level variable, this measure of job avail
ability raises some of the same concerns as the relative salary variable.
Personal characteristics also influence the decision to teach. Gender,
age, and marital status in particular may serve as proxies for unob
served, nonpecuniary returns to teaching. Regional dummies control
for further unobserved variation in labor market conditions.
Several variables are introduced as measures of the quality of an
applicant's academic background, among them the ranking of the col
lege granting the bachelor's degree and the applicant's undergraduate
grade point average. While these variables are intended to capture the
influence of academic ability on the decision to teach, it is recognized
that they also serve as proxies for personal tastes, since choice of col
lege and the effort made to achieve high grades may well be influenced
by career plans. A dummy variable signifying a degree in mathematics
and science is also included.
Results are presented in the first column of table 4.1. All variables
are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs. Certification
probabilities are responsive both to salaries and job availability. The
implied elasticities are 2.4 for relative salaries and .74 for job availabil
ity. Students with strong academic backgrounds are less likely to com
plete teacher education.
As noted above, both relative salaries and job availability have been
measured imprecisely; while the results clearly indicate that salaries
and job availability both matter, the estimated elasticities are only sug
gestive. In addition, the limited variation in the data (by region and
year only) makes it impossible to interact these regressors with mea
sures of teacher quality, a point of some interest, since we would like to
know whether persons with stronger academic backgrounds are more
sensitive to salaries and job opportunities than others. Unfortunately,

Table 4.1 Influence of Salary and Job Availability on New Teacher Certification

Relative teacher salary, lagged
Job availability, lagged
College quality:
Select
Above-average
Average
GPA
Math or science degree
Interactions with salary:
Select college
Above-average college
Average college
GPA
Math/science degree
Interactions with job availability:
Select college
Above-average college
Average college
GPA
Math/science degree
Male

(1)
All survey years
1.99 (.18)***
.75 (.14)***

(2)
1991 survey
.379 (.36)
1.31 (.98)

-.50 (.03) ***
-.28 (.02) ***
-.04 (.02)
.16 (.02)***
-.27 (.03) ***

-.53 (.06) ***
-.25 (.05)***
-.07 (.04) **
22 (.04) ***
-.01 (.06)

(3)
1991 survey with
quality interactions
1.42(2.30)
7.23 (6.68)
.01 (1.4)
-1.57(1.14)
-1.19 (.87)
1.13 (.79)
-1.66 (.128)

(4)
1991 survey,
noneducation majors
.92 (.51)*
3.39(1.40)**
-.19 (.08)**
-.08 (.06)
-.03 (.06)
.11 (.05)**
.47 (.06) ***

1.41 (1.29)
.44 (.99)
1.08 (.74)
.59 (.70)
2.00(1.08)*

-.54 (.02) ***

-.43 (.04) ***

7.44 (3.43) **
7.75 (2.70) ***
.33 (2.53)
2.90(1.95)
3.20 (3.47)
-.43 (.04) ***

-.20 (.05) ***
(continued)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Married
Married x male
Hispanic
Black
Age
Census regions
Log likelihood
Number of observations

(1)
All survey years
.31 (.02) ***
-.18 (.03)***
.13 (.04) ***
.07 (.03) **
-.00 (.00) **
yes
-19,091.66
49,197

(2)
1991 survey
.36 (.04)***
-.20 (.07)***
.18 (.07)***

(3)
1991 survey with
quality interactions
.36 (.04) ***
-.19 (.07)***
.18 (.07)***

-.04 (.06)
.00 (.00)
yes
^,776.79
12,273

-.03 (.06)
.00 (.00)
yes
^,756.61
12,273

(4)
1991 survey,
noneducation majors
.17 (.06)***
-.11 (.09)
.27 (.09) ***
.24 (.08) **
.00 (.00)
yes
-2,243.31
10,037

SOURCE: Teacher characteristics from Surveys of Recent College Graduates; state average teacher salaries from Digest of Education Statistics; earnings
of colleges graduates from 1990 Census; proportion of new teachers from Schools and Staffing Survey, 1987-88.
Significant at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).

Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality

61

better measures of job opportunities covering this entire period are not
available. Proxies like the growth in enrollment are very imprecise,
since demand for new public school teachers is also a function of turn
over and the extent to which vacancies are filled by other sources of
supply (returning teachers, in-migrants). Data on these determinants of
demand are quite incomplete.
However, useful measures of job opportunities are available for the
end of the 1980s. The 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey furnishes
the number of full-time teachers in each school with fewer than three
years' experience. Aggregated to the state level, these numbers provide
a reasonable measure of demand for the services of new teachers. 6
Since 1990 graduates were deciding on their courses of study at this
time, we use these indicators of demand to investigate certification
rates for that cohort. To control for differences in state size, job avail
ability is defined as the number of newly hired teachers divided by total
public school teacher employment in the state. Relative salary is mea
sured as the average teacher salary divided by the mean earnings of
college-educated workers in each state. Other variables are unchanged
from column one.
Probit estimates appear in columns two, three and four of table 4.1.
In column two, neither salary nor job availability has a statistically sig
nificant effect on certification, though the sample size is, of course,
much smaller than in column one. The effects of grade point average
and college quality are very similar to those reported for the larger
sample. In column three we have interacted both salary and job avail
ability with indicators of teacher quality. Most coefficients have large
standard errors, a consequence of including so many interaction terms.
There are no significant interactions involving salary except for mathe
matics and science graduates, who are more responsive than the aver
age graduate to an increase in teacher pay, though the effect is only
marginally significant. However, a striking pattern emerges with
respect to job availability. Graduates of better colleges are much more
sensitive than others to market conditions. The implied elasticity for
graduates of selective and above average colleges is near unity, though
the large standard errors imply that these estimates should be regarded,
again, as no more than suggestive.7
In the fourth column of table 4.1 we restrict the sample to persons
who did not major in education. Members of this group who obtained
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teacher certification did so while completing an academic major.
Among these students, both salary and job availability have a positive
and statistically significant influence on the decision to acquire certifi
cation. Of the two, job availability has the larger and more important
impact.
In summary, an empirical investigation of certification decisions
shows that the number of students completing teacher education
responds positively to both salaries and job availability, though there is
considerable imprecision in our estimates of the magnitude of these
effects. In addition, job availability appears to be more important to
graduates of better colleges and to students with academic majors, a
point to which we return below.

Teacher Attrition and Job Availability
In practice, salaries and job availability are linked. Higher salaries
reduce turnover among current staff. As exit from the profession falls,
so does the demand for new teachers. Indeed, it did not take long for
school systems that raised pay in the 1980s to see feedback from the
former to the latter.
Even the infusion of new teachers, lured to Rochester by the pub
licized pay increases, was slowed because the high salaries con
vinced older teachers to defer retirement (New York Times, April
10, 1991).

High salaries also jeopardize the job security of new recruits. In Con
necticut, where average teacher pay rose 50 percent in real terms dur
ing the 1980s, high labor costs compelled many towns to lay off their
newest teachers when government revenues fell during the last reces
sion.8
As dramatic as such cases are, the impact of salaries on the exit of
younger teachers is probably more important. Investigating teachers'
career paths in Michigan during the 1970s and 1980s, Richard Murnane and colleagues found that a $4,000 pay raise (in 1988 dollars)
reduced the probability that a teacher would quit at the end of the first
year by one-third.9 The percentage of elementary school teachers esti
mated to teach longer than five years rose from 43 percent to 54 per-
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cent. The gain was even greater for high school teachers, from 27
percent to 42 percent. Median career duration among the latter rose
nearly two years. While Michigan was in some respects an anomalous
case, with many younger persons leaving the state for regions experi
encing greater economic growth, estimates for North Carolina teachers
confirmed that salaries have a strong effect on the duration of teaching
spells. A raise of $4,000 was found to increase median career duration
among high school teachers by three and a half years, with the percent
age of teachers serving five years or longer advancing from 56 percent
to 64 percent.
To illustrate the effect such responses have on the demand for new
teachers, we construct a simple model of the composition, by cohorts,
of the teaching workforce. A representative career is divided into three
segments: an early, seven-year period when exit rates are high, a mid
dle period of twenty-three years when exit rates are low, and a final
period of ten years when exit rates again rise. This is a stylized repre
sentation of the U-shaped pattern found in empirical studies of teacher
attrition (Gilford and Tenenbaum 1990). Baseline values of these exit
rates are chosen so that the proportion of teachers in each cohort
reflects the actual composition of the U.S. workforce as of the mid1970s. (First-year teachers are 6 percent of the total; mean work life is
fourteen years; etc.) Demand for new teachers is set to 10 percent of
each graduating cohort.
We simulate the effect of a pay raise on attrition and new teacher
demand under three sets of assumptions:
1. The impact of higher salaries is felt only during the first phase of
a career. 10 Annual survival rates are assumed to increase by 3 per
cent, generating changes in the length of the work life and the
five-year survival rate roughly equivalent to the effects of a
$4,000 raise on the behavior of Michigan and North Carolina
teachers, as described above.
2. Higher salaries affect exit during the mid-career and final career
phases as well. We assume an increase of only .5 percent in the
one-year survival rate for mid-career teachers. A higher value, 3
percent, is assigned to teachers in the final career phase, reflect
ing the sizable influence of salary increases on the timing of
retirement.
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3. One-year survival rates are increased by 5 percent in the first
career phase, 1 percent in the middle phase, and 3 percent in the
final phase. The implied change in the five-year survival rate
remains within the response observed among North Carolina
teachers to a $4,000 raise.
A complete description of the construction and calibration of the
model is provided in appendix 4A.
Simulated responses are depicted in figure 4.2. Even under our most
conservative assumptions, demand for new teachers falls by 10 percent
initially, by 15 percent after ten years. When changes in survival rates
are larger and more pervasive, as in case three, demand for new teach
ers falls fully one-third. Note that the changes we have assumed in oneyear survival rates are far from extreme. Given that a $4,000 raise rep
resents only 12 percent of the average 1988 salary in Michigan and 16
percent of the mean salary in North Carolina, it is likely that even our
third simulation underestimates the response to salary increases of 20
percent or more in "high-growth" states.
Figure 4.2 Demand for New Teachers, Following a Salary Increase
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Screening and the Quality of Teacher Applicants
Figure 4.2 shows how an increase in teacher salaries feeds back on
the demand for new teachers. Since the supply of new teachers is sensi
tive to job availability, this feedback dampens their response to higher
pay. This analysis does not establish, of course, that raising salaries
does no good. Indeed, with fewer jobs to fill, school districts can be
more selective in their hiring decisions. A pay increase should consti
tute, at worst, a mixed blessing: new teachers of better quality, albeit
fewer of them.
This argument supposes that more capable individuals will continue
to apply despite declining demand for teachers. 11 Given the opportunity
cost of their investment in teacher education, however, these persons
are more likely than the average applicant to pursue an alternative
career when their job prospects deteriorate. Much depends, then, on the
way job applicants are screened. If the market fails to show preference
to better candidates for the jobs that remain, their share of the applicant
pool may fall.
Previous investigations of teachers' entry into the labor market have
provided little systematic information about the way job candidates are
screened. While it has been recognized that newly certified teachers
with the highest test scores and the strongest academic records are less
likely to enter the teaching corps, this phenomenon is generally
explained as a consequence of individual choice: "Presumably, the
most able could have obtained teaching jobs" (Nelson 1985). 12 Infor
mation that would permit a test of this conjecture—the identity of per
sons who actually sought teaching positions—has been missing from
the data sets most often used to investigate the career paths of new
teachers. 13
This is not the case in the Surveys of Recent College Graduates,
which identify job applicants. Figure 4.3 displays certification, applica
tion and entry rates among new bachelor's degree recipients by college
quality. These data exhibit the pattern found in other studies: the higher
the quality of the undergraduate institution, the less likely a student is
to enter a teaching career. This is partly due to differences in applica
tion rates: 75 percent of the certified graduates of selective and aboveaverage schools seek teaching positions, compared to 85 percent else-
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where. A larger share of better educated students select out of the
applicant pool at this stage. However, as figure 4.3 also shows, this pat
tern is not reversed at the next stage, when applicants are screened for
the available positions. Applicants from more selective colleges do not
fare better in the job market; indeed, remarkably, they do somewhat
worse. This pattern also characterizes data disaggregated by survey
years and by region.
If teacher candidates from better colleges are no more successful
than graduates of the least selective colleges, the offsetting effects
described above come into full play. The more capable applicants, who
would be attracted to teaching by higher salaries, are at the same time
discouraged by the reduction in job openings. The poorer their chances
of obtaining a job, the more likely the second effect is to cancel the
first. The net result: little change in the applicant mix and little
improvement in the quality of new recruits.
Evidence presented earlier shows that this is not a remote theoretical
possibility. As reported in table 4.1, certification decisions are more
sensitive to job availability, the better the college attended. It is difficult
to explain why this should be so, unless these graduates felt the effects
of a declining job market. Still, the evidence examined so far is not
wholly persuasive. A variety of confounding factors might obscure the
positive effect that college quality has on job prospects within teach
ing. Since this point is central to our argument, we devote the remain
der of this section to it.
To begin, not all applicants are equally serious about teaching. For
some a teaching job may represent a fallback option should a preferred
job fail to materialize. This may be especially true of applicants from
better colleges. To assess the importance of this phenomenon, we
adjust the figures on job applicants by excluding all persons whose
subsequent activities suggest they may have turned down teaching jobs
(among them, all full-time students). Remaining applicants either
obtained a full-time public school position or gave evidence of an
unsuccessful search in one of the following ways:
1. By working part time despite expressing a preference for fulltime work
2. By taking a teaching job in a private school 14

Figure 4.3 Entry of New Teachers, by College Rank
Employed
Applied
Certified
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3. By working outside their field of study because "no jobs were
available" in their fields
4. By working in a job holding little or no career potential
5. By reporting they were involuntarily unemployed at the time of
the survey (late winter or spring following graduation)
Excluding all job seekers who do not fit one of the preceding
descriptions considerably reduces the number of graduates available
for a teaching job; however, the decline is quite similar across college
rankings. Application rates conditional on certification fall by 20 per
centage points among graduates of selective colleges and by a uniform
15 percentage points in each of the other classes. Substituting adjusted
application rates for the original rates would not, therefore, substan
tially alter inferences based on figure 4.3. Nonetheless, we retain the
distinction between nominal applicants and those meeting the more
restrictive definition for use in further analysis.
It is also possible that graduates of better colleges do not search as
widely for a teaching job and are more particular about the positions
they are willing to take. Although the SRCG do not generally ask
respondents how hard they looked for a job, some relevant information
was reported in the 1976 and 1978 surveys. Persons who sought teach
ing jobs in 1976 were asked how many applications they filed. This
question was asked again in 1978, though only of those applicants who
did not subsequently teach. The results, presented in table 4.2, do not
exhibit a clear-cut relationship between the intensity of job search and
the quality of the undergraduate institution. While graduates of the best
colleges filed fewer applications on average, the difference does not
seem large enough to explain the hiring patterns we have observed.
Teacher trainees from better colleges may also put themselves at a
disadvantage by restricting their job search to a subset of school dis
tricts with superior pay and/or working conditions. To test this hypoth
esis, we look for a positive association between college quality and the
pay and working conditions enjoyed by new public school teachers. In
the first column of table 4.3, we report coefficients from a regression of
teaching salary on dummies for college ranking, controlling for year
and region. (The omitted category is "average.") The results reveal a
slight association between the quality of a new teacher's college and
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that teacher's earnings. (The difference between select and below-aver
age is significant at 10 percent. However, these differences amount to
only a few hundred dollars. When we allow for the fact that teachers
from better colleges are more likely to work in metropolitan areas,
where costs of living are higher, the gap seems trivial. There is little
support here for the notion that teachers from better colleges have, as a
group, held out for jobs offering substantially higher pay.
Table 4.2. Application Rates by College Ranking
Number of applications
College ranking_________1976____________1978"______
Selective
1L716J
Above-average
14.3
14.1
Average
16.6
19.5
Below-average
12.2
19.4
Number of observations
1,804
444
SOURCE: Surveys of Recent College Graduates, 1976 and 1978.
a. Question was asked only of applicants who did not subsequently teach.

Since the SRCG do not obtain information on working conditions,
we turn to the Schools and Staffing Survey of 1987-88.for evidence on
teaching environments. 15 As shown in columns two and three of table
4.3, graduates of better colleges tend to work in schools with smaller
percentages of poor students and higher percentages of students bound
for college. However, the differences by college quality are small, par
ticularly among the top three rankings.
The poverty rate is a proxy for behavioral and learning problems
found more often among low socioeconomic status students. The
Schools and Staffing Survey also asked teachers for a direct assessment
of the severity of the following problems: physical and verbal abuse of
teachers, fighting, pregnancies, vandalism, and the carrying of weap
ons to school. For each of these items, we constructed two measures of
severity, the first indicating that the teacher regarded it as a serious
problem in the school, the second that it was judged a moderate prob
lem. The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic was computed to mea
sure the association between college background and the perceived
severity of each problem. In only three cases—the perception of physi
cal abuse of teachers, verbal abuse of teachers, and vandalism as mod-
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erately severe problems within the school—did this statistic exceed the
10 percent level of significance. Moreover, the association was in the
wrong direction, i.e., teachers from better colleges were more likely to
work in schools in which they found these problems moderately
severe. This is likely due to the fact that more of these graduates work
in large cities.
Table 4.3. Teaching Pay, Working Conditions by College Ranking

College ranking Teaching pay8

Selective
Above-average
Average
Below-average
No. of jobs.

298
(271)
71
(140)
—
-200
(124)
5,208

Student
College
poverty rate"
application ratec
Mean
Mean
(Std. dev.) No. of obs. (Std. dev.) No. of obs.

.286
(.271)
.281
(.251)
.301
(.260)
.354
(.217)
-»-

257
617
1,945
1,163
3,182

.532
(.225)
.532
(.219)
.515
(.213)
.502
(.218)

116
229
745
457
1,547

SOURCES: Surveys of Recent College Graduates; Schools and Staffing Survey 1987-88.
a. Teaching pay coefficients obtained from regression of full-time public school teaching salary
on college ranking, regional and year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedasticity.
b. Student poverty rate = proportion of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
c. College application rate = proportion of graduating seniors applying to college. Calculated for
secondary schools only.

In conclusion, we find virtually no evidence to support the claim
that graduates of better colleges do not find teaching jobs because they
are less willing than others to accept low pay and difficult working
conditions. Still, it is possible that other confounding factors obscure
the relationship between college quality and labor market outcomes. To
assess this hypothesis, we regress the probability that an applicant
obtains a full-time public school teaching position on a set of labor
market conditions and personal characteristics. The latter include
aspects of the candidate's academic background and professional prep
aration—grade point average, certification fields, college quality, major
subject—as well as demographic variables that may influence a hiring
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decision—age, gender, marital status, race, and ethnicity. Two addi
tional variables indicate how much time an individual has had to obtain
a job. The first is the number of months that have elapsed since gradua
tion, the second a binary variable indicating that the applicant did not
receive a teaching certificate until after graduation.
Since the probability that an applicant will receive an offer depends
greatly on the need for new public school teachers, we include various
indicators of demand. Our first measure is the ratio of newly hired
teachers to the size of the graduating cohort. Because there are too few
observations to obtain accurate state-level values, this variable is con
structed as the ratio of regional aggregates. We also use, in place of this
measure, a set of regional and survey year fixed effects. Finally, we
estimate a model containing a full set of state and year interactions,
allowing demand to vary by state and by year.
The sample is limited to persons who meet the more stringent
(adjusted) definition of applicant given above; however, quite similar
results obtain when the sample is based on the original, unadjusted def
inition of a teaching applicant. 16
The first two variants of the model were estimated by probit. Results
were so similar that we report only the first variant in table 4.4 (column
one). The third variant was estimated as a linear probability model due
to the large number of state by year effects (column two). Since the
coefficients of the linear model are easier to interpret and support the
same conclusions as those in column one, our discussion focuses on
them.
The introduction of background controls has, if anything, strength
ened our earlier conclusion. Not only does college quality fail to
improve an applicant's job prospects, there is evidence, albeit margin
ally significant, that graduates of above average and average colleges
fare worse on the job market than graduates of below-average schools
(the omitted category).
Results are only slightly more encouraging with respect to other
aspects of academic background. A degree in mathematics or science
raises an applicant's prospects of success by 8 to 9 percent (the sum of
the coefficients on a math or science major and math or science certifi
cation, statistically significant at 10 percent). However, the effect of a
bachelor's degree in education is equally strong, a disconcerting find
ing, given efforts to recruit more teachers with subject area majors.
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Table 4.4. Influence of Teacher Attributes on Job Offers
Explanatory variables
College rank
Selective
Above-average
Average
Below-average
Undergraduate GPA
Degree in math or science
Degree in education
Certification areas
Early childhood
Elementary
Special education
Math or science
Elementary or early childhood certification
x education degree
Month since graduation
Certification received after graduation
Teacher characteristics
Male
Married

(1)

Probit estimates

(2)
Linear probability
estimates8

.053
(.118)
-.059
(.081)
-.046
(.062)
—
.284***
(.060)
.238
(.159)
.250***
(.094)

.018
(.035)
-.042*
(.025)
-.034*
(.019)
...
.106***
(.015)
.064
(.048)
.087***
(.027)

-.057
(.061)
.085
(.096)
.418***
(.072)
.064
(.083)

-.027
(.016)
.029
(.028)
]47***
C016)
.021
(.020)

-.036
(.096)
.016**
(.007)
-.256***
(.068)

-.011
(.032)
.005***
(.002)
-.097***
(.018)

.090
(.078)
-.074
(.061)

(.020)
-.026**
(.015)

Q4Q**#
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Table 4.4 (continued)
Explanatory variables
Married male
Age
Hispanic
Black
Market demand
Region (omitted west)
NE
NC
South
Newly hired teachers as share of all
graduates
State, year, and state x year interactions

Intercept
Number of observations
2
Log likelihood / R

(1)
Probit estimates
.286**
(.120)
-.001
(.004)
.542***
(.161)
-.034
(.104)

(2)
Linear probability
estimates3
.090***
(.032)
-.001
(.001)
.128***
(.029)
.001
(.027)

— 511***
(.096)
-;436***
(.089)
-.162
(.109)

—

7 03***
(1.97)
no
_1 24***
(.153)
8,940
-1740.99

—

—
—

yes
-.012
(.007)
8,940
.14

SOURCE: Surveys of Recent college Graduates,
a. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity.

Since the model includes an interaction between education majors
and persons with certificates in early childhood and elementary educa
tion, this coefficient applies specifically to applicants for secondary
school positions. The implication is that an individual who wishes to
teach mathematics or science at the secondary school level is better off
majoring in education with a teaching field in math or science than
completing an academic major in one of those disciplines. Of the vari
ables measuring the quality of an applicant's academic record, only
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grade point average has a significant, positive impact on the probability
of a successful job search. It is somewhat curious that school districts
care about grades but not about the quality of the institution or aca
demic program awarding them, an indication that grades may matter as
much for the information they contain about an applicant's affective
characteristics (e.g., diligence) as for the signal they furnish of cogni
tive ability. 17

Recapitulation: Critical Features of the Labor Market
In the introduction to this chapter, we listed several features of the
teacher labor market that interact in ways that undermine the attain
ment of policy objectives. We now restate the argument of the preced
ing pages to highlight their role.
One would expect an industry that raises wages to improve the qual
ity of the workers it recruits in two ways. First, the number of appli
cants rises. Even if there is no change in the average ability of those
applicants, the mere fact that there are more of them permits employers
to be more discriminating about those they hire. In addition, the quality
of the applicant pool improves. The marginal applicants who are
attracted by higher salaries are persons whose reservation wages
exceeded the pay formerly offered by the industry. Unless the skills
required by this industry are wholly idiosyncratic, it is to be expected
that persons who command higher salaries elsewhere will, on average,
perform more capably in this sector as well. Thus there are two chan
nels by which the ability of the workforce rises: one, an increase in the
number of applicants relative to vacancies, allowing employers to raise
the standards job applicants must meet; and two, an influx of more
capable applicants at the margin, raising the quality of the applicant
pool. Under these conditions, it would seem next to impossible for a
salary increase to fail of its purpose.
However, as we have already seen, this argument overlooks some
important features of the teacher labor market. First, public schools
pay teachers on the basis of their experience and their academic cre
dentials—not on the basis of their teaching performance. Pay increases
are not targeted to the type of persons one wants to attract into teaching
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but are delivered across the board. As a result, more older workers
decide to stay on, vacancy rates fall, and the demand for new teachers
declines. Indeed, our calculations indicate that pay raises on the order
of 20 percent could easily diminish the demand for new teachers by
one-third. Nor is it possible to circumvent these consequences by
removing the worst of the older teachers from their jobs—tenure and
other forms ofjob security close this option.
The decline in demand for new teachers will clearly delay any
improvement in the workforce. But the problems are not merely transi
tional. The decline in job openings feeds back on the quality of appli
cants, since it is costly to enter the applicant pool. Prospective public
school teachers are required to spend time and effort acquiring a
license to teach before knowing whether they will have a job. Since
this license is of no value outside the occupation, application rates
become a function of job availability as well as wages. In recent years,
teacher labor markets have been characterized by excess supply. This
situation is exacerbated when salaries rise, for the number of job open
ings declines at the same time the number of job seekers rises. The
effect of excess supply is not neutral when it comes to teacher quality:
the better an individual's options outside teaching, the more costly the
investment in a teaching credential if, in fact, no job materializes.
Thus, persons with attractive options will be less likely to enter the
applicant pool as job opportunities disappear, just as they were more
likely to enter the pool when salary increases made teaching more
competitive with other occupations. Whether they enroll in programs
of teacher education depends critically on how confident they remain
of their own job prospects in a declining market. The evidence exam
ined above suggests they do not feel very confident, and with good rea
son. Applicants from better colleges, as well as graduates of more
rigorous programs of study, have no discernible advantage in the mar
ket for public school positions. As a result, the decline in job openings
poses a significant deterrent to prospective teachers with attractive out
side options.
It is unlikely that this deterrent fully offsets the incentive created by
higher salaries in the first place. On the contrary, there will probably be
more applicants for teaching positions. But—and this is the key
point—there will be more applicants of every type. Since persons with
attractive options outside teaching are more responsive both to the
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incentive and to the deterrent, their share of the applicant pool is not
likely to increase very much. Indeed, under plausible assumptions it
declines, as we show in appendix 4C.
Even this might not matter greatly if school systems concentrated on
hiring the best of those who apply: after all, the need for new teachers
has diminished; districts can be more selective. But districts do not
appear to select on the basis of the indicators of quality we have used.
Indeed, if they did, high-quality applicants need not have been discour
aged in the first place. The result: with no improvement in the applicant
pool, and no marked tendency on the part of districts to select on the
basis of our indicators of quality, there is little or no improvement in
the qualifications of new teachers.

Responses to Skeptics
At this point a skeptic might interrupt as follows: "Your results
merely demonstrate that school officials do not agree with the National
Commission on Excellence in Education and other blue-ribbon task
forces about the criteria to be used in screening teacher applicants. The
commissions thought it was of great importance to hire teachers with
stronger academic records; educational practitioners apparently think
otherwise. The fact that school officials do not give much weight to
these criteria when deciding whom to hire only shows that you have
been looking at the wrong set of characteristics, not that raising pay
has failed to improve the workforce."
However, the mere fact that school districts are not using our indica
tors of quality does not mean the indicators are valueless. It may be,
instead, that the practices of school officials need to change. As noted
in chapter 2, significant positive relationships have been shown
between these indicators of teacher quality and student achievement.
Recall, too, that by principals' own ratings of their new teachers,
higher salaries do not appear to have contributed very much to the
quality of the workforce. Principals in states that have raised pay the
most are only slightly more positive about the new teachers they have
recruited than are principals elsewhere. This finding poses questions
about the value of the information used to make personnel decisions.
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Unfortunately, little is known about the way school districts screen
job applicants. Scholarly research takes the form of case studies and
provides scarcely more than anecdotal evidence (Murnarie et al. 1991;
Gilford and Tenenbaum 1990; Wise et al., 1987). Yet what we know
does not inspire confidence. So far as we can tell, applicants for teach
ing positions are not generally asked to teach a class as part of the
interview process. Some research suggests that school recruiters give
too much weight to the impression an applicant makes during a job
interview, too little to a record of academic achievement assembled
over a period of many years. Webster's (1988) study of hiring and
teacher evaluation in the Dallas school system showed that teachers'
scores on tests of verbal and quantitative ability were the best predic
tors of student achievement test gains; however, interviews and per
sonal references were more important than test scores and transcripts
in determining who was hired. Likewise, a telephone poll of large
urban school systems conducted for the Dallas schools and cited in the
same study found that interviews generally carried the most weight in
the selection of teachers. Results were more negative yet in Perry's
(1981) examination of labor market entry for a small sample of teacher
training graduates in Texas: among those who sought teaching jobs,
there were no significant differences between successful and unsuc
cessful candidates with respect to grade point averages, student teach
ing evaluations, and recommendations.
It could be argued that schools currently overlook applicants with
strong academic records, if such individuals show less promise for
other reasons. One liability is sufficiently well documented to merit
further discussion. As noted in chapter 3, individuals with strong aca
demic backgrounds are more likely to leave teaching within a few
years. Teachers' quit rates are positively related to scores on the SAT
and the NTE (Schlechty and Vance 1981; Murnane and Olsen 1990)
and to college quality (Ballou and Podgursky 1993a). Thus, on this
argument, school officials are right to reject candidates with stronger
academic backgrounds, given the costs of high turnover.
Two propositions need to be distinguished here. The first is that
school officials turn down applicants who are more likely to quit. We
do not doubt that this is factually correct. Whether they have arrived at
the optimal trade-off between turnover and quality is another question.
A few calculations based on a simple model of the makeup of the
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teaching workforce suggest that current practices are far from optimal.
(Details are presented in appendix 4B.)
To keep the analysis simple, we suppose there are two types of
teachers, low quality and high quality. Given the same level of experi
ence, the latter make better teachers. However, they also exhibit higher
rates of attrition. Assumptions about quit behavior are based on the
studies of teacher attrition cited above. Seven-year survival rates
among the low-quality teachers are assumed to range between 50 and
60 percent. High-quality teachers are one-half to two-thirds as likely to
last this long. In addition, we assume that teachers reach full effective
ness after four years, as research on education production functions
indicates that virtually all the gains from experience accrue in the first
few years (Hanushek 1981). Finally, new teachers are assumed to be
only half as effective as they eventually become. Solving the model for
mean teaching effectiveness reveals that preference should be given to
low-quality applicants only if they are at least 96 percent as effective as
a high-quality applicant with the same experience.
This result is highly robust to reasonable changes in the model's
parameters. Lengthening the period during which teachers learn on the
job to seven years lowers the critical ratio by only 5 percentage points,
from 96 percent to 91 percent. Similarly, even if beginning teachers are
only one-fifth as effective as they later become (thus raising the value
of experience), it is optimal to prefer low-quality teachers only if they
are at least 91 percent as effective as applicants of higher quality. Vary
ing turnover rates makes little difference, provided the implied differ
ence in survivor functions remains within the bounds that have been
reported in the literature.
We conclude that while school officials may be motivated by the
desire to hold down turnover, it is exceedingly difficult to defend hiring
practices that give preference to individuals of less initial ability on
these grounds. These are not, of course, the only costs associated with
turnover. Since the mean spell length for teachers of low quality (under
our assumptions) falls between 16 and 18 years, while the mean spell
for high quality teachers lies between 7 and 9 years, keeping a position
staffed with a high-quality teacher will require recruiting almost twice
as often. However, the expected difference—the cost of filling a posi
tion once every 7-9 years instead of once every 16-18 years—appears
to be no more than a trivial addition to the costs schools routinely incur
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in order to deal with turnover. It should also be noted that this analysis
has assumed that once teachers hit their stride, their teaching never
deteriorates thereafter. A more realistic assumption would, of course,
reduce the bias that presently favors low-attrition, low-quality instruc
tors, making it even harder to defend current practices.
In conclusion, it is very difficult to make the case for the optimality
of current hiring practices on the basis of differential turnover rates. On
the contrary, recruiting persons who might teach for a few years (as
opposed to a long career) represents one of the most promising ways to
raise the quality of the workforce.
In a society with abundant opportunities for talented college grad
uates and a tradition of labor market mobility, it will never be pos
sible to persuade two million of them to teach their whole lives.
Public rhetoric that implies personal failure when a teacher leaves
the classroom after successfully teaching for a number of years
may deter many of them from ever setting foot in a classroom
(Murnane et al. 1991).

This does not, of course, exhaust the objections schools might have
to hiring teachers with strong academic records. Rather than attempt to
anticipate all such arguments, let us suppose that these officials are
right. Suppose, then, that the criteria we have been using bear little
relationship to teaching effectiveness, and that they are rightly disre
garded by districts when new teachers are hired. Presumably there are
some other criteria that districts use to assess candidates. 18 One of two
things must be true. Either these criteria are idiosyncratic to teaching
(so that persons who fare well by these measures do not have superior
alternatives outside teaching), or at least some of the characteristics
and traits that make a good teacher enhance one's marketability in
other careers. The first of these alternatives is not very plausible; more
over, if true, it substantially weakens the case for raising teacher sala
ries. Higher pay will increase the number of applicants, but not their
quality—indeed, quality may fall, if the idiosyncratic qualities that
make good teachers (e.g., love of children) are associated with low res
ervation wages. If these qualities are also hard to observe ex ante, as
seems likely given they are unrelated to signals of productivity in other
occupations, an increase in the number of applicants that does not raise
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mean quality leaves schools hiring essentially the same kind of teach
ers as before.
Consider, then, the second alternative, implying that good teachers
must be bid away from other occupations. Everything we have said
about graduates with strong academic records remains true of this
group. In particular, persons with better options outside teaching are
more likely to be deterred by a declining demand for new teachers,
since they will have paid a higher opportunity cost if no job is forth
coming. They will overlook the general decline in job openings only if
they can be confident that their own job prospects remain good. Yet
what grounds can they have for this belief? Note that we are discussing
a career decision on the part of college undergraduates. If good grades
and high test scores do not matter, what indicators of their own
employability will they possess? At the point where the decision must
be made, these individuals will have little else to go on when attempt
ing to assess their chances on the teacher job market. They will not yet
have done any student teaching. They will have had no opportunity to
show instructors in their professional education courses that they pos
sess the commitment, enthusiasm, imagination, etc., that will make
them good teachers. If one's academic record is irrelevant, it becomes
very difficult to assess with any accuracy one's chances on the job mar
ket. This is not to say that only accurate assessments matter. Indeed, it
may be that those who enroll in teacher education are, on the whole,
overly optimistic. But excessive optimism would presumably affect all
types of potential candidates—it is not a mechanism on which we can
rely to select into the applicant pool those who will make the best
teachers.
To this point we have considered arguments that might be raised by
a reader who accepts our analysis of the teacher labor market but
denies that there is anything much to worry about in the way this mar
ket functions. We now turn to a different kind of objection, namely, that
the features of the labor market that we have deemed important cannot
represent more than minor hindrances to efforts to recruit better teach
ers. This argument derives some plausibility than the observation that
nothing in our analysis would seem to pertain uniquely to teacher labor
markets. In all professions, an increase in salary will reduce exit rates,
leading to a drop in demand for new recruits. Other professions, too,
have their licensing requirements, many of them involving much more
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professional education than teaching. Are we arguing for the implausi
ble proposition that no professional workforce can be improved by an
increase in its compensation? Or have we exaggerated the importance
of these factors?
In fact, there are some critical differences between teaching and
other professions. These differences have a substantial effect on the
opportunity costs of professional training and the deterrent posed by a
decline in job openings.
Professions like medicine, law, and accounting offer a broad range
of employment opportunities. At one end are the most prestigious hos
pitals, clinics, and firms offering large salaries and prospects of organi
zational advancement. At the other end are small entrepreneurs in
private practice. When the supply of new professionals rises relative to
demand on the part of established firms, the overflow enters private
practice where conditions are quite competitive. For this very reason it
is difficult to conceive of circumstances that would produce an acrossthe-board increase in incomes together with rising excess supply. If the
best-established firms (hospitals, etc.) offer higher pay in conditions of
stable demand, the resulting increase in supply will drive down
incomes in private practice, which will in turn moderate the supply
response.
In addition, we are aware of no other profession where compensa
tion and contract renewal are so largely divorced from evaluations of
performance as they are in public school teaching. In most cases, when
new recruits enter the employ of established firms, they face extended
probationary periods when their performance is carefully monitored.
Young lawyers at large law firms face highly competitive "up or out"
tournaments in promotion to partner. In other professions, such as den
tistry and veterinary medicine, pay and advancement within the organi
zation are explicitly tied to individual or small group performance.
More generally, the use of performance incentives is widespread
throughout the corporate sector (Milkovich and Newman 1993). Pay
flexibility implies, of course, that efforts to improve the workforce
need not involve across-the-board raises. 19
Since the least successful job seekers can enter private practice, an
investment in professional training is rarely a complete waste. One can
generally earn a living practicing one's profession, though perhaps not
on the scale one hoped for. Matters are quite different in teaching. If a
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newly certified teacher does not obtain a public school job, the invest
ment in acquiring certification is basically wasted. There is virtually no
private practice. There are a limited number of positions in private
schools and in tutoring services (e.g., Sylvan Learning Centers),
though not enough to absorb all unsuccessful applicants for public
school jobs: More important, few of these alternative employment
opportunities require a license. In general, state certification is not
needed to teach in the private sector, nor is it of much help in securing
a teaching job. Even those private schools that nominally require their
teachers to be certified often allow them to earn this license after they
have begun working. Thus, the incentive to undertake an up-front
investment in a teaching license depends critically on the availability of
public school jobs and little else.
Finally, teaching differs significantly from other professions in that
the quality of one's academic record plays a major role in determining
access to the best programs of professional education and the best jobs.
Candidates from the most selective schools (and the top of the class at
these same schools) unquestionably fare better in the market. Rankings
of the programs are well known in the profession and guide recruit
ment. Jobs at the most prestigious law firms, hospitals, or corporations
tend to go to the graduates of the top programs, where admissions are
based, in turn, on undergraduate records and examination scores. Com
pared to students considering teaching careers, those contemplating
careers in law, medicine, accounting, etc. are far better able to assess
their chances of obtaining a high-paid position. As a result, even if high
salaries create an excess number of applicants, clear signals are sent to
the best candidates that their services are still in demand.
Still, it may be that we have attached too much importance to these
factors. Yes, higher salaries may make it harder for new graduates to
find a job. But is it that difficult or costly to obtain a teaching certifi
cate? Implicit in our analysis must be some implausible assumptions—
perhaps that prospective teachers are unusually risk averse, or that they
overestimate the decline in job openings (a mistake that would, pre
sumably, right itself with time).
It is difficult to respond to this objection, as the empirical literature
provides few reliable estimates of key determinants of teacher supply.
There is virtually no research on the importance of job availability;
indeed, it is common to find market-clearing assumptions in both theo-
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retical and empirical models (e.g., Manski 1987; Zarkin 1985). Yet
according to the estimates in table 4.1, demand for new teachers is an
important determinant of certification rates. Indeed, interactions of job
availability with college quality and academic major were more impor
tant than interactions of the same indicators with pay. If these estimates
are taken at face value, they support the conclusion that higher pay will
lower overall applicant quality: larger salaries attract more applicants
of every type (roughly in proportion to their original shares of the
pool), while declining job opportunities selectively screen out the best.
Yet the estimates in table 4.1 are not very precise. Most of them are
based on a single cross-section from 1990. Rather than rest the full
weight of the analysis on these findings, in appendix 4C we present an
alternative examination of the relationship between salaries, job avail
ability, and the career decisions of prospective teachers. The model we
employ assumes risk-neutral agents with perfect knowledge of salaries
and the probability of obtaining a teaching job—thus prospective
teachers are not overreacting in either sense mentioned above. There
are two kinds of teachers: high ability and low ability. The decision to
pursue a teaching career is based on a comparison of the income
derived from teaching (including nonpecuniary benefits) with the
income available from one's best alternative choice. Thanks to the
structure of the model, elasticities of dubious accuracy are not required
to evaluate the effect of raising teacher pay; rather, the data required
are average length of teaching careers, earnings outside education, and
the opportunity cost and out-of-pocket expense of teacher training.
Some assumptions must be made about unobservables, notably the
nonpecuniary returns to teaching. However, extreme assumptions are
not required to generate our central finding, that higher salaries can fail
to produce any improvement in teacher recruitment.
Finally, we return to the possibility that salaries have simply not
increased enough. If teacher supply is not very responsive to salary, or
if teachers are skeptical that wage gains will be preserved, increases in
pay must be larger and more lasting to have a significant impact on
teacher quality.
As we have noted, there is considerable uncertainty about the mag
nitude of salary elasticities, given the lack of reliable data on teacher
supply. Consider, however, the case of Connecticut, where teacher sal
aries rose 50 percent in real terms between 1980 and 1990. Connecti-
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cut teachers are now the highest paid in the nation, earning an average
salary of $48,850 in 1992-93. The policy pursued by Connecticut prob
ably represents the upper bound on what is politically feasible with
respect to teacher pay. Those who continue to call for higher salaries
for teachers can scarcely expect that other states will do more than this.
The result has been a glut of teachers on the market. In the 1992-93
school year Connecticut districts received 559 applications for each
elementary school vacancy. There is excess supply even in such tradi
tionally hard-to-fill subjects as math and science. In the same school
year, districts received 40 applications per vacancy in biology or gen
eral science, 13 for each vacancy in earth or physical sciences.
Between 50 and 100 applications were received for every opening at
the secondary level in humanities, social science, arts, and mathemat
ics (Beaudin 1994-95). While many candidates filed multiple applica
tions, this behavior does not explain away these ratios. A 1993 survey
of newly trained teachers who succeeded in obtaining public school
employment found that half had submitted seven or fewer applications.
The modal response was one, and only 2.6 percent of the respondents
blanketed the state. Many of these individuals worked as substitute
teachers, teacher's aides, or part-time teachers. Indeed, these appear to
be the most important avenues into public school employment; nearly
three-quarters of these teachers indicated they found their current posi
tions through personal networking (substitute or student teaching,
direct contact with the district, information from a colleague or friend)
as opposed to advertisements or placement bulletins.
There can be no doubt that this kind of labor market is discouraging
to prospective teachers.20 When newly trained teachers must take lowpaid, low-status jobs as aides or substitutes, when personal contacts
("who you know") become the most important means for obtaining a
public school position, talented individuals with attractive outside
options are likely to continue to pass up teaching in favor of alternative
careers.
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Conclusion
In chapter 3 we concluded that the salary increases awarded teachers
in the 1980s have done little to improve the workforce. In this chapter
we have looked at the workings of the teacher labor market in an effort
to understand why this policy misfired. Several factors seem to be
responsible, among them an exacerbation of excess supply, resulting in
declining job opportunities for new teachers and an increased likeli
hood that an investment in teacher training would be wasted. The last
factor is not neutral when it comes to teacher quality: the better an indi
vidual's options outside teaching, the more costly the mistake if no job
materializes.
All this might not matter very much if the market signaled the best
prospective teachers that their services remain in demand. This does
not appear to occur. On the contrary, when hiring new teachers, school
districts appear to place little or no weight on measures of academic
achievement and cognitive ability that are valued in other professions.
Several years ago John Chubb and Eric Hanushek anticipated this
discussion in their essay for the Brookings publication, Setting
National Priorities:
Some analysts argue, for example, that higher salaries will
improve the pool of teachers. This argument, with which few
would disagree, does not, however, establish that the quality of
teaching will improve, because it is still necessary to select and to
retain the better people from any enlarged pool. The research on
performance indicates that schools have not developed effective
salary policies. The exact mechanism leading to this result is not
really known; it could be poor selection, poor promotion, or poor
retention. But the outcome is clear (Chubb and Hanushek 1990).

While we would agree with the conclusion of these authors, we believe
the reasons for policy failure have been more obscure than they sup
pose. Precisely because selection is poor and because tenured teachers
are more likely to remain in their jobs when salaries rise, there is no
assurance that even the first objective of salary reform can be achieved,
namely an improvement in the ability of those who seek to become
teachers.
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NOTES
1. In 1988, 19 percent of the U.S. workforce was unionized. The share of public sector
employees was 43 percent. Among public school teachers it was 75 percent (Corme, Hirsch, and
MacPherson 1990).
2. There is also an irregular route into teaching, as virtually all states allow districts facing a
shortage of applicants to hire uncertified teachers on an emergency basis. Continued employment
is contingent on completion of conventional licensing requirements within a set period of time.
According to the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey, fewer than 5 percent of new teachers are
hired on these terms. It is impossible to be more precise, since the item on the SASS refers to
teachers hired on a "provisional" basis. In many states, new teachers certified through traditional
routes are considered to have "provisional" certificates, with a "standard" certificate awarded after
the completion of a certain number of years of service and, in some states, additional education.
This inconsistent terminology may well have resulted in some misclassification of new teachers.
Since the error would have been one-sided, it seems safe to conclude that the proportion of new
teachers with emergency certificates could have been no greater than 5 percent.
3. Although the fact that the aggregate number of applicants exceeds total vacancies does not
imply an absence of shortages, since some areas may have too many applicants while others have
too few, there is little evidence that shortages occur to any significant extent. The 1990-91 Schools
and Staffing Survey reports that qualified candidates were found for more than 99 percent of all
public school teaching positions.
4. The SRCG provide the location of college and workplace in only one-half of the survey
years. When both are available, data indicate that approximately 90 percent of teachers work
within the same region in which they attend college. As one would expect, the proportion is
smaller for graduates of selective colleges, though still over 80 percent.
5. One might think that market conditions at the time of graduation would also matter; how
ever, the costs of pursuing a teaching job at this stage (mailing out resumes, going to interviews)
are considerably smaller than those associated with the investment in training. In fact, they do not
appear to deter applicants even when job prospects are poor. In their responses to the SRCGs, a
negligible proportion of newly certified graduates indicated that they declined to apply for a
teaching job for the reason that "jobs are hard to find."
6. This would not be true had new teacher markets been supply-constrained. However, given
that teacher labor markets have generally been in a state of excess supply, the numbers of new
teachers hired represent demand.
A longer series is not available. Published data provide only the aggregate number of teachers,
not the number newly hired. Since most of the demand for new teachers is replacement demand,
trends in aggregate employment can provide a highly misleading picture of the job market for new
teachers.
7. Additional variants of the model (not reported here) included controls for working condi
tions (weighted averages of the characteristics of the communities and schools where new teach
ers had been hired) and alternative measures of salary (e.g., beginning teacher pay rather than
mean salary). Neither specification changed the central finding on the interactions of job availabil
ity and college quality.
8. "The [Connecticut] Educational Enhancement Act ... is widely identified with higher
teacher salaries. . . . Because retirement benefits are based on a teacher's highest salary during his
last three years on the job, the EEA has had the effect of encouraging teachers to stay on the job
longer. That trend, coupled with municipal budget cuts, will mean some of the younger teachers
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who have been subjected to rigorous standards and testing as part of EEA will be losing their
jobs" (Daily Hampshire Gazette, June 11, 1991).
9. Other controls in the model included age, gender, subject specialty, cohort, race, and district
characteristics.
10. This is in accordance with the finding of Murnane et al., that the effects of salary on attri
tion are limited to the first several years of a teaching career. However, this result is not common
to all studies of teacher attrition. For example, Mont and Rees (1996), estimating separate hazard
functions for a sample of New York state teachers with less than four years' experience and a sec
ond sample of teachers with more than four years' experience, find strong negative effects of sal
ary on quit rates in both groups.
11. The argument of this section is presented in greater detail in Ballou (1996), which includes
several sensitivity tests.
12. A similar explanation was offered when a study of entry by North Carolina teachers
showed that certificants with higher NTE scores were less likely to take a teaching job (Murnane
and Schwinden 1989). While the authors note that the data do not allow them to disentangle the
influence of supply factors from demand factors in accounting for this phenomenon, they surmise
that candidates with higher scores enjoyed better options in the labor market and therefore chose
not to teach.
13. These data sets include the National Longitudinal Survey of 1972 (Vance and Schlechty
1982; Weaver 1979; Nelson 1985) and High School and Beyond (Hanushek and Pace 1995).
14. Since the sample is restricted to certified graduates, this seems to be a reasonable assump
tion. Persons who intended to teach all along in a private school need not, in general, have
invested time and effort obtaining a certificate. Nonetheless, there are some reasons to suspect that
our results may be sensitive to this treatment of private school teachers. We have investigated this
issue using a more complicated version of the model that estimates both the probability that an
individual sought a teaching job and the probability than an offer was received. In this framework,
there is no need to impose the assumption that all certified private school teachers were disap
pointed public sector applicants. The results were robust to this alternative specification. A full
discussion of this and other sensitivity tests is provided in Ballou (1996).
15. To provide results comparable with those from the SRCG, we have restricted the sample to
public school instructors with three or fewer years of experience.
16. As noted above, we have presented elsewhere a two-equation version of the model control
ling for selection into the applicant pool (Ballou 1996). Results from this model are equally nega
tive about the importance of college background in hiring decisions.
17. Interactions of GPA with education major are positive (though the effect of GPA is not sig
nificantly different for education majors and other majors). Thus, education majors are at least as
likely as others to benefit from higher grades. Interactions of GPA with college quality are not sta
tistically significant.
18. Case studies of teacher selection reported in Wise et al. (1987) indicate that these criteria
vary considerably from one school system to another. Principals need to be persuaded that a given
teacher will "fit in" at their schools. There are no overarching criteria that appear to predict
employability across various school systems. If this view is correct, it supports our contention that
prospective teachers find it very hard to assess their own prospects in the market.
19. Teaching salary structures are rigid even by the standards of the civil service, the other
major category of government employees. In the federal Civil Service, for example, entry GS lev
els can be adjusted to permit differentials for professions or fields in greater demand. Once hired,
all employees undergo annual performance appraisals, which determine the rate at which they
progress within a grade or move up grades. Merit pay is used to a limited extent in the GS grades,
more extensively at managerial levels (Milkovich and Wigdor 1991).
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What Went Wrong

20. Although the State of Connecticut claims that salary reforms and stricter licensing stan
dards have led to improvements in the quality of its workforce, it does not report the kind of data
that would allow this claim to be verified. Since 1988-89, the state has published biannual data on
"newly hired" educators, a category that includes former teachers returning to work and teachers
migrating in from other states, as well as those newly trained in Connecticut who were subject to
stricter licensing requirements (Beaudin, various years). This provides a very imperfect basis for
gauging the quality of new teachers, who in both years made up less than 30 percent of the newly
hired. Worse, since salaries of new teachers rose sharply in 1985-86, the state provides no bench
mark for the quality of its workforce prior to the onset of reforms.
Efforts to obtain a more informative breakdown of the data from the Connecticut Department
of Education were not successful. To some extent, we can make good the deficit with data on Con
necticut teachers from the Schools and Staffing Survey of 1987-88. Of 353 full-time public school
teachers with at least three years' experience who responded to the SASS, 10 percent had gradu
ated from selective colleges. An equal percentage had graduated from the institutions we have
termed below-average. How does this compare to the state's survey of its newly hired instructors?
In 1988-89, three years after the sharp up-turn in salaries, the proportion of newly hired teachers
who graduated from selective institutions was 9.6 percent, those from below-average institutions
11.4 percent. Thus, so far as we can determine, there was no improvement over this period. This
changed somewhat by 1990-91, when the proportion of newly hired teachers from selective col
leges rose to 12.3 percent, while the share from "average" colleges dropped by a comparable
amount. There were, however, two confounding factors. Since the number of newly hired teachers
also fell by one-fourth between these two years, it is unclear whether to attribute this change to
changes in supply or greater selectivity in hiring. In addition, the state's economy was severely
affected by the recession of the early 1990s, a circumstance that may have increased the number of
well-qualified applicants for teaching jobs.
The latest published figures are from 1992-93. At this point the state changed its reporting
practices: the latest figures refer not to all "newly hired" but to beginning teachers only. Of this
group, 14 percent had graduated from selective colleges. While this would appear to constitute
evidence of improvement, these figures are not directly comparable to those reported earlier.
Since graduates of the best colleges have higher rates of attrition, they are better-represented
among beginning teachers. Indeed, the state's own published data on teachers newly hired by
urban school systems show as much. In the 1990 school year, 18.2 percent of the experienced
teachers who were newly hired by these districts had attended selective colleges. Among novice
teachers who went to work in the same districts, the share was 28.5 percent. (Unfortunately, the
state provides this breakdown only for these districts in this year.) Indeed, if this difference were
to characterize the state as a whole, and not just its urban school systems, one would expect to see
a much higher share of graduates from selective colleges in the 1992-93 figures. The fact that only
14 percent of newly trained teachers had such a background suggests that quality in this pool actu
ally declined between 1990 and 1992. One must be cautious, of course, in extrapolating patterns
from the urban school systems to the rest of the state. But certainly one would also want to be very
cautious in claiming that the state has seen much improvement in the quality of newly recruited
teachers, at least by this measure.

Appendix 4A
Teacher Attrition and Demand for New Teachers

Model
To analyze the impact of attrition on new teacher demand, we construct a
model of the composition of the workforce by cohorts.
Assumptions:
1. There are T teaching positions, identical with respect to pay scale and
working conditions.
2. An individual's working life lasts M years. Every year a cohort of N work
ers comes onto the labor market, some of whom fill vacancies in order to bring
the workforce back up to T. There are no subsequent opportunities to enter the
occupation.
3. Each teacher makes an annual decision whether to continue teaching. Ex
its are permanent. Thus there are no interrupted spells of employment.
Notation
Ps = the probability that a teacher who has taught for s years decides to re
main a teacher for one more year (hence, Ps is one minus the year s hazard rate)
7it = the probability that an individual remains a teacher at least through t
years (t>l)=IIs=1 , t.,Ps
P = the probability of entering the profession (becoming a first-year teach
er);
T = the total number of teaching positions to be filled
N = the size of a graduating cohort (normalized to one)
M = maximum length of a teaching career (=40 years)
We assume that empirical frequencies equal the corresponding probabilities
(a large numbers assumption). It follows that the total size of the workforce in
a steady state satisfies
T = P0[Zt=2,M 7tt +l],
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where the right-hand side merely sums the (normalized) number of teachers in
each cohort over the number of cohorts active in the workforce. P0, the number
of new teachers, solves as
(1)

P0 = T/[E7Ct +l].

To simulate the impact of a salary change on P0, we make various
assumptions about the effect of higher pay on the Pt, t>0, compute the resulting
7Ct, and use (1) to find the residual demand for new teachers. To project P over
a multiyear period, we iterate this procedure, updating the 7it year by year.
Calibration
The behavioral parameters take the following baseline values:
P. = -7
P2 = .85
P3 through P6 = .95
P7 through P30 = .98
P31 through P40 = .9
In the first simulation, corresponding to the uppermost curve in figure 4.2,
retention probabilities during the first six years are increased by 3 percent (e.g.,
P, increases from .7 to .721). Since the simulation is intended to mimic the im
pact of a 12 percent salary increase on attrition, this is equivalent to assuming
a retention elasticity of .25 during the first phase of a worklife, and 0 thereafter.
The implied five-year survival rate increases from 51 percent to 59 percent, a
change well within the ranges reported in Murnane et al. (1991).
In the second simulation, corresponding to the middle curve in figure 4.2,
we retain the changes made in the first simulation. In addition, P7 through P30
increase to .9849 (an elasticity of .04), while P31 through P40 increase to .927
(an elasticity of .25). The five-year survival rate is unchanged from the first
simulation, since the values of Pt, t<7 have not changed.
In the third simulation, corresponding to the lowest curve in figure 4.2, we
increase Pt, t<7 by 5 percent and Pt for 7 < t < 30 by 1 percent. The five-year
survival rate increases from .51 to .65.
Nonidentical Cohorts
In the foregoing model the workforce initially exhibits a steady-state com
position, in which every cohort follows an identical career trajectory. This tra
jectory is perfectly mirrored in the composition of the workforce: thus there are
more new teachers than second-year teachers, more second-year teachers than

91

third, and so on. This was notably not the appearance of the U.S. workforce in
the 1980s, which contained disproportionately many teachers in mid-career
who were hired during years of rising enrollments. As a check on the relevance
of our initial analysis, we have recalibrated the model allowing for mid-career
cohorts that were 50 percent larger (at the time of entry) than other cohorts now
in the early or late stages of their careers. The results show that the relative de
cline in the demand for new teachers is virtually the same under the modified
model as under the original assumptions.
Reentry of Former Teachers
Assumption 3 abstracts from the fact that many teaching careers are inter
rupted. In a steady state, this is an innocuous abstraction, since we can regard
the retention rates in the model as net of such flows. However, for the purposes
of this analysis, we need to recognize the existence of a pool of former teachers
who would not return to teaching in the absence of a pay raise, but who might
reenter the profession in response to higher salaries. Since reentry further de
presses the demand for newly trained teachers, the estimates we report are up
per bounds on the number of new teachers who will be hired following a pay
raise. Indeed, under the reasonable assumption that turnover will be lower
among reentering teachers (who are already familiar with working conditions)
than among newly trained teachers, demand for the latter will decline by more
than one for each former teacher who returns.

Appendix 4B
A Model of Turnover and Workforce Quality

Description
Denote teachers of low quality as type 1, those of high quality as type 2. Pjt
denotes the probability that a teacher of type i chooses to remain in teaching
another year, given he or she has taught for t - 1 years already, while n-is is the
s-year survival rate, the product of the Pit from t=ltot = s-l. (P;i = 1 by def
inition.) To abstract from temporary withdrawals, teachers who have exited do
not return. Finally, q. denotes teacher quality or effectiveness, varying across
types and over time. During the first years of teaching q. is rising, after which
it stabilizes at a value assumed constant over the rest of the worklife.
The object is to contrast two policies, one staffing a teaching position with
instructors of low quality, the other hiring only high-quality teachers. Mean
quality under a policy of hiring teachers of type i is
Z1=1,40 q it 71 it fL t=l,40 n it
given a worklife of forty years. After n years, teachers of each type reach their
full effectiveness (qj). Effectiveness when first hired is a fraction of this, i.e.,
q. = bq., b < 1. In every year through year n, they gain a constant fraction of
the difference between initial and final effectiveness. (In reality, on-the-job
learning is front-loaded; the assumption that it occurs in constant increments
biases the conclusion in favor of teachers with lower attrition rates.) Effective
ness of type 1 teachers is a constant fraction of the effectiveness of type 2 teach
ers with the same experience: q h = kq for all t, k < 1. Last, the attrition rate
for teachers of low quality is a fraction of that for teachers of high quality at the
same point in their careers: Plt= rP2t for all t.
Apart from the P , the key parameters of the model are k, r, n, and b. If we
fix b, n, and r in accordance with the results of investigations of teacher attrition
and the contribution of experience to teacher performance, we can solve for the
value of k (the relative quality of the two types) necessary to justify a policy
that gives preference to low-quality applicants.
Calibration
Values of PJJ are set to produce survival rates consistent with findings in the
literature on attrition (e.g., Murnane et al. 1991). For type 1, P 12 through P17 =
(.85, .85, .95, .95, .98, .98} yielding a seven-year survival rate of .63. Plt re
mains .98 thereafter until t = 30, at which time it drops to .9. The mean spell
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length in teaching is 18.6 years. To obtain values for type 2, r is set to .9 for the
first six years, thereafter to .95. This gives a seven-year survival rate of .33 and
a mean spell length of 7.9 years. In the baseline case, b = .5. For sensitivity
analysis it is reset to .2.

Appendix 4C
Wages, Career Choices and the Composition of the Applicant
Pool with Respect to Ability

The Model
We employ a simple model of the prospective teacher's career choice. Al
though actual career choices involve several decisions (whether to enroll in a
teacher education program, whether to apply for a job, whether to accept any
offers), we will collapse these distinctions and speak of a single decision to un
dertake teacher training and pursue a teaching career. This choice is made
while an individual is still in college. We abstract from decisions to enter teach
ing at later stages in one's worklife, though such choices could be included via
straightforward modification of the model.
Certified individuals who obtain a teaching job following graduation have
an expected lifetime income of V, which is a function of teaching salaries plus
nonpecuniary benefits (e.g., long summer vacations); V includes, of course, the
option value of switching to another career at a later point in one's worklife.
There are two alternatives to teaching. Noncertified graduates pursue an al
ternative career from the outset, earning A over the course of a lifetime. Those
who acquire certificates but fail to obtain a teaching job enter a fallback career
in which they earn A-C, where C represents the opportunity cost of teacher
training. 1 Such costs arise because students must forgo other coursework and/
or internships in order to complete the pedagogy courses and student teaching
practicum needed for a certificate. Alternatively, a student may preserve his or
her outside options in full, but only at the cost of prolonging his education in
order to complete additional requirements for certification.
Agents are assumed to maximize expected lifetime earnings, inclusive of
nonpecuniary benefits. A college student therefore elects to pursue a teaching
career when
(1)

jcV + (1-7C)(A-C) > A

where n denotes the probability that a teaching position is obtained ("offer
rate"). To keep the analysis tractable, we make the following simplifying as
sumptions.
1. Individuals are distinguished by two characteristics, a taste for teaching
called the nonpecuniary benefits of teaching, x, and ability, a. E(tlcc) need not
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equal the unconditional expectation E(i); however, we assume that second mo
ments of the distribution of I are independent of a (as would be the case if, for
example, T and a were bivariate normal). The earnings expected in an alterna
tive career and the opportunity costs of certification (A and C, respectively) are
increasing functions of ability but are independent of T.
2. The offer rate, n, is invariant with respect to ability.
3. Teachers earn an annual wage of w and annual nonpecuniary benefits of
T. Both are also assumed constant over time for any individual.
4. The expected length of a teaching career, S, is the same for all persons of
a given level of ability, as are expected earnings when one leaves teaching.
Assumption 1 captures the essential features of this career choice, in which
individuals weigh the satisfaction provided by teaching against the higher fi
nancial rewards that may be available in other occupations. In Assumption 3
we have abstracted from salary growth. The assumption that T is constant over
time is restrictive in this context, but much less so in the refined model present
ed further on.
Assumption 4 is primarily an expositional convenience, since we relax it be
low. It is easiest first, however, to derive our results under this simplification.
It may be worth noting that Assumption 4 is not so far-fetched as it first ap
pears. To be sure, some persons are more drawn to teaching than others and are
likely to remain teachers longer. However, individuals are not well-informed
about the strength of others' interest in teaching, and are therefore unlikely to
know whether their own interest is stronger than average or not. Thus, a pro
spective teacher wondering how long he or she will remain interested in teach
ing might well take the mean spell among persons of his or her own ability level
as a guide.
The assumption that n is independent of ability follows, of course, from our
findings that quality of college attended and academic degrees had no influence
on applicants' chances on the teacher labor market. Thus districts are effective
ly hiring at random. In these circumstances, higher pay can produce an im
provement in the quality of new recruits (by these indicators) only if it raises
the average quality of the applicant pool.
Since our interest is in the composition of the applicant pool by ability, we
select two levels of a, high and low, and conduct the analysis conditional on
these values (represented henceforth by the superscripts H and L). Let S de
note the mean career length of low ability individuals, and S the mean spell
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length among high ability persons. It follows from Assumption 3 that the ex
ante value of a teaching career, V, is equal to
(2)

V^Cw+^s'+b'CM-S1)

i=H,L

where b' represents annual earnings in the career to which the teacher devotes
the other M-S* years of his working life. (Discounting is implicit.) Substituting
V1 into (1) yields the probability that an individual elects a teaching career, P1 ,
as
(3)

pio = Prob(T > (« 1 -n)/n)Cl - S1 w - bCM-S1) + A'yS1).

The term to the right of the inequality represents a threshold value of x, call
it T, which must be exceeded before someone of ability level i decides on a
teaching career; that is,
PO = l,i g (I) dl
where g' is the probability density function of T conditional on a'. Given our
previous assumptions, T will be greater on average among high ability appli
cants than low. Persons with attractive career options who choose to teach do
so because they expect higher job satisfaction; the lower one's ability, the more
likely one is to be attracted by the salary.
We are now in a position to investigate the effect of a wage change on the
composition of the applicant pool by ability. There are two channels by which
higher pay affects P. First, V rises. Second, since job vacancies are declining at
the same time the supply of applicants increases, n falls. This feeds back upon
application decisions. Differentiating P with respect to w and n yields

(4a)

9

and
(4b)

9P/97i= (1/7C2) (d/S1) g'Cc').

Since the applicant pool improves if the increase in application rates is propor
tionately greater among persons of high ability than low, we convert (4a) and
(4b) into partial elasticities,
(5a)e!

=
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(5b) £l n = (1/7C) (CVS1) g'CtX .
Combining these expressions, we obtain the total wage elasticity as
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where the final term represents the elasticity of the offer rate, n, with respect to
the wage.2
L
H
We want to examine the conditions under which e > e , implying a de
terioration in the quality of the applicant pool. The following ratios are useful:
(6a)
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(6b)

(6c)
eHp>w
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Using (5c), we obtain after some algebraic manipulation
(7) eLt>w - eHtjW = e"p)W [k, - 1 + k3(k2-l)e7t,w].
The sign of (7) can be obtained by evaluating the terms inside the square
brackets. Moreover, if the bracketed expression is close to zero, even a large
partial wage elasticity, eHp w is consistent with our finding that higher pay has
produced little change in the composition of the workforce. Teacher supply
might be quite responsive to changes in the wage, yet the full effects of higher
salaries, allowing for feedbacks through n, remain quite small.

Evaluation of elasticities
To evaluate (7), we will identify graduates of the nation's least selective
four-year colleges as "low ability" and graduates of selective institutions as
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"high ability." Data on teacher attrition suggest that the mean teaching career
among type L persons is approximately sixteen years, while the mean among
type H is about nine years. Approximately 60 percent of all applicants have
found full-time public school positions (thus n = .6). The probability that a lowability individual pursues a teaching career is approximately .18, that of a highability person .06. From distributional assumptions, we can back out (to an un
known scalar) the values of g and g implied by these values of PL0 and PH0.
For this purpose, we assume that T is a N([i,o2) variate. Thus g = .26/o, while
g =. 12/CT, where o is the variance of x. Observe that while this unknown scalar
affects the magnitude of e'p w, it drops out of the ratios k k and k
This leaves, finally, the variables C and C , the opportunity costs of acquir
ing a teaching license and applying for teaching positions, and en w, the feed
back of wages on offer rates. The costs of acquiring a license take a variety of
forms. Some students prolong their schooling. Others forgo the chance to take
courses that would enhance their marketability in alternative careers. For those
selecting the former option, Concludes the opportunity cost of the individual's
time over the year required to complete pedagogy courses and student teaching,
plus any out-of-pocket expenses of attending school. Those electing the latter
course of action incur an opportunity cost equal to the value of the courses they
might have taken. This is more difficult to measure, though it is reasonable to
suppose it is positively related to the costs (in tuition and fees) of attending the
institution offering these courses.3 If we suppose that such individuals might
have prolonged their schooling but preferred to complete teacher training with
in a conventional four-year span, it is reasonable to take the cost of an addition
al year of formal education as an upper bound on these costs.
New graduates seeking teaching positions are also likely to experience a pe
riod of enforced idleness as they wait for districts to make hiring decisions.
There may be a protracted spell of underemployment if unsuccessful job seek
ers attempt to work their way into a school system by serving as a substitute
teacher or accept temporary jobs in order to try again the following fall.
Whatever form these costs take, they tend to be higher for students at selec
tive institutions. Studies of the determinants of earnings have found that grad
uates of the best colleges earn 20 percent more than those who attended the
least selective schools (Solmon, 1975; James et al. 1989). The difference in tu
ition and fees between the most selective colleges and the least far exceeds 20
percent, of course, though some students at the former may arrange to complete
pedagogy courses at less-expensive schools in fifth-year programs.
This analysis suggests that the opportunity cost of acquiring certification
will not far exceed the annual earnings of new graduates in entry-level jobs
plus the out-of-pocket costs of an additional year of formal education. In ad
dition, C is at least 1.2 times C . It is likely, however, that this considerably
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understates the true ratio. For many students at nonselective institutions, the
opportunity costs of studying teacher education approach zero (given the deci
sion to attend college in the first place). A study of the transcripts of college
students at seventeen major universities in the south found that elementary
school teachers took two-thirds more education courses than state regulations
required, secondary school teachers nearly one-third more than necessary
(Galambos 1985). The failure of education students to take more challenging
courses in college has led many states to impose such requirements on wouldbe teachers (Toch 1991). Enactment of a binding constraint of this type implies,
of course, that the marginal opportunity cost of enrolling in an education course
is seen as negligible. For students with no realistic prospect of entering another
profession, an education major appears to be an easy way of getting through
college.
On the strength of the foregoing analysis, we assume (conservatively) that
certification costs for high-ability persons are equal to what they might have
earned as teachers during the year required to obtain a certificate, i.e., C = w.
For low-ability individuals, we assume that C is only half this large. We also
comment below on the consequences of relaxing these assumptions.
The final term in (5c) is en w. Since this term is negative, its interaction with
ert lowers the total application rate elasticity. It is straightforward to demon
strate that e,^ equals ev w -ea w, the difference between the elasticities of the va
cancy rate and the application rate with respect to w. As we saw in connection
with figure 4.2, a 12 percent increase in teacher pay might easily lower vacancy
rates by 20-25 percent, at least through the first ten years following the pay
change. This is an understatement of the change in n, of course, since it repre
sents only ev w and ignores any response in application rates. Since ea w is surely
not zero, an estimate of en w = -2 would seem to be conservative.
When these values are substituted into the formulas for k b k2, and k3 ,
eLt w- eHt w is shown to be nearly zero, indicating that essentially no change
takes place in the mix of ability levels in the applicant pool. (Table 1 summa
rizes parameter values and calculations.) This result is, of course, sensitive to
the specific assumptions employed here. Reducing the ratio of CH to CL to 1.3
would raise k2, implying a very slight increase in the share of high ability ap
plicants. On the other hand, if CH were equivalent to two years' income at the
teaching wage of w, rather than one, e\w - eH, w would rise to nearly .23 eHp w
even if CH = 1.3CL, implying an increase in the share of low-ability individu
als in the pool.
Absent better information about the parameters of the model, these results
are suggestive, not definitive. However, this is enough for our purpose, which
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is to show that the claims in the text do not require implausible assumptions
about the behavior of prospective teachers. On the contrary, under quite rea
sonable assumptions, it is apparent that the feedback of higher pay on offer
rates is strong enough to produce the results described in this chapter.
Appendix Table 4C.1. Difference in Total Wage Elasticities
Variable

Low ability

Teaching spell (S)

16

Probability of applying (P0)

.18
.26

Implied value of g
Offer rate
Certification/application costs
Calculation of difference in elasticities:

High ability

.60

9
.06
.12
.60

.5w

w

eLt,w - eHt,w = eHP,w [k, - 1 + k3(kr l)e7I,w] = .006eHp>w,
with k, = .72, k2 = .20, k3 = .185

A Refinement: Fully Optimizing Agents
We now relax Assumption 4 to allow for fully optimizing agents who fore
cast S as a function of their own taste for teaching, T. To do so, we need to im
pose more structure on V while preserving enough of the original simplicity of
the model to obtain interpretable results.
Assumption 4a. Certified individuals anticipate that the length of their
teaching careers will depend on future comparisons of the full teaching income,
W+T, with the income available in the best alternative occupation. The alterna
tive offer for year t is expected to be drawn from a distribution with probability
density function f\. The subscript t indicates that this distribution need not be
stationary. Indeed, it would be reasonable to expect a high degree of serial cor
relation in this series (e.g., bt might be a martingale). College students deciding
whether to pursue teacher education will not, of course, know the future values
of the bt; however, they are assumed to know (or at least have beliefs about)
f1^ As a result, they anticipate teaching in year t with probability
(8)

P't = Prob(w + T>bt) =|W+T f st (b)db.
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The mean of the distribution of b is increasing in ability. Other things equal,
more capable individuals expect to have shorter careers. However, f(b) does
not depend on T. Given ability, taste for teaching conveys no information about
future alternative wage offers.
Assumption 5. Prospective teachers who foresee an interruption in their
teaching careers expect to be able to return to teaching at will (i.e., with an offer
probability of 1).
Assumption 4a makes career length an endogenous function of w and x. The
assumption that i remains constant over time is not as restrictive as appears,
since changes in the attractiveness of teaching vis-a-vis other careers can be in
corporated in the sequence of alternative offers, bt. Note, too, that a high degree
of serial correlation in the bt implies that individuals will tend to sort into one
of two trajectories: those who find out early that teaching is not for them and
exit in the first few years of their worklives, and those who make a career of it.
This closely accords with observed career paths. Assumption 5 makes job
availability an issue only at the beginning of a worklife.
It follows from Assumptions 3, 4a, and 5 that the ex ante value of a teaching
career, V, is equal to
V1 = Z, (w+x)Pt + E(b\ I b^w+r) (l-Pt)
while
(9)

PJ0 = ProbCrcV + ( I-TC)( A'-C) - A1 > 0)

as before. Since V' is monotonically increasing in T while A' and C' are inde
pendent of T,
(10)

rcV1 + (l-rcXA'-CO - Aj = 0

implicitly defines T1 , which is, again, the value of 1 on the margin of indiffer
ence between a teaching career and an alternative career. Thus we can write the
probability that an individual embarks on a teaching career as
P|)

=JTig(T)dT.

It follows that
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and

where 3T'/3w and 3i'/37i are obtained from (10) via the implicit function theo
rem. Since T and w are perfect substitutes, 3T'/3w = -1. It is straightforward to
show that

where S' equals the expected length of a teaching career for marginal applicants
of type i (i.e., those for whom T = T'). Then
(lla)3Pi) /9w =
and
(1 Ib) aPi /dn = (1/Ti2) (CVS1) g(Tj)
which differ from (4a) and (4b) only in that S' is no longer the mean career
length among teachers of type i, but rather the length of a teaching career
among marginal applicants. Note that the simpler model presented above can
be regarded as a special case arising when agents lack sufficient information on
ft(b) to evaluate (8) and therefore set P't equal to the mean among persons of
their own ability level.
Evaluating elasticities in the refined model
Because marginal applicants have lower values of T, they will have shorter
expected spells than inframarginal applicants. Thus it is no longer appropriate
to set SL = 16 and SH = 9. Without more information on the distribution of al
ternative offers, bt, we cannot say how much the marginal values differ from
the average. However, it is possible to establish some useful bounds. Since SL
must be at least as large as SH, setting SL=SH establishes a lower bound on k2 of
CL gL/PL0 =37 .
C"gH/PH0

Similarly, since SH will not exceed the mean career length among type
H teachers, a reasonable lower bound on k3 is given by
CH/97iw = .185.
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Inserting these values into (7), we find that
L
L

t,w

p
_ pH
_
c

-^

c t,w •*

Since this is a lower bound, the implications of the refined model are
very similar to those obtained above. There is not likely to be much
improvement in the composition of the applicant pool; indeed, quality
may deteriorate. For example, if SH at the margin were 7 years, rather
than 9, the lower bound on e\ w - e1] w would rise to .02eHp w.
NOTES
1. C does not capture all the opportunity costs of certification, since teacher training can lower
earnings after a teaching career has ended. Since these latter costs are not relevant for the analysis
here, they are ignored in what follows.
2. It will be evident from (4a) that in differentiating T1 with respect to w, we have ignored any
effect of w on S1 ; that is, the derivative does not include 3S'/9w. This may appear inconsistent with
our claim that higher wages reduce job vacancies by inducing teachers to remain on the job
longer. In fact, as we show below, when fully informed agents choose S as a function of w and i,
the derivative of PQ with respect to w does not contain 3S'/3w. Since the current model can be
regarded as an approximation to a fully optimal decision on the part of an agent with limited
information, it is inappropriate to include such a term here either. (This point is made more explic
itly below.)
3. This may include a consumption value ("a great course from an inspiring lecturer") as well
as the impact on future earnings.
4. In fact, use of entry-level wages understates C, which is the difference in lifetime earnings
associated with having to obtain a teacher's license and wait out the application process for a
teaching job. This cannot be less than the earnings that one might earn during that year; however,
it could well be more, if it delays one's entry onto a career path in which earnings in later years
will considerably exceed entry-level salaries.

CHAPTER

Prospects for Reform
The argument of the preceding chapters can be summarized as fol
lows. Teacher salaries rose substantially during the 1980s. Nationwide,
the mean increase was 20 percent in real terms. In several states
increases exceeded 30 percent. Yet a comparison of new-to-experi
enced instructors turns up little evidence that higher salaries brought
about significant change in the qualifications of persons newly
recruited to the profession over this period. The modest improvements
that occurred were not limited to states where teacher salaries rose the
most, either in real terms or relative to the earnings of other college
graduates; by most measures, there was little if any association
between salary growth and improvements in the quality of teacher
recruits.
The explanation, we believe, resides in various structural features of
the teacher labor market. As a result of rigid pay structures, raises have
been awarded across the board to all teachers, regardless of effective
ness. Because tenured teachers retain their jobs virtually at will, the
predictable consequence is a decline in job availability. This feeds back
on the quantity and quality of applicants for the remaining vacancies
(and, of course, diminishes the inflow of new teachers, delaying any
improvement in the workforce that might occur). Applicant quality is
affected because application is not costless: would-be teachers must
invest in an occupation-specific credential—a teaching license—in
advance of securing a job. The poorer are job prospects, the higher is
the opportunity cost of this investment for those with attractive options
outside teaching. These are, of course, the very persons one hoped to
recruit by raising pay. Were the market to send a strong signal to these
individuals that their services remain in demand, this consequence
might be avoided. But no such signal appears to be sent on a systematic
basis: applicants with the kinds of academic backgrounds that indicate
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command of subject matter and above-average cognitive ability do not
appear to be any more successful than others in their job searches.
Under such circumstances, raising salaries may fail to yield any mea
surable improvement in the workforce.
These features of the market would seem to explain, then, why we
have found it so difficult to detect a positive outcome of the salary
reforms of the 1980s. We do not want to overstate the case, however. At
the close of chapter 3 we acknowledged that higher salaries might have
had some positive effect on teacher recruitment that we were simply
unable to detect. Similarly, despite the negative feedbacks that we
identified in chapter 4, higher salaries may still produce some gains: a
somewhat better applicant pool, more selective hiring, an overall
improvement in the quality of newly recruited teachers, perhaps in
ways that we have found difficult to measure. But whatever has been
accomplished by recent increases in teacher pay (results that appear to
be quite modest, at best), more could have been accomplished if the
labor market for teachers did not exhibit the various structural imper
fections described in the preceding chapter.
This conclusion has important policy implications. On the basis of
the evidence in chapter 3 alone, one might conclude that salary
increases have not been large enough, and that with further increases
the United States will finally begin to recruit the kind of workforce we
desire. American education is often compared unfavorably to public
schooling in nations like Japan and Switzerland, where salaries are
higher and where the academic qualifications of teachers are consider
ably higher than those of American instructors. The case for raising the
salaries of American teachers continues to be pressed, presumably in
the belief that only if we increase pay will our teachers meet compara
ble standards (Bishop 1993; Bok 1993).
This policy prescription is, in our view, a mistake. Given the struc
tural imperfections in the market, further raises are likely only to yield
more of the same results—exceedingly modest if not utterly negligible
improvements—at high cost to taxpayers. In our judgment, further
increases in teacher salaries should be conditional on the removal of
structural impediments in the market, requiring significant changes in
the way teachers are licensed, recruited, and compensated.
We are not the first, of course, to be interested in such changes. Rec
ommendations of this kind have been advanced for a variety of rea-

Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality

107

sons, some having little to do with teacher recruitment. Our purpose
here is not to evaluate all of these claims. Rather, we are interested in
these reforms insofar as they remove the various imperfections and
rigidities in the labor market that have undermined past efforts to
recruit better teachers. With this goal, we examine some of the more
prominent proposals and the efforts to implement them in recent years.
What is the outlook for complementary reforms?

Salary Differentiation
As just noted, when teacher salaries are increased across the board,
job opportunities decline, discouraging prospective applicants and
delaying improvements in the workforce. To avoid these side effects,
raises might be targeted to new teachers, either by paying bonuses to
beginning teachers or by frontloading salary increases onto the first
years of a teaching career. For new recruits who borrowed to finance
their college education, loan forgiveness would serve the same pur
pose.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to design a policy of this kind that will
prove acceptable to a majority of teachers and still solve the problem.
While small bonuses might be tolerated, raising the regular salaries of
new teachers above those of more experienced instructors will not. In
order to preserve a conventional, upward-sloping salary/experience
profile, a large raise for first year teachers will have to be accompanied
by a still substantial (though somewhat smaller) raise for second-year
teachers, and so on. But this largely vitiates the attempt to keep
vacancy rates from dropping, since it is in the first six or seven years of
a teaching career that quit rates are highest. Moreover, even this sort of
salary reform will be unpopular. The median level of experience in the
profession is now fifteen years; a policy that restricted raises to (say)
teachers with no more than ten years' service would leave the majority
with nothing.
Alternatively, salaries could be differentiated on the basis of merit.
Merit pay has had a rocky history in public education (as have other
efforts to differentiate teacher salaries on the basis of specialized
knowledge, market conditions, or superior performance). This is due in
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no small part to the opposition of teacher unions. Unions have lobbied
legislatures against merit pay; when unable to block such measures
outright, they have influenced legislation in ways that promote the
interests of their membership (Uzell 1983; Brandt 1990). At the local
level, unions have opposed school boards and superintendents who
support merit pay (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford, 1994). In the face of
this opposition, merit pay plans that survived have often been con
verted into forms of job enlargement offering extra pay for extra work
(Murnane and Cohen 1986; Cornett 1991). Elsewhere, the size of merit
bonuses have been reduced to the point where administrators often
wonder if plans are worth the time spent on them (Hatry, Greiner, and
Ashford 1994).
The opposition to merit pay does not come from teacher unions
alone. Educators as well as some economists have argued that because
it is difficult to spell out the practices that make someone a good
teacher, administrators are often unable to justify merit awards to their
staffs. The tenuous connection between stated criteria and effective
teaching makes it hard to explain why instructors were denied high rat
ings and bonuses. Those passed over become demoralized and embit
tered, impeding efforts to build effective instructional teams. For these
reasons, merit pay plans that have not evolved into arrangements to pay
teachers for assuming extra duties have often been abandoned within a
few years of their adoption (Murnane and Cohen 1986). In one promi
nent study conducted by the Urban Institute, three-fourths of the dis
tricts that had been using merit pay in 1983 were no longer doing so
when recontacted ten years later (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford, 1994).
Given the negative publicity merit pay has received, it comes as
something of a surprise to find that the record on merit pay is not
unequivocally negative. The same Urban Institute study found many
administrators and teachers who believed that merit pay had a positive
influence on their schools. The fact that most plans have been aban
doned within a few years is not necessarily a sign of ineffectiveness;
plans are abandoned for a variety of reasons, not least of them costs.
Merit pay has been particularly vulnerable during budgetary cutbacks
because it is typically structured as an add-on to base pay. As noted,
plans are also terminated following a change of superintendent or
school board. Merit pay may not "work" because it is opposed by
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unions, but that is not the same as saying it is opposed because it does
not work. 1
Whatever the other problems with merit pay, special difficulties will
beset a policy that relies on merit bonuses to raise the quality of new
recruits. Prospective teachers will discount compensation that is con
tingent on future performance, given uncertainty whether and when
such awards will be made. In addition, to attract significantly better
recruits, the sums involved will need to be substantial. For the policy to
succeed, many new teachers will have to earn more than teachers with
much longer service, effectively creating an unacceptable two-tier
workforce.
An alternative to merit pay would award bonuses on the basis of
measured competencies, a policy termed "pay for knowledge and
skills" (Odden and Conley 1991). Such plans differ from merit pay in
that the desired competencies are specified in advance in terms of
objective criteria (e.g., test scores on subject matter exams). We are
unaware of any large-scale implementation of a compensation policy
of this type. In some respects, such a policy might be an improvement
over merit pay. Clearer criteria for awards would presumably help in
the recruitment of new teachers, who may well know whether they
meet the standard. However, unions would likely be opposed, given
their resistance to the testing of teachers for other purposes. Since
acceptance by rank and file would presumably hinge on the proportion
of teachers deemed to have demonstrated the skill, pressure would
build to set standards that most teachers could pass. Programs of
teacher education could be expected to develop extra courses and practica for teachers who need to be brought up to speed and to exert addi
tional pressure to ensure that persons who completed these courses
were judged to have met the standard.
In summary, while the evidence suggests that compensation could
be more flexible than at present, considerable opposition would need to
be overcome before differentiation of salaries on the basis of ability
could proceed to the point where it solves the problem with which we
began: raising pay without triggering a substantial reduction in job
opportunities. The history of efforts to introduce merit pay and other
performance incentives into public schools does not leave grounds for
much optimism.2 A policy that drew some distinctions among teachers
would be superior to one that relied solely on across-the-board raises to
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attract better teachers, but the difference in practice is likely to be mod
est.

Lowering Entry Barriers
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it will be difficult to raise salaries
without reducing the number of job openings. At a minimum, this will
delay any improvements in the workforce. Yet the effects may be still
worse, if declining job prospects discourage more capable persons
from applying in the first place. Unfortunately, this is only too likely.
Public school teachers must be certified in the subjects they will teach.
As a rule, this credential is earned before prospective teachers know
whether they have jobs. If a position is not forthcoming, the effort to
obtain a certificate is wasted, a consideration that can deter them from
making the investment in the first place. Conversely, if professional
training could be postponed until prospective teachers were assured of
obtaining a job, a decline in job opportunities ought to have little effect
on the number of willing applicants. The fear of making a fruitless
investment in teacher training would no longer deter interested individ
uals.3
The usual route to certification involves college course work in an
approved program of teacher education. Much of this course work may
overlap with that in traditional academic disciplines, especially for
those seeking secondary school certification, but some of it consists of
methods courses (usually termed "professional education") plus a stu
dent teaching internship or practicum. In most states these additional
requirements involve a minimum of eighteen semester hours for high
school teachers (Burks 1987). Elementary school instructors and spe
cial education teachers are usually required to do more.
Though these requirements may not seem very burdensome (espe
cially for secondary school teachers), they can constitute a consider
able barrier to entry. The barrier is obviously greatest for persons who
have already completed an undergraduate degree and who return to
school at a high cost in foregone income. Barriers are also substantial
for students who begin thinking about teaching only towards the end of
their undergraduate years, with courses to make up. Other students
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(e.g., those majoring in the sciences) are often required to take a care
fully sequenced set of courses in order to complete their majors. As a
result, they, too, may find it difficult to schedule the necessary profes
sional education courses within a normal four-year period. If they are
fully resolved on a teaching career, they can circumvent this problem
by taking their subject area courses within a School of Education
(obtaining, for example, a degree in "physics education"), but such a
degree will be much less marketable should they find themselves at any
point looking for a job outside teaching. In states that have increased
required course work in teachers' subject areas, this option may no
longer exist; there may be no alternative to a prolongation of one's
undergraduate education. At the University of Massachusetts, for
example, all prospective secondary school teachers are advised that the
usual program of study leading to certification requires nine semesters.
The best evidence that certification requirements pose a genuine
barrier to entry is the behavior of would-be teachers. Substantial num
bers of noncertified graduates take teaching positions in private schools
for salaries well below those in public schools. Part of the appeal of the
private sector is the absence of entry barriers, offering new graduates a
chance to see whether they like teaching before they go to the expense
of acquiring certification. Still more to the point, as shown in chapter 4,
certification rates are quite responsive to the availability of jobs. If cer
tification were costless (or nearly so), it would be difficult to explain
why job availability affects the number of interested applicants.
If certification requirements were relaxed, public schools would be
able to recruit more widely. One might wonder how much good this
will do, given the evidence presented in chapter 4 that schools do not
recruit optimally at present. However, prospects for improvement are
enhanced given that noncertified applicants are likely to be of higher
ability. The reason is that certification acts as a reverse screen, impos
ing greater costs on individuals with more attractive alternatives to
teaching. This is most clearly true of persons who must return to school
or prolong their undergraduate educations in order to complete addi
tional coursework, but it also characterizes persons who might have
improved their marketability in another career (say, by taking com
puter science courses or learning a second language) had they not been
required to complete professional education courses. The same consid
erations do not arise for students who would not otherwise enter a pro-
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fession and whose alternative occupational choices require no specific
academic training beyond the mere completion of a college degree (if
that). In addition, attrition from teaching rises with academic ability.
Thus, more capable students can anticipate having fewer years in
which to amortize their investment in an occupation-specific creden
tial. Finally, academically talented students are likely to find profes
sional education courses intellectually unsatisfying compared to
traditional liberal arts studies, or, at the very least, to anticipate an
unsatisfactory experience, given the low regard in which such courses
are held.4
To summarize, the barriers to entry posed by certification require
ments are higher for more capable students with attractive career
choices outside education. To attract such persons to teaching, legisla
tures might lower entry barriers in lieu of raising salaries. Or both mea
sures might be enacted together, since a reduction in entry barriers
complements a pay raise by blunting the deterrent effect of a decline in
job openings. Still better results could be achieved by using examina
tions and interviews to identify selected individuals who ought to be
exempted from traditional licensing requirements, thereby raising their
representation in the applicant pool.
What, then, is the justification for requiring certification of public
school teachers? Economists have advanced arguments based on infor
mation and agency problems to support licensing in labor markets that
would otherwise suffer from a suboptimal supply of quality—variants,
essentially, of Akerlof's (1970) analysis of the market for lemons. The
relevance of these analyses for teacher labor markets is doubtful, as
they rest on the assumption that the government possesses information
private buyers lack. In this market, government entities (school dis
tricts) are the buyers of services, and could on principle have access to
the same information about job applicants used by other government
agencies to issue certificates.
Murnane et al. (1991) note that teacher certification has traditionally
been defended as a protection against incompetent or corrupt school
administrators. Indeed, certification was once the primary requirement
for teachers; only later did states expect their teachers to hold a
diploma from a four-year college. In those circumstances, licensing
requirements may indeed have provided some assurance that teachers
would meet a minimum standard of competency. It is far less certain
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they do so today. The indifference of many private school administra
tors to the certification of their faculty (see chapter 6) suggests that this
credential conveys no information about teaching competence that is
not readily available in other forms.5 Indeed, even within public educa
tion there is growing recognition that the entry barriers erected by cer
tification requirements are too high. In recent years, many states have
instituted alternative routes to certification, most often for the purpose
of easing the transition from other occupations into teaching. Although
they differ in details, these alternatives typically allow new teachers to
complete professional education courses while employed on a provi
sional basis in a public school system, usually under the guidance of an
established, mentor teacher. As a result, few of the costs associated
with certification need be incurred until a job is found.
Most alternative certification programs were started recently on a
very small scale. Only ten states certified more than 300 instructors by
alternative routes between 1988 and 1990 (NASDTEC 1991). None
theless, in several of these states, teachers with alternative certification
provided more than 10 percent of all newly hired instructors (Feistritzer and Chester 1993). In these states, at least, a significant number
of public school districts have been willing to hire teachers who lack
prior course work in professional education. Indeed, in Connecticut
alternative route certificants have been more successful in finding
classroom positions than those certified by conventional programs,
though the numbers have been so small (about fifty per year) that it
may be unwise to draw broad conclusions about the demand for such
instructors. Some of the worst fears raised by critics do not appear to
have been borne out. Despite charges that these teachers would not be
adequately prepared for the problems they will face in the classroom,
the retention rate among alternatively certified teachers in New Jersey
has exceeded that of new teachers with traditional licenses (New Jersey
State Department of Education 1991). A study of the alternative certifi
cation program established by the Dallas Independent School District
found that recruits generally out-performed new teachers from tradi
tional programs. They received more favorable ratings from supervis
ing teachers and teacher advisors and outscored traditional certificants
on the exit exams required of teacher training graduates (Lutz and Hutton 1989).
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Despite the promise shown by these programs, most have been
designed in ways that prevent them from playing a much larger role in
the preparation of new teachers. As noted, many programs are small.
Readily identifiable bottlenecks—for example, a limited number of
places in mandatory summer workshops—restrict the number of
entrants. Such workshops themselves can constitute a barrier to entry if
participants are not certain that a job awaits them. The Connecticut
program is a case in point. Participants must complete an eight-week
workshop meeting full-time during the summer, a requirement incom
patible with most forms of full-time employment. Yet there is no guar
antee of a job when the workshop is over; indeed, barely half have
subsequently taught in the state's public schools (Feistritzer and Ches
ter 1993).
Because alternative certification programs were designed to facili
tate mid-career changes, many will not accept individuals who recently
graduated from college (say, within the past five years). This precludes
the participation of a younger, more mobile part of the workforce.
Other programs, created expressly to meet shortages, allow districts to
hire alternatively certified teachers only after a declaration that no reg
ularly certified instructor could be found (Feistritzer and Chester
1993). In many programs, there is a major focus on recruiting minority
teachers for urban schools. While these are worthwhile goals, they
make it clear that alternative certification programs are not primarily
regarded as a vehicle for recruiting bright persons into teaching with
out requiring them to pass through a year of preservice training.
Finally, while lowering entry barriers is an important step, none of
these programs deals with other impediments to the entry of older
teachers, notably salary rigidity. Yet salary flexibility may be essential
to attract individuals who have been successful in other careers.
A more radical reform would permit school districts to hire unli
censed teachers. Limited experimentation is underway with this policy.
Some states permit charter schools to employ noncertified instructors. 6
Texas has recently begun a special program whereby districts may hire
exceptional individuals whose backgrounds have been outside educa
tion. No course work in professional education is required. Contracts
are individually negotiated; salary offers are not constrained by the
schedule. Despite these promising features, it does not appear that this
program will be a significant source of teaching talent. Individuals can
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be hired under this program only after a special petition has been
approved by the Commissioner of Education; reviews are conducted on
a case-by-case basis. According to the Texas Education Agency,
approximately 100 petitions had been received by the start of the 1995
school year. While the agency would not reveal the precise number
approved, we were told that it was far below the number of petitions.
Proposals to reduce or eliminate certification requirements are vig
orously opposed by segments of the education community that benefit
from current practices. These include the faculty of conventional
teacher education programs as well as certified teachers and their
unions. Restrictions on the size of alternative certification programs
and the population of eligible participants may well represent an
accommodation with these interests. Sometimes the accommodation is
blatant: under the alternative program that awards California's Univer
sity Intern Credential, the teachers' union in the district hiring the
intern must approve the application (Feistrizter and Chester 1993).
Similarly, conventional teacher education programs have been given
significant roles in selecting candidates for alternative certification and
designing program requirements. Faculty at these institutions have
shown themselves far less receptive to reforms that by-pass them alto
gether (see, for example, the attack on Teach for America in DarlingHammond 1994). There can be little doubt that these faculty will con
tinue to function as advocates of "teacher professionalization" and to
inculcate their views in the teachers and administrators with whose
training they are entrusted. This raises the prospect that certification (or
the equivalent course work) may remain a de facto prerequisite for
many jobs, even if licensing requirements are reduced or eliminated.
The defense of traditional teacher preparation mounted by faculty in
schools of education should not obscure the central issue. The question
is not whether preservice training provided in programs of teacher edu
cation is valueless (though the attitudes of many administrators in the
private sector suggest that it may be very close to that). Studies demon
strating that new teachers who have passed through traditional pro
grams out-perform those who have not miss the point. Defenders of the
traditional licensing system must do more than show this training is
useful; they must show it is indispensable—that no reliable alternatives
exist to identify individuals whom it would be better to hire without
this previous training than lose to public education altogether.
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Raising Standards
In the previous chapter we argued that an excess supply of teachers
discourages individuals with strong academic backgrounds from pur
suing this career, especially as such persons fare no better on the job
market than other candidates. Yet there would seem to be an obvious
solution to this problem, namely to raise academic standards for teach
ers along with salaries. Ideally, higher standards would improve the job
prospects of better-qualified teachers while better salaries ensure a suf
ficient supply of applicants capable of meeting the new requirements.
Various standards have been proposed: additional postgraduate educa
tion, more course work in subject areas, and a passing score on a
teacher examination. Proponents regularly point to the success of
nations like Japan, where teachers must meet exacting academic stan
dards, and ask why American teachers cannot attain a comparable
degree of professionalism.
Yet we are skeptical that it will prove possible to accomplish much
by raising standards for American teachers, apart from screening out
the illiterate and innumerate. Our skepticism is based in part on the
proposals themselves. There is virtually no evidence, for example, that
postgraduate education enhances teaching effectiveness (Hanushek
1986). While advocates of additional education sometimes have in
mind specific programs of study thought to be especially effective
(e.g., the Holmes Group 1986), such claims often lack evidentiary sup
port. Nor is it clear how to assure high-quality programs in the hun
dreds of institutions that train teachers. On the contrary, requiring
additional years of schooling before one can enter the classroom raises
precisely the entry barrier most discouraging to candidates with a high
opportunity value of time.
Many states have increased subject area course work for secondary
school teachers. Some now require secondary school instructors to
complete undergraduate majors in the subjects they will teach (e.g.,
history rather than social studies or history education). It is too early to
tell what effect this has had on teaching quality. As of 1991, there was
no significant difference between these states and others with respect to
the proportion of new secondary teachers who had earned a degree in
an academic major. Delays in implementation and the grandfathering
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of current trainees have held up progress. The long-term efficacy of
this reform is also uncertain. Consider the requirement that all history
teachers hold a degree in that subject. Well-intentioned though this reg
ulation is, it cannot ensure that the prospective teachers bound by it
will be as well-trained and enthusiastic as those who would have cho
sen to major in history before the regulation took effect. An influx of
prospective teachers into courses they would not otherwise take may
put pressure on academic standards and dilute the quality of training
that history majors formerly received. This is the more likely given the
low college board scores (SAT, ACT) among education majors. This is
not to say that this reform will yield nothing positive. But there will
also be costs, not least of which is the loss of information formerly pro
vided by the self-selection of students into more rigorous and demand
ing majors.
This leaves teacher testing. The last fifteen years have seen a sub
stantial increase in the use of teacher examinations. Virtually all states
now test teachers at least once before they are granted regular licenses.
Some tests are for admission to programs of teacher education; others
are given upon the completion of such programs, as requirements for
certification. Many of these examinations are tests of basic skills. No
one claims that they select into teaching the best and the brightest, only
that they screen out teachers lacking fundamental reading and mathe
matics skills. Virtually all states allow an unlimited number of retakes
on any required teacher examination (NASDTEC 1996). The circum
stances are often remarkably easy. Those taking the California Basic
Education Skills Test (CBEST), for example, are given four hours to
take the test; they can spend all four hours on a single section and com
plete the three sections of the exam in three separate sittings. More
over, it is possible to fail one or even two sections and still pass by
doing sufficiently well on the rest of the test. Of the half-million indi
viduals who have taken this exam, 86 percent have passed. This rate is
by no means exceptional: passing rates of 80-90 percent on teacher
tests are commonplace (Childs and Rudner 1990). It is instructive to
contrast this with the situation in Japan, where every year approxi
mately 200,000 candidates take rigorous prefectural examinations for
40,000 jobs (Leetsma et al. 1987).
As easy as these tests seem to be, teacher examinations have been
opposed by teachers, their unions, and other professional educators.
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Many have expressed concern over high failure rates among minority
candidates; indeed, the State of California has been taken to court on
the grounds that its teacher examination is racially biased. This is by no
means the only instance in which the disparate impact of an examina
tion on minority candidates has resulted in a law suit. It is hard to envi
sion teacher exams becoming any more rigorous in this climate. On the
contrary, the disposition of some of these law suits points in the oppo
site direction, as shown by the settlement of Alien v. Alabama State
Board of Education, in which the state agreed to lower required pass
ing scores. Examinees who failed the tests were to be given a second
opportunity to be certified on the basis of a formula that gave equal
weight to test scores and college grade point averages. Finally, if these
adjustments did not produce a black pass rate equal to 90 percent of the
white rate, the state agreed that additional numbers of black candidates
would be certified (on the basis of class rank) to assure a final certifica
tion rate within 10 percent of the pass rate among whites (Hood and
Parker 1991).
Indeed, if the problem is the failure of school districts to give suffi
cient weight to cognitive ability when hiring new teachers, it is clear
that teacher testing is simply the wrong remedy. Passing scores can
never be raised to the point where schools will be compelled to hire the
brightest teachers. Nor should they be. Opponents of testing argue with
some justice that an individual's eligibility to teach should not rest
solely on performance on a standardized exam. The cognitive skills
measured by these tests are only one predictor of teaching effective
ness. Other attributes also matter in the classroom. More difficult
examinations with higher minimum passing scores would screen out
some teachers whose strengths lie elsewhere. In addition, tougher tests
could produce local shortages. A standard high enough to force some
districts to raise their threshold for new hires might deprive others of
qualified applicants altogether, forcing them to employ permanent sub
stitutes or resort to other stopgap measures that are worse than present
policies.
Unfortunately, a more balanced approach, in which test scores are
weighed with other indicators in the course of teacher selection, does
not seem likely. The Educational Testing Service, which supplies
nearly all of the tests, has validated the NTE (and its successor, the
Praxis Series) for purposes of licensing only, not for hiring or reten-
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tion. School districts using these scores for the latter purposes would
be in violation of ETS' express policy. 7 Moreover, as federal court
decisions require validation of any employment test, such districts
would be exposing themselves to costly legal action.
Let us instead consider an alternative, to raise standards for students.
Indeed, if schools were held accountable for student achievement,
there would presumably be little need for teacher examinations or other
licensing requirements. Schools would choose to employ instructors
capable of raising student test scores (or other agreed-on indicators).
Since it is ultimately student learning that counts, this policy would
appear to accomplish all that could be achieved by stricter licensing
requirements without needlessly tying districts' hands. In addition,
higher standards for students would have a positive effect—so the
argument goes—on the effort of students and teachers. Indeed, it is pri
marily for this reason, and not for their indirect impact on teacher
recruitment, that higher standards are generally advocated.
Educational standards are much in the news as this book goes to
press, and it may be premature to pass judgment on the final shape of
reforms. Yet the obstacles to success seem even greater than in the case
of higher standards for teachers. The testing of students raises the same
concerns about disparate impacts on minorities as does the testing of
teachers, with the difference that these concerns are intensified when
the outcome is something as critical to further educational and eco
nomic opportunities as high school graduation. Perhaps the most
doubtful aspect of this policy lies in the notion that our political system
is capable of Grafting a coherent set of objectives to guide local educa
tion authorities. This was, indeed, just the purpose of Outcomes-Based
Education, a movement that has stalled due to public disapproval of
objectives that seem irrelevant, if not actually inimical, to the aims of
education as various segments of the public conceive them.
Outcomes-Based Education is not the only effort to establish stan
dards for public education that has foundered in the cross-currents of
American politics. When curriculum guidelines for American history
were issued under the Goals 2000 legislation, a furious debate was set
off over the political content of the guidelines, and the U.S. Senate
ended up repudiating the standards by a vote of 99 to 1. The lesson was
not lost on the National Council of Teachers of English, who issued
curriculum guidelines for English that steered clear of specifics,
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prompting this response from a senior advisor to the Secretary of Edu
cation: "The report contains very vague and very general statements
that don't tell parents or students what is important to learn and don't
tell teachers what is important to teach" (New York Times, March 12,
1996). States have also undertaken their own standard-setting exer
cises, but these efforts often fall victim to many of the same political
forces. The task is made all the more difficult by a strong tradition of
local control over schools. According to the American Federation of
Teachers, only thirteen states have developed standards clear enough to
be used as part of a formal curriculum (New York Times, March 27,
1966). As a leading student of education reform has recently observed:
The multiplicity of often conflicting goals, purposes, and inten
tions that have become commonplace in American Education will
make it difficult, if not impossible, to establish high standards.
The politics of education guarantees a veto to a broad assortment
of interest groups, creates entitlements for others, and permits
exceptions for still others. These are the very conditions that cre
ated the current educational system, in which schools expect little
effort from students while offering them inflated grades and selfesteem. It is unlikely that standard-setting activities can be insu
lated from the interest group politics that promotes uniformity of
practice and tolerance of mediocrity (Ravtich 1995).

Suppose, however, that it proved possible to overcome all of these
obstacles and adopt a clear set of standards against which students
would be measured. It still does not follow that teacher recruitment
would improve. Schools might escape accountability if the blame for
student failure could be placed elsewhere. High failure rates might be
masked by manipulating the population of test-takers (e.g., exempting
the learning disabled) or replacing standardized tests with more subjec
tive methods of assessment under the control of teachers (e.g., evaluat
ing student portfolios).
Even if accountability were clearly established, there would remain
questions about the appropriate sanctions. In a market system, a school
that failed its clients would not survive. No such discipline exists
within public education. It has proven to be exceedingly difficult to
withdraw resources from failing schools. Administrators and teachers
in these schools argue (with some justification) that their prospects for
success can only be poorer if they are given less to work with. Such
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measures are easily portrayed as harmful to students. Similar objec
tions apply to policies that do not withdraw resources but rather make
increased funding contingent on improved performance.
This leaves little choice but to hold administrators or teachers indi
vidually accountable. Of course, superintendents and principals are
already largely responsible for improving student outcomes, though in
some states the institution of tenure has made it difficult to remove
ineffective principals. It is not clear what difference it will make to give
students more standardized tests; the tests in use now show that stu
dents are not learning enough. Of course, if the adoption of higher
standards were accompanied by a more vigorous effort to remove
administrators whose schools were not performing at an acceptable
level, there might be some impact on teacher recruitment. Department
heads might be instructed to spend more time with job candidates.
More applicants might be observed teaching practice classes. Adminis
trators might go to greater lengths to obtain information about appli
cants who have graduated from distant liberal arts colleges. Yet it is
also easy to see how such steps could be overlooked by administrators
under pressure to produce quick results. In most schools, workforce
turnover is simply too low to afford any basis for a rapid turn-around in
student performance. Principals are likely to concentrate instead on
policies that will elicit greater effort and better results from the staffs
they have.
What of the second approach, holding teachers accountable for what
students learn? It is difficult to link student achievement to the perfor
mance of individual teachers. Many factors influence the amount stu
dents learn, while the impact of teachers (for both good and bad) is not
limited to the years and classes in which they see their students. The
most that one might realistically expect from such a policy would be
the removal of the worst teachers from their classrooms. Yet once
again, there would seem to be ample cause at present to take such
steps. While raising standards might increase pressure on administra
tors to act, unless the policies that currently make it so difficult to dis
miss poor teachers were also changed, higher standards for students
would be likely to have little impact on faculty quality.
Many i%f not most public school systems award tenure to teachers
after a few years' continuous service. In addition, as public employees,
teachers are protected against arbitrary dismissal (without "just
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cause"). Most teacher contracts stipulate that reductions in force be
conducted on the basis of seniority. As a result, teachers with more
than a few years' seniority enjoy an extraordinary degree of job protec
tion. Complaints by administrators that it is next to impossible to dis
miss tenured teachers for poor performance are commonplace.
Hard data on the costs of such policies are difficult to come by; as a
result, discussion of these issues is based largely on anecdotal evi
dence. Estimates of the number of public school teachers who are
incompetent range as high as 10 percent (e.g., McGrath 1993); the
poor performance of many teachers on teacher competency examina
tions suggests that in some states this figure is too low. 8 Yet the number
of public school teachers dismissed for incompetence is exceedingly
small. The cost of such efforts is a major deterrent: for example, a 1993
survey by the New York State School Boards Association found that
the average disciplinary proceeding against a tenured teacher or admin
istrator cost taxpayers of that state $176,000 (New York Times, Sept.
24, 1995). As a result, it appears that most school districts take such
steps only in extreme cases. A review of employment records for all
public school teachers in Washington State between 1984 and 1987
turned up only 42 whose contracts were officially terminated
(Theobald 1990). This is consistent with statistics from other states.
Fewer than .6 percent of the teachers in 141 California districts sur
veyed in 1982-1984 were dismissed for incompetence, a figure that
includes untenured and temporary teachers (Bridges 1992). It is possi
ble, of course, that many more have been "counselled out" or induced
to leave by the threat of an attempt to dismiss them. Even so, it seems
clear that many instructors of doubtful ability remain.
The ambiguity inherent in teacher evaluation and the job security
of most teachers exert a powerful influence on administrators to
tolerate the incompetent teacher and to avoid the use of dismissal.
Although incompetence is sufficient cause for dismissing a ten
ured teacher, it constitutes extremely problematic grounds for
challenging the tenured teacher's employment contract with the
district. Incompetence is a concept with no precise meaning;
moreover, there are no clear-cut standards or cut-off points which
enable an administrator to say with certitude that a teacher is
incompetent. This ambiguity poses a serious problem for adminis
trators because the burden of proof falls on them to demonstrate
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that a teacher is incompetent. Administrators can never be confi
dent under these conditions that a Commission on Professional
Competence or a court judge will uphold their judgment (Bridges
1992).

Unfortunately, recent history suggests that it will be very difficult to
take away these job protections. For example, school boards that
signed contracts with private management firms to run their schools
(e.g., Baltimore and Hartford) have nonetheless yielded to union pres
sure and severely constrained managerial prerogatives in personnel
decisions.9 As a result, these firms have taken on failing school systems
with little or no authority to replace the work forces they find teaching
in them.
Legislative efforts to strengthen the position of management have
also been affected by union opposition. The Massachusetts Education
Reform Act of 1993 is a case in point. When the act was passed, sup
porters declared that teacher tenure had been abolished in the state's
public schools. This claim was somewhat disingenuous. Although
automatic renewal of contracts was replaced by the requirement that
teachers be recertified every five years, this requirement can be met in a
variety of ways that pose no threat whatever to a teacher's job. In-ser
vice programs and workshops, conferences outside the school, and
courses in the state's universities are all approved methods. (Even
auditing a course counts.) Important job protections remain. As a read
ing of the act shows, the term "tenure" has been replaced by the phrase
"professional teacher status," which is granted, like tenure, to teachers
with three years' service in a system. The due process requirements
that have made it so difficult for administrators to remove ineffective
teachers remain substantially in force. Dismissals are for just cause and
require written notification with "documents relating to the grounds for
dismissal." Dismissed teachers can request arbitration before a panel
appointed by the Commissioner of Education. The outcome of arbitra
tion is subject to judicial review. The act also stipulates that districts
are not to lay off a professional teacher if an instructor lacking this sta
tus is teaching a subject in which the former is certified. Collective bar
gaining agreements that allow a more senior teacher to displace a
junior one in the event of a layoff are not affected by the legislation.
The Massachusetts case is by no means exceptional, as a recent
review of state actions makes clear (Lindsay 1996). The Virginia legis-
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lature failed to act on a proposal by the state schools superintendent to
replace tenure with renewable contracts. Lawmakers in Minnesota
declined to follow up the governor's challenge to "put a premium on
excellence, not seniority." The California Assembly killed a proposal to
replace tenure with renewable contracts. In states where legislation
passed, changes were often minimal. Thus, in Pennsylvania, the proba
tionary period before an award of tenure was lengthened from two to
three years (and in South Dakota, from three to four years). After pro
posing legislation that would make it easier to dismiss teachers who
were given poor evaluations, the governor of Ohio ended up vetoing a
law that, in his judgment, made teacher tenure still stronger. In New
York, the state school boards' association has been unable to find a
Senate sponsor for its proposal to replace tenure with renewable con
tracts. According to the association's executive director, the reason is
the opposition of the New York State United Teachers, which spent
more than $3 million dollars on lobbying and campaign contributions
in the 1994 elections, more than any other special-interest group in the
state.

Conclusion
In chapter 4 we identified several features of the teacher labor mar
ket that have frustrated efforts to recruit better teachers. In this chapter
we have asked whether these impediments could be removed, clearing
the way for higher salaries to attract more capable persons into the pro
fession.
The outlook for such reforms does not look very bright. There
seems little chance that the compensation of new (or better) teachers
will be allowed to rise significantly while the incomes of the rest
remain unchanged. Barriers to teacher entry have fallen, but very
slowly: programs of alternative certification provide only a small share
of new teachers and are often circumscribed in ways that prevent them
from competing head-on with traditional programs of teacher prepara
tion. Though most states now test teachers, these tests are a far remove
from the rigorous examinations taken by teachers in Japan and some
European nations. Since even basic skills tests are being challenged in
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the courts, more selective screening does not seem likely. Other efforts
to raise standards and increase accountability have yielded modest
results to date.
This is not to say that none of these reforms will ever amount to
much. They may well succeed in other terms. We believe that in an
increasing number of districts, the single salary schedule will give way
to salary structures that include a modest role for merit pay, eliciting
greater effort from teachers. We expect, too, that the on-going debate
over educational standards will raise what is expected of students and
that student achievement will rise. Where we remain skeptical is in
doubting that these measures will have a substantial effect on teacher
recruitment. None of the reforms we have examined are likely to be
implemented on the scale required to fundamentally alter the way the
teacher labor market works.
There are several reasons why. One is the difficulty of designing
policies of sufficient flexibility to meet the various goals served by
public schools. The diverse needs of a heterogeneous clientele have
also made public education a political battleground where radical
reform is unlikely. Yet in our view, the major obstacle is the influence
wielded by teacher unions, associations of administrators, and educa
tion schools in the formulation of education policy. These groups have
strong vested interests in the present system of training and licensing
teachers and in the terms of their employment. The consequences of
their opposition are clearly apparent when reforms are blocked or
repealed. Less obvious, but still important, is the ability of these groups
to influence the policy-making process, shaping reforms in ways that
serve their interests.
Twelve years ago, in A Nation at Risk, the National Commission on
Excellence in Education advanced the following recommendations.
Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and
should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and per
formance-based. Salary, promotion, tenure, and retention deci
sions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes
peer review so that superior teachers can be rewarded, average
ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated
(National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983).
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For all the effort that has gone into education reform since then, the
nation is still waiting to see significant progress on most of these
counts. Proposals that threaten the power of teacher unions or diminish
the role of the nation's schools and departments of education in the
preparation of teachers and administrators have been defeated outright
or severely restricted in scope. In the twelve years that have elapsed
since the publication of A Nation at Risk, numerous states have
awarded teachers significant increases in salaries. Few, if any, have
enacted the other changes needed to ensure that better teachers are
recruited as a result.
NOTES
1. Other data show that many teachers are more open minded on the subject of merit pay than
much union rhetoric would suggest. As is often the case, surveys have presented contradictory
findings. Two Gallup polls conducted for the Phi Delta Kappan in 1984 and 1989 found a major
ity of respondents (64 percent and 61 percent, respectively) opposed to merit pay (Gallop 1984;
Elam 1989). However, a 1983 poll of teachers by the National School Board Association turned
up 63 percent in favor (Cramer 1983). A 1990 survey by the National Center for Education Infor
mation found that 70 percent favored pay on the basis of job performance in addition to seniority
and education (Feistritzer 1990). Differences in survey design and the phrasing of questions are
likely to have influenced responses and may explain some of these discrepancies. These polls also
differed with respect to sample size, sampling technique, and response rates, further complicating
the interpretation of results.
Additional information on teachers' attitudes toward incentive pay was obtained by the
National Center for Education Statistics in the 1987-1988 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS),
which asked teachers their opinion of particular types of compensation and whether they received
such remuneration. While it would be unwise to claim that any one survey provides a definitive
answer to this question, both the sample size and the response rate were far higher for this survey
than for any of those just cited. Opposition to performance incentives of any kind came from a
minority of teachers. These data have been subjected to a multivariate analysis exploring the
determinants of teachers' attitudes toward merit pay (Ballou and Podgursky 1993b). Teachers in
schools using merit pay were more favorably disposed toward this kind of compensation than
were teachers elsewhere. The effect was greatest among those who actually received a bonus, but
attitudes were more positive even among nonrecipients. Teachers who were more likely to be
working with students from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., minority teachers, employees of
large urban school systems) were also more supportive, a pattern difficult to square with the
notion that teachers resist performance-based pay because so many determinants of student learn
ing are beyond their control.
These findings suggest that easy generalizations about teachers' views on incentive pay
should be resisted. That teachers in districts using merit pay are generally more supportive than
teachers elsewhere indicates that characterizations of merit pay as a frequent source of divisiveness and ill-feeling may be overstated. Indeed, a different item on the same survey asked teachers
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "There is great cooperation among the staff
in this school." In schools lacking a merit pay plan, the response rates were 36 percent strongly
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agree, 43 percent mildly agree, 16 percent mildly disagree, and 5 percent strongly disagree.
Response rates in schools with merit pay plans were 37 percent, 43 percent, 15 percent, and 5 per
cent. There was virtually no difference between recipients' and nonrecipients' answers in the lat
ter districts.
2. One such incentive that has attracted much recent attention is the career ladder. As the name
implies, a career ladder involves a progression of steps through which the teacher advances in the
course of a career. It is fair to say, however, that proponents of career ladders have never satisfac
torily resolved a fundamental tension in the concept: how to provide career advancement for
teachers that does not remove them from the classroom. Some career ladders expressly require
that instructors continue to spend the same amount of time teaching as they move to higher levels.
This has the inevitable consequence of turning a career ladder into a form of extra pay for extra
work. In most career ladders, moreover, eligibility for advancement is based on years of service
and completion of workshops, courses, and/or advanced degrees. In this respect, ladders differ
only modestly from traditional salary schedules, which also reward experience and education.
Some form of performance evaluation is also a criterion for advancement, a feature that has
proven problematic. When promotion is limited to a relatively small number of truly outstanding
teachers, ladders provoke the same objects as merit pay. Indeed, dissatisfaction is likely to be
keener, since the amounts of money at stake are substantially greater. On the other hand, in many
instances meaningful performance reviews are not undertaken and promotion comes too easily
(Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994).
3. This is brought out by equation (4b) in appendix 4C, where the derivative of the application
probability with respect to the offer rate is shown to be a multiple of C, the opportunity costs of
certification. With C=0, this derivative is also zero: a low offer probability does not deter job seek
ers if no costs must be incurred acquiring a credential in advance of employment.
This is not to say that low offer rates might not discourage applicants for psychological rea
sons. However, a rational actor should not be deterred by a low probability of success, if the costs
of applying are zero. Costs are not, of course, strictly zero; prospective teachers must send out
applications, go to interviews, etc. These costs are trivial, however, compared to the investment in
acquiring certification.
4. To say that undergraduate training in education is held in low esteem is perhaps an under
statement. Boston University President John Silber writes, "The willingness to endure four years
in a typical school of education often constitutes a negative intelligence test" (quoted in Finn
1991). Sowell (1993) concludes, "In short, some of the least-qualified students, taught by the
least-qualified professors in the lowest-quality courses supply most of American public school
teachers." An earlier, widely cited critique of teacher training by the president of the Council on
Basic Education concluded that the subject matter taught at education schools reflected "intellec
tual impoverishment" and was filled with jargon that "masks a lack of thought, supports a spe
cious scientism .. . and repels any educated mind that happens upon it" (Koerner 1963).
5. This conclusion is supported by estimates of a hedonic wage equation for private school
instructors. There is no consistent evidence that these schools place a positive value on certifica
tion. Other measures of academic ability, by contrast, carry significantly larger hedonic prices
(Ballou and Podgursky 1995c).
6. This freedom may be more apparent that real, if the authorities granting charters decide to
require these schools to comply with the same regulations that apply to public schools. This seems
all the more likely when the chartering authority is itself a local school board, the case in several
states (e.g., California).
7. "As a matter of policy . . . assessment scores and other data from the Praxis Series may not
be used ... to determine employment, retention, or termination of fully licensed teachers. School
districts without authority to license teachers may receive the Praxis Series assessment scores or
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other Praxis assessment data of teacher applicants only to verify that the applicants have met the
state licensing testing requirements" (Educational Testing Service 1992).
To validate the Praxis exam, ETS solicits the opinions of teachers, education school faculty,
and other education professionals regarding test items. Respondents are asked what proportion of
"minimally qualified" teachers would be able to answer a particular item correctly. No attempt is
made to ascertain whether test scores predict differences in teaching effectiveness above the level
of minimum competence. Nor has ETS made any effort to correlate student outcomes with teach
ers' scores on these examinations. According to one ETS official whom we questioned, opposition
of teacher unions figured among the reasons for this decision.
8. During the 1980s, 10 percent of experienced teachers in Texas and Arkansas failed teacher
competency tests that amounted to little more than tests of literacy. A similar failure rate occurs on
mandated certificate renewal tests in Georgia. A basic skills test for new teachers introduced in
Florida in the 1980s produced failure rates of 63 percent for blacks, 50 percent for Hispanics, and
12 percent for whites (Toch 1991, p. 164). Unfortunately, teachers are given so many opportuni
ties to retake these examinations that few are actually dismissed. If 10 percent of the workforce
cannot pass a basic skills test, the proportion who are incompetent for whatever reasons is proba
bly considerably greater.
9. In an exception to this pattern, the Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania school district has contractedout management of a single elementary school to a private firm, Alternative Public Schools, which
has been given the authority to replace current teachers. The local union, an NEA affiliate, has
taken the board to court. As of this writing, a lower court order to rescind the contract has been
stayed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has yet to rule on the legality of this contract.

CHAPTER

The Private Sector
There has lately been a remarkable growth of interest in the role
market forces could play in education reform. At the heart of this argu
ment is the claim that private schools provide a better education than
public schools because they have been compelled to adopt policies that
respond to consumers' demands and because they are not as heavily
regulated. Public schools, it is alleged, could do likewise if they faced
the same incentives and opportunities. Various mechanisms, ranging
from charter schools to educational vouchers, have been proposed to
empower consumers and provide them a sufficient range of options to
make reform on the market model possible.
In this chapter we examine the implications of this argument for
teacher recruitment and retention by examining the personnel policies
of private schools. It is not obvious that a deregulated and competitive
market, whatever its other advantages for consumers, will make it eas
ier for schools to recruit good teachers. As noted in the preceding chap
ter, many of the regulations and contractual constraints that limit
managerial prerogatives in the public sector are thought to benefit
teachers. One might therefore expect private schools to labor under a
disadvantage in recruiting faculty. In particular, few private schools
have been organized by unions. If a unionized workplace is more
attractive than one that has not been organized, private school recruit
ment will suffer. 1
To conduct this investigation we turn again to the national surveys
that have provided data for earlier chapters. We also report information
and insights obtained from discussions with more than thirty school
heads, diocesan superintendents, and officials of Catholic, protestant,
and independent national private school associations. These persons
are collectively acquainted with the policies and practices of hundreds
of private schools, both religious and nonreligious, in all parts of the
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country. We have also interviewed managers and owners of several
proprietary or for-profit businesses providing K-12 educational ser
vices. At various points below we draw on the comments of these edu
cators to improve our understanding of the way this sector works.

Teacher Quality
Nationwide, public school teachers earn half again as much as
teachers employed in private schools (see table 6.1). This difference is
greatest in the northeast but is substantial in all regions. Part of the gap
reflects higher levels of education and experience in the public sector.
However, most of it remains after controlling for those factors, as
shown by the difference in starting salaries (36 percent). 2
Despite the differences in pay, by most of our indicators private
school faculties are as good as those in the public sector, if not better.
As shown in table 6.1, a higher proportion attended selective colleges.
Fewer went to colleges rated below average. 3 The private sector
employs more secondary teachers with an academic major and recruits
as many teachers with degrees in mathematics or science (relative to its
size). There is no significant difference in teachers' undergraduate
grades.
It may be wondered whether this comparison favors private schools
simply because so many of them are located in the northeast, home to
many selective colleges and universities. However, a regional break
down reveals a private sector advantage in all parts of the country. This
advantage grows more pronounced when attention is restricted to sec
ondary schools, where academic credentials presumably play a larger
role in hiring decisions.
On a few dimensions the comparison favors public schools. More
private school teachers lack a bachelor's degree, nearly 3 percent, as
opposed to fewer than 1 percent in the public sector. 4 In addition,
because turnover is higher in the private sector, mean experience is
lower. More than 7 percent of private school teachers were in then" first
year of full-time teaching in 1987-88, compared to 4 percent in the
public sector.

Table 6.1. Comparison of Public and Private School Teachers8
Private

Public
Salary and quality
indicators
Mean salary
(std. dev.)
Starting pay
(std. dev.)
College
Selective
Above-average
Average
Below-average
Unrated
No Bachelor's Degree
Mathematics or science
major (secondary only)
Academic major
(secondary only)
First-year
Undergraduate GPA

Northeast
30,106
(7,928)
19,125
(2,173)

Other
regions
25,456
(6,752)
18,104
(2,243)

Secondary
&
combined
26,886
(7,510)
18,315
(2,261)

All regions
17,434
(6,035)
13,466
(3,073)

Northeast
17,796
(6,546)
13,017
(3,039)

11.6
21.0
54.0
8.2
4.4
.8
7.6

5.2
13.1
47.6
30.0
3.5
.6
6.4

7.3
15.3
47.8
24.8
3.7
1.1
6.8

10.7/12.4b
13.1/15.2
44.5/51.4
18.1/21.0
12.7/-—
2.9 /
6.8

18.7
16.6
42.8
7.9
11.5
3.5
6.8

8.0
11.8
45.1
21.9
10.6
2.6
6.8

13.8
13.2
42.9
16.6
11.2
2.3
6.8

38.9

43.1

37.6

38.9

49.2

60.7

44.9

49.2

4.3
3.3

3.4
3.3

4.6
3.3

4.1
3.3

7.6
3.2

9.8
3.2

6.8
3.2

7.4
3.2

All regions
26,458
(7,278)
18,314
(2,267)
6.5 / 6.8b
14.8/15.4
49.0/51.2
25.3 / 26.5
3.7 / —
.7 / —
6.8

Secondary
Other
regions & combined
17,300
18,406
(6,329)
(5,830)
14,086
13,608
(3,081)
(3,070)

SOURCES: Full-time teachers from 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey. Teachers in Catholic schools who have never married are omitted in order to
exclude members of religious orders. Undergraduate GPA is taken from Surveys of Recent College Graduates for 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, and 1991.
a. Percent of teachers except for GPA, which represents a numerical conversion of ordinal responses,
b. Percent of graduates of rated colleges only.
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A final, albeit indirect, comparison of public and private school
teachers is provided by the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey,
which asked principals and school heads to rate the effectiveness of
their faculties. As shown in figure 6.1, principals gave similar ratings to
new teachers in all four sectors: public, Catholic, other religious, and
nonsectarian private schools. The modal response in each category was
four. Intersectoral differences were slight and not statistically signifi
cant. For experienced teachers, the comparison clearly favors private
schools (figure 6.2). The mean public school rating (4.24) was below
the mean in each of the private school sectors. Significantly more pri
vate school heads rated their experienced staffs excellent. 5
Figure 6.1
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Figure 6.2 Experienced Ranking by School Type
Public

Catholic
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In summary, private schools appear to recruit remarkably effec
tively, given the substantial difference between their salaries and those
in public school systems. What accounts for their comparative success?

Working Conditions and Benefits
Working conditions are part of the explanation. Generalization is
hazardous, as there exist many types of private schools serving diverse
clienteles. Nonetheless, the comments of administrators and the
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responses of teachers to national surveys indicate that private schools
on the whole offer a more attractive and supportive environment in
which to teach.
First, these schools practice selective admissions and enjoy the right
to expel students who fail to conform to rules of conduct. The families
that purchase their services are also more likely to insist on acceptable
behavior at school. As a result, private school teachers face fewer of the
disciplinary problems that confront their counterparts in public
schools. Our discussions with educators leave little doubt that this is
one of the reasons private school teachers accept lower salaries.
Private schools are typically only one-third to one-half as large as
public schools at the same grade levels. Smaller size fosters a sense of
community and belonging. By contrast, many public schools, designed
to realize anticipated economies of scale, appear to be too large. A
growing body of research shows that students at smaller schools, par
ticularly elementary schools, have better records of achievement.
Smaller high schools have been shown to promote higher levels of stu
dent satisfaction, attendance and graduation rates and to diminish
involvement with alcohol and drugs (Walberg 1993).6
Size alone does not account for the shared sense of mission found in
many private schools. Researchers have found that the religious beliefs
and moral training central to a Catholic education contribute to a sense
of community and common purpose that raises teacher efficacy and
morale (Bryk and Lee 1993). Other religious schools as well as many
nonsectarian schools can justly make the same claim. And, of course,
parents who send their children to private schools have a stronger than
average commitment to education.
Not surprisingly, these circumstances affect the way teachers per
ceive their jobs. In table 6.2, we report the responses of private and
public school teachers to items on the Schools and Staffing Survey that
concern relations with students, administrators, and colleagues. On
every item, private school teachers were more likely to express strong,
positive attitudes about their schools.7 Particularly striking are teach
ers' perceptions of the support they receive from parents. Only 16 per
cent of public school instructors strongly agreed when asked whether
they received a great deal of support from parents. In the private sector
the corresponding figure was 40 percent. The importance of this ques
tion should not be underestimated: in the 1992 Metropolitan Life/Louis
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Table 6.2. Teachers© Perceptions of Colleagues, Students, and School
Administration
Survey items (1987-88 SASS)
"School administration's behavior toward staff
is supportive/encouraging."
"I receive a great deal of support from parents
for the work I do."
"Most of my colleagues share my beliefs/
values about what the central mission of the
school should be."
"There is a great deal of cooperative effort
among staff members."
"In this school, staff members are recognized
for a job well done."
"The level of student misbehavior interferes
with my teaching."
"Routine duties and paperwork interfere with
my job of teaching."
"I have to follow rules in this school that
conflict with my best professional judgment."

Percent replying "strongly agree"
Public
Private
40.5

60.2

16.0

40.0

35.6

59.0

35.3

56.1

25.5
39.2
Percent replying "strongly disagree"
33.0

52.5

8.9

29.5

40.6

58.2

SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey 1987-88. All differences are significant at 1 percent.

Harris poll of the profession, new teachers likely to leave teaching
cited lack of support from parents more often than any other cause
(U.S. Department of Education 1993). It also appears that teachers in
private schools enjoy more autonomy in the classroom and exercise
more influence over policies concerning discipline, curriculum, and
student placement (table 6.3). They express a greater sense of their
own efficacy. Seventy percent strongly disagreed with the statement, "I
sometimes feel it is a waste of time to try to do my best as a teacher,"
compared to 54 percent in the public sector. These differences are also
apparent in the responses teachers gave when asked whether they
would still become a teacher if they had the choice to make again. Half
of the private school teachers said they certainly would; only 37 per
cent of public school instructors were this positive.

Table 6.3. Percentage of Teachers Who Thought That They Had a Great Deal of Influence on Certain Policies, by
Sector: 1987-88 and 1990-91

1987-88
Total
Public
Private
1990-91
Total
Public
Private

Determining
discipline policy

Content of inservice
training

Grouping students in
classes by ability

Establishing
curriculum

37.3
34.8
55.9

31.8
31.1
36.8

30.3
28.1
47.2

37.5
35.0
56.3

39.1
37.0
54.4

33.3
32.9
36.2

29.0
26.7
45.1

37.5
35.2
54.1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education; National Center for Education Statistics; Schools and Staffing Survey; 1987-88 and 1990-91 (Teacher Question
naire).
NOTE: Teachers were defined as having thought they had a great deal of influence if they responded with a 5 or 6 on a 6-point scale of influence, with 6
representing a great deal of influence.
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Compensation Policies
As noted in the last chapter, virtually all public school systems use
salary schedules to set teacher compensation, with a teacher's position
on the schedule a function of experience and advanced college credits
(or degrees). Formal schedules of this kind are much less prevalent in
the private sector. Only two-thirds of the non-Catholic religious
schools set compensation according to a schedule. Among nonreligious
schools the share is barely half.
Of course, private schools that do not use a schedule may still pur
sue policies similar to those in public education. Indeed, experience
and level of education are major factors in determining the compensa
tion of private school faculty, just as in public school systems. Often,
however, these factors matter most when a school is making its initial
salary offer to an experienced teacher. Thereafter, compensation may
be determined in ways that bear little resemblance to public sector
schedules. In some schools, all staff receive equal percentage raises as
voted by the board of trustees. Faculty who obtain an advanced degree
while employed at the school are much less likely to receive an auto
matic raise. A small number of schools negotiate contracts individually
with staff.
Where private schools have adopted salary schedules, adherence to
the schedule is not as rigid as it is in public school systems. In many
Catholic parishes, for example, the schedule is an advisory guideline
prepared by the diocesan board. Actual salaries are set locally by the
pastor and his or her board and often deviate from these recommenda
tions. Since the diocese typically runs the high schools while local par
ishes are responsible for grammar school education, there are
frequently large disparities between the salaries paid teachers at the
elementary and secondary levels, with the latter earning substantially
more. By contrast, public school districts pay elementary and second
ary school teachers according to the same schedule.
Policies also differ with respect to performance-based incentives
like merit pay. As shown in table 6.4, nonsectarian schools are twice as
likely as public schools to use merit pay, though the incidence among
religious schools is lower. 8 Twenty-eight percent of the teachers in nonsectarian schools with merit pay plans are recipients, compared to 10
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percent elsewhere. The financial stake is considerably greater.
Although direct measures are not available, regression analysis of sal
ary data from the 1990-91 SASS shows that a recipient of merit pay in
the private sector earns, on average, nearly 12 percent more than he or
she would in the absence of merit incentives. In the public sector, by
contrast, the average bonus is only 2 percent. (Full results from these
regressions are presented in appendix 6a.)
Table 6.4. Use of Incentive Pay

Incentive & coverage

Merit pay
Percent of schools with plan
Percent of teachers with plan
Percent of teachers receiving2
Average award, as percent of
base payb

Type of school
NonOther
Public Catholic religious religious

12.8
13.8
10.1
1.9

6.0
7.2
10.5

9.3
11.8
10.2

24.3
33.8
28.1

All
private

10.9
14.9
19.0
10.7

SOURCE: Data are from the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey.
a. Percentage of teachers in schools acknowledging use of such incentives who received an award,
b. Computed from coefficients in a regression of log of salary on schedule variables and binary
indicators for incentive plans. Complete results appear in appendix table 6a. Too few observations
were available to estimate separate coefficients by type of private school.

Private school heads find other ways to reward superior perfor
mance, assigning additional duties to good teachers (with correspond
ing adjustments in compensation). The boundary between teaching and
administration is much more porous in private than public education:
many headmasters, assistant headmasters, and deans continue to teach,
while classroom teachers are also likely to be active as coaches, coun
selors, librarians, and resource teachers, and (in boarding schools) resi
dence directors. Private school heads also retain considerable
discretion with respect to the initial placement of a newly hired teacher
on the schedule. Offers can be raised for teachers in hard-to-fill sub
jects (though few of the educators we spoke to indicated that they had
needed to do this). Special discretion is exercised when recruiting indi
viduals whose personal qualities make them attractive applicants. Indi
viduals who are making career changes to become teachers are
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frequently credited with prior experience, albeit outside the field of
education, in order to bring them in at a salary level comparable to that
of other older teachers.
Surveys focusing on formal compensation policy will fail to detect
many of these practices. To ascertain their importance, we conduct a
regression analysis of the salaries of public and private school teachers
to determine how much variation in pay remains after controlling for
the standard schedule variables. Further controls are added for the
overall level of salaries at the school, as explained in appendix 6a. Pri
vate schools that do not use schedules at all are omitted from the esti
mation sample. While a perfect fit is not to be expected—our
regression equations imperfectly mimic schedules in actual use—pro
portionate unexplained variation in salaries is nearly double that in the
private sector. This suggests that teacher attributes that we do not
observe (but are known to school officials) play a larger role in deter
mining compensation in the private sector. Of course, the additional
variation in salary may not be related to differences in merit. However,
the competitive pressures faced by private schools create a presump
tion that systematic differences in compensation have an economic
explanation. Pay differentials that are unrelated to teaching quality lack
a clear economic rationale.
The advantages of flexible salary structures are clear. Resources are
allocated more efficiently. The adverse effects of across-the-board
increases are mitigated. Since these benefits accrue as readily to public
as private schools, there must be other reasons why salaries are more
flexible in the private sector.
In the first place, private schools face market sanctions if they fail to
attract and retain the kinds of teachers that sustain the school's reputa
tion. No such discipline exists in the public sector. As a consequence,
incentive plans in the public schools are more likely to appear as zerosum games to staff, in which the bonuses awarded some teachers
reduce funds that could have been used to raise salaries across the
board. This is emphatically not the case in private schools, where
improvements in the quality of the school's staff and instructional pro
gram enhance the school's reputation and increase the demand for its
services. This feature of the private sector has no obvious counterpart
in public education, where poor performance is as likely as not to be
accompanied by demands for additional resources.
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Many private schools have explicit expectations that teachers will
become part of a team and commit themselves to serving the mission
of the school. A private school teacher who persists in complaining
about salary differentials risks being perceived as one who puts per
sonal gain before the good of the school. The possibility of contract
nonrenewal may inhibit the more extreme kinds of actions that public
school employees have used to undermine incentive pay plans. 9 In
addition, decisions about merit pay are often made in a quieter, less
obtrusive manner in private schools. By contrast, the very formality
and publicity accompanying merit awards in the public schools appear
to alienate teachers, many of whom are anxious about the prospect of
being judged before their students and peers. 10

Recruitment Priorities and Constraints
Private schools face market pressures to provide satisfactory ser
vices to their clients. For many of these clients, a strong focus on aca
demics appears to be a high priority. Students in private schools take
more courses in the core academic areas of English, mathematics, sci
ence, social studies, and foreign languages. By graduation, the average
difference amounts to two full-year courses (U.S. Department of Edu
cation 1993). This focus on academics is found in schools that offer a
comprehensive curriculum as well as those that specialize in a college
preparatory program. Indeed, private school students are more likely
than their peers in public school systems to be enrolled in college pre
paratory classes even after controlling for student socioeconomic sta
tus, race, and educational aspirations (Coleman and Hoffer 1987).
The emphasis placed on academics influences how these schools
recruit and how effectively they make use of the talents of their staffs.
When asked what they look for in a prospective teacher, private school
heads regularly cite knowledge of subject matter. (The other responses
most frequently given are enthusiasm for working with children and, in
religious schools, a commitment to the moral and religious beliefs of
the school.) By contrast, public school officials do not appear to give
special weight to a strong academic background when recruiting teach
ers. This difference in priorities is likely to be one of the reasons pri-
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vate schools obtain a comparatively high percentage of teachers from
good colleges with academic majors.
Barriers to entry are also lower for private school instructors. In
most states, private schools are free to hire teachers who lack state cer
tification. Even in the states that nominally require certification of pri
vate school teachers, enforcement appears to be lax, and exceptions are
commonplace. Schools often hire unlicensed teachers on the under
standing that they will earn certificates within a suitable period (e.g.,
three to five years). This extra flexibility can be quite important to pro
spective teachers, who thereby postpone the costs of acquiring certifi
cation until they have determined how likely they are to make a career
of teaching.
Data on the percentage of noncertified teachers employed by private
schools are presented in table 6.5. Although most Catholic school
instructors are certified, barely half of the teachers in other private
schools are. It may be wondered if private schools recruit noncertified
personnel only because they must, given their noncompetitive salaries.
This is not the case. The share of noncertified instructors is largest in
nonsectarian secondary schools, where salaries are highest. School
heads in this segment of the market indicate in private conversation
that certification is simply of no importance to them when hiring fac
ulty. 11
Table 6.5. Teachers Certified in Primary Teaching Field as a Percent of
All Teachers
Private school teachers

All teachers
Elementary
Secondary
Combined

Public school
teachers
95.9
96.7
94.8
96.0

Catholic
73.6
77.1
67.7
72.2

Other religious Non-religious
50.2
55.9
51.9
49.2
46.4
35.1
49.6
62.8

SOURCE: 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Surveys. Sample restricted to full-time teachers in states
which do not require that private teachers be certified. Teachers in Catholic schools who have
never been married are dropped from the sample to avoid including members of religious orders.

In the previous two chapters we argued that applicant quality would
improve if licensing requirements were relaxed, since these barriers to
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entry are greatest for individuals with attractive options outside teach
ing. The data in table 6.6 confirm that private schools have increased
their employment of graduates from selective colleges by recruiting
noncertified teachers. This effect is particularly pronounced among
teachers who attended the most competitive of these colleges and uni
versities.

Turnover and Related Policies
As noted, teacher turnover is considerably higher in the private sec
tor. Between the 1987-88 and 1988-89 school years, nearly 13 percent
of private school instructors left teaching, twice the rate at which pub
lic school faculty quit. Another 4.7 percent departed for positions in
public systems (Choy et al. 1992). There is little doubt the loss of so
many experienced personnel adversely affects instructional quality in
the private sector. Since private schools could presumably reduce turn
over to the levels found in the public sector by raising teacher pay, it is
curious that they do not. Is turnover excessive, indicating some kind of
market failure? Or are rates of turnover that would be viewed with
alarm in public school systems simply a sign of a cost-effective person
nel policy?
High turnover does not appear to prevent private schools from meet
ing their staffing requirements. According to the 1990-91 SASS, 98.7
percent of all private school positions were filled by a qualified individ
ual, a figure only slightly below the public school rate of 99.4 percent.
Private school heads to whom we spoke indicated that they were expe
riencing no difficulty filling vacancies, even in such fields as mathe
matics and science. (The only reservation concerned the recruitment of
minority teachers.) Freedom to employ noncertified teachers is obvi
ously one reason. Private schools administrators also enjoy greater lati
tude in staffing positions when a qualified teacher cannot be hired on a
regular basis. They are twice as likely as public school districts to hire
a part-time teacher or increase teaching loads for current staff (Choy et
al. 1993). This ratio widens to three or four when the comparison is
restricted to public schools in large cities, where collective bargaining
agreements curtailing managerial prerogatives are common.

Table 6.6. Percent of Teachers Who Graduated from Selective Colleges and Universities
College selectivity
Most competitive
Other selective
Total selective

Public
schools
1.0
5.4
6.4

Cerfitied
.9
4.1
5.0

Private religious
Not certified
2.4
5.7
8.1

Total
1.4
4.6
6.0

Private Non-religious
Certified
Not certified
Total
14.6
3.4
7.9
9.8
15.0
11.9
13.2
29.6
19.8

SOURCE: Full-time teachers from Schools and Staffing Survey, 1987-88. Sample excludes teachers in Catholic schools who have never married.
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Discussions of turnover among public school educators often con
vey the impression that turnover per se is never good and that the
appropriate goal of policy is to drive turnover rates as low as possible.
This is false; the optimal rate of turnover among teachers is not zero.
This is not merely because older teachers can burn out and lose effec
tiveness. The optimal rate of turnover also depends on the quality of
new recruits available to replace departing teachers. More capable indi
viduals are less likely to spend their entire careers in teaching, creating
a tradeoff between longevity and ability. We have already seen evi
dence that private and public schools view this tradeoff differently. Pri
vate schools are more likely to hire teachers with strong academic
backgrounds interested in teaching for a few years.
High turnover can also be the deliberate result of policies adopted to
deal with ex ante uncertainty about prospective teachers' ability. Such
uncertainty requires that many candidates be given a low-cost opportu
nity to see whether they have a career fit in teaching, and if not, to
move on. To mitigate the impact on students, new teachers require
assistance and mentoring. In addition, persons who fail to recognize
that they do not have a good career fit in teaching need to be counselled
out or dismissed. The evidence indicates the private schools do a better
job of managing staff turnover on both these counts.
The mentoring of new teachers is now widespread: by 1991, twothirds of public schools had implemented a mentor program for begin
ning teachers. More than half (53.6 percent) of new public school
teachers participated in a formal induction program with a mentor or
master teacher (Choy et al. 1993). This was twice the private school
incidence (27.3 percent).
This difference notwithstanding, instructors in public schools take a
dimmer view of the help provided beginning teachers than do the fac
ulties of private schools. Evidence comes from the 1990-91 SASS,
which contained a series of questions concerning the assistance pro
vided new teachers in four areas: student discipline, instructional meth
ods, curriculum, and adjusting to the school environment. We have
regressed teachers' responses to these questions on a dummy variable
for school sector as well as controls for school level and teacher demo
graphics. The sector coefficients are reported in the left-hand panel of
table 6.7. In all four areas, teachers at private schools report signifi
cantly more assistance for new hires. Further evidence on this point
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may be found in the responses of inexperienced teachers (<3 years) in
the 1987-88 SASS who were asked to assess the helpfulness of superi
ors and other teachers. Estimates controlling for type of school and
selected teacher characteristics are reported in the right-hand panel of
table 6.7: the results consistently favor private schools. In other regres
sions (not reported) we find that inexperienced private school teachers
also report much more cooperative relationships with other staff than
do new instructors in public schools. These responses suggest that new
teachers receive more help and on-the-job training in the private sector.
Some private schools have instituted formal internship programs.
Interns are generally hired directly out of college; they are paid sub
stantially less than regular teachers and are assigned to work with one
or more of the school's experienced instructors. At the end of the year,
interns may be offered a regular job, should a vacancy arise. More
often they are helped to find positions in other schools, including pub
lic systems. 12
New teachers who show little promise should be dismissed. In prin
ciple, there should be little difference between the public and private
sectors in this respect. New public school teachers are hired on a pro
bationary status. They have no property right in their jobs and may be
dismissed at the discretion of the school board. 13 Since it is extremely
difficult to dismiss teachers once they become tenured, one might
expect that public school administrators would make vigorous use of
this probationary period to screen out ineffective teachers. Yet a 1984
survey of 141 mid-sized California districts found that only 1 percent
of teachers on probationary status were given notice for poor perfor
mance over a period of nearly two academic years. To be sure, this
understates the true extent of screening, if others were "counselled out"
or induced to resign. Unfortunately, such practices make it easier for
ineffective teachers to find jobs in other school systems.
In most of the private sector, by contrast, teachers are on "probation
ary" status throughout their careers. With the exception of some Catho
lic high schools where faculty have been organized, teacher contracts
are written for one year and can be renewed or not as the school
chooses. There is no tenure. While nonrenewals for incompetence are
not frequent, they do occur. Virtually all of the school heads who spoke
to us indicated that they had dismissed an ineffective teacher on at least
one occasion.

Table 6.7. Assistance for New Teachers in Public and Private Schools
"Indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree,
"To what extent has each of the following people at this
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that this school is school helped you improve your teaching or solve an
effective in assisting new teachers in each of the following instructional or class management problem?"
matters."

Variable
Dep.var. mean std.
Public
Catholic
Other religious
Secular
Sample size

l=Strongly agree ... 4=Strongly disagree

l=No help ... 6=Extremely helpful

(standard errors in parentheses)

(standard errors in parentheses)

Sample: Full-time teachers, 1990-91 SASS

Sample: Full-time teachers with tenure < 3 years,
1987-88 SASS

(1)
Student
discipline
2.12
(.93)
_27g***
(.021)
-.303***
(.018)
-.173***
(.028)
53,347

(4)
(2)
Adjusting to
Instructional
(3)
the school
methods
Curriculum environment
2.13
2.04
1.99
(.88)
(.76)
(.74)
-.181***
(.020)
-.138***
(.017)
-.087***
(.026)
53,347

-.252***
(.017)
-.227***
(.026)
-.107***
(.009)
53,347

-.268***
(.019)
..279***
(.017)
-.159***
(.025)
53,347

(7)
(5)
(6)
Other
(8)
Principal or Department
school
Other
school head
chair administrators teachers
4.20
5.31
4.43
4.64
(1.72)
(2.10)
(2.15)
(1.47)
.358***
(.071)
.398***
(.058)
.033
(.070)
12,879

.681***
(.084)
.626***
(.069)
.258***
(.083)
12,879

1.428***
(.086)
1.009***
(.072)
.568***
(.088)
12,879

.169***
(.060)
.184***
(.049)
.141***
(.059)
12,879

NOTE: OLS estimates. Other regressors not shown: male teacher, black teacher, secondary school dummy, years tenure at the school (columns 1-4 only).
***Significant at 1 percent.
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Of equal, if not greater, importance for the quality of the workforce
is the way schools handle reductions in the size of staff. In the public
sector, layoffs are based on seniority. This is not the case among private
schools. With the exception of some Catholic dioceses where contracts
are collectively bargained, layoffs are never based solely on seniority
(though length of service may be a consideration). 14 Rather, schools
seek to retain their most effective teachers.
Over time, such policies can have a substantial effect on the quality
of the workforce. For example, in a single year (1990), the contracts of
1.3 percent of private school teachers were not renewed because of
budget limitations, declining enrollments, or elimination of courses
(Choy et al. 1992). (Schools that closed and laid off all staff are not
included in this figure.) If this year is typical, then over a decade some
10 percent of the workforce, many of whom have been deemed less
effective than their peers, are put through a competitive screening pro
cess in which they must prove themselves to alternative employers or
leave teaching. 15

Market Forces and Public Education
To summarize, private schools employ a workforce that compares
favorably with that in the public sector, despite paying salaries that are
quite low by public school standards. While it's true that private
schools serve a more select clientele, several other factors also play a
role in this success. Salary structures are more flexible. Teachers may
be hired who lack state certification. Private school heads find it easier
to dismiss teachers who perform poorly or whose services are no
longer required. Indeed, to a considerable extent, the reforms examined
in the last chapter already characterize private schools.
Although private schools are subject to regulation, for the most part
they are disciplined by the market rather than the state. To provide the
services their customers desire, private schools emphasize academics
and place a priority on recruiting teachers from good colleges with a
strong background in their subject areas. New teachers receive more
assistance than in the public sector; ineffective instructors are more
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readily dismissed or laid off. More schools use merit pay and other per
formance incentives.
Teacher unions, so influential in public education, are virtually
absent from the private sector. Private schools are much more difficult
to organize: they are small and diverse, with strong traditions of inde
pendence. Most are affiliated with churches and seek teachers who
share a communitarian ethic difficult to square with self-aggrandize
ment. These are not, however, the only obstacles to unionization. Free
dom to hire unlicensed teachers gives private schools access to a huge
potential supply of instructors. Salary growth is constrained by the fact
that schools face a competitive market for their services.
In short, the vested interests that have constituted such formidable
obstacles to reform in public education play a vastly diminished role in
private schooling. By contrast, consumers exercise far more power. In
our judgment, it is primarily this difference—rather than any measured
difference in the achievement of public and private school pupils—that
accounts for the burgeoning interest in such market-based reforms as
charter schools, educational vouchers, and privatization of instruc
tional services. The resistance to change on the part of those who bene
fit from the way public education is conducted in this country has led
many to conclude that the best hope for long-term improvement lies in
the restoration of consumer sovereignty.
In any comparison of public to private schools, questions arise about
the extent to which private sector performance is due to special circum
stances not easily replicated in public education. This issue is central to
the current debate over market-based reforms. Much of the clientele
for private schooling consists of higher income families who provide
stronger support for education at home. This is particularly true of stu
dents in nonsectarian schools. Schools with a religious affiliation bene
fit from a sense of community and shared values reinforced by the
instruction in religion and morality. In addition, private schools prac
tice selective admissions and expel students who fail to comply with
school regulations.
Public schools, by contrast, must serve the entire population. They
are expected to deliver services to all while simultaneously closing the
gap between disadvantaged children and the rest of American society.
Given the surpassing difficulty of this task, many educators regard the
claims advanced for market-based reforms as fraudulent Charter
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schools and private schools accepting vouchers, it is argued, serve few
of the students who pose the greatest challenge for the public schools.
Indeed, school choice plans are thought to make the job of the public
schools still harder, as charter schools and private schools attract the
best students, leaving behind those children whose parents lack the ini
tiative or ability to find schools for them. The more closely the market
model is followed, the more ruinous the outcome for these children, if
public schools that lose students also lose resources. Given that the
marginal cost of educating another student is generally substantially
below average cost, funding cuts based on per-pupil expenditures will
lead to a reduction in program variety and an increase in class sizes.
Other negative consequences are foreseen. The departure of the best
students will deprive the remainder of positive peer effects. Communi
ties will lose some of their most effective voices for school improve
ment as parents most concerned about education opt for private or
charter schools. 16
These are legitimate concerns. Fortunately, a number of experiments
are now underway that may provide evidence on these issues. These
include a variety of school choice plans: interdistrict choice, magnet
schools, charter schools, and both public and privately funded vouch
ers. Other market-oriented reforms include privatization of instruc
tional and administrative services.
School districts have for some time subcontracted to private vendors
noninstructional activities such as school bus maintenance and opera
tion, food services, or facilities maintenance. A number of school dis
tricts now contract out selected instructional activities (National
School Boards Association 1995). Indeed, the subcontracting industry
has grown sufficiently large, and the range of activities so wide, that
new contracts are regularly reported in Education Week, a newsletter
devoted to tracking industry developments has started up (Education
Industry Report), and the Lehman Brothers investment bank now orga
nizes an Annual Education Industry Conference for investors.
The largest and most visible example of private sector subcontract
ing involves Sylvan Learning Systems. The core business of Sylvan
Learning Systems is individualized mathematics and reading tutoring
services sold to families at over 600 Learning Centers throughout the
United States. Since 1993, however, Sylvan has signed contracts to
provide compensatory education (Title I) services in Baltimore, Chi-
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cago, Washington, D.C., Prince Georges County and Dorchester/Talbot
County (Maryland), Broward County (Florida), and Pasadena, Texas.
In all of these cases, the teachers are Sylvan employees, and as such are
not covered by the union salary schedules or the district collective bar
gaining agreement. None are tenured. Compensation includes perfor
mance incentives.
Huntington Learning Centers, best known for tutoring and test prep
aration services, has contracted for some time with public schools to
provide SAT preparation courses. Like Sylvan, it has begun contracting
with several school districts to provide Title I services. Berlitz Jr., a
division of Berlitz International, has contracted with public schools in
ten states to provide foreign language and ESL training. Ombudsman
Educational Services Ltd. operated alternative off-site programs for atrisk students in grades 6-12 in approximately 100 school districts in
seven states during the 1994-95 school year (McLaughlin 1995; Beales
1994). In response to poor student performance, the school board in
Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania recently contracted with Alternative Public
Schools of Nashville, Tennessee to operate an elementary school
enrolling primarily minority students. This case is particularly contro
versial since the company dismissed all of the incumbent teachers,
hired its own teachers and aides, and terminated the union contract.
This has put the company and district in a protracted and costly legal
battle with the Pennsylvania Education Associated and its parent, the
NEA. The final disposition of this case remains uncertain as this book
goes to press.
All of these contracts have brought elements of the marketplace into
public education. Contracts specify performance standards and hold
firms accountable for results. For example, under its contract with the
Baltimore school district, Sylvan provides 12 hours of free instruction
for each student whose test scores fail to improve by a predetermined
amount. Since public school officials decide who receives these ser
vices and on what terms, contracting-out raises few of the equity issues
associated with parental choice plans. There is no change in the
school's clientele, no creaming of the best students: indeed, the major
ity of these subcontracted services are provided to at-risk students.
That entrepreneurs stand ready to provide services to many kinds of
students suggests market-based reforms need not increase educational
inequality. Of course, the programs just surveyed are of limited scope
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and narrow focus. One might concede a role for privatization in these
contexts and still oppose reforms that offer parents more choice of
schools. Whether school choice will in fact exacerbate inequality rests,
however, on several unproven assumptions. The first is that schools
will selectively screen applicants, leaving many students with no effec
tive choice. Failing this, it is argued that large numbers of parents will
not choose responsibly anyway. Finally, public schools are assumed to
be incapable of improving when faced with market competition.
There are not enough data yet on the way choice plans operate to
know whether these conditions will hold. Some of the early evidence
suggests otherwise. So far, states authorizing charter schools have pro
hibited selective admissions policies. While it might be better still to
permit schools to specialize in serving particular niches of the market,
if open access is deemed an overriding goal, there is no reason choice
plans cannot be framed in those terms.
Early studies report that charter schools serve the same diverse pop
ulation as traditional public schools. Of 106 charter schools responding
to a survey by the Education Commission of the States and the Center
for School Change (1995), 67 indicated they served a cross-section of
students. Fifty-one served at-risk students and 37 the learning disabled.
(These responses overlap.) On average, 59 percent of charter school
students were white, 23 percent Hispanic, and 11 percent black. This is
not to say, of course, that the students who enroll in choice schools are
a random subset of the public school population. It is often argued that
any choice plan is necessarily selective, if only because parents with
the best information and the greatest concern for their children's edu
cation will be more likely to take advantage of it. There is obviously
some merit to this argument; however, this point is easily overstated.
Another early study of charter schools reports that "disproportionately
many" of the children enrolled had fared poorly in their former schools
(Finn et al. 1996) Rather than attracting those who would have been
successful in any environment, these choice plans attract students who
were previously struggling. A similar point was made in a recent study
of parochial education: urban minorities, not the white middle class,
were found to benefit most from a Catholic school education (Neal
1995).
Ironically, there is one circumstance in which opponents of school
choice are likely to be proved right—when the number of choice
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schools is strictly limited. In this case, the most astute parents are
likely to secure the small number of available places for their own chil
dren; other students will lack alternatives; and in the absence of mean
ingful competition, public schools will not be compelled to change.
Since those who predict the failure of school choice generally push for
strict limits on such plans, there is a danger that school choice will not
receive a fair test. Opponents may ensure that choice is tried only
under conditions likely to prove them right.
The point is an important one. An experiment may be so hedged in
with restrictions that it fails to constitute a legitimate trial of marketbased reform. The argument has been well expressed by Myron Lieberman in an analysis of the Milwaukee voucher plan. As implemented
in 1990, the plan restricted participation to 1 percent of the Milwaukee
public school enrollment. Eligible families' incomes could not exceed
175 percent of the poverty line. Voucher students could not comprise
more than 49 percent of the students in any one school. Neither forprofit schools nor schools with a religious affiliation could participate.
No extra funds were provided for learning-disabled or emotionally dis
turbed students, although participating schools were required to accept
all voucher-carrying students. Finally, while the value of the voucher
equalled barely half the per-pupil expenditure in Milwaukee public
schools, participating voucher schools were not allowed to charge any
tuition or fees in excess of the voucher.
Several features of this plan made it something less than a true test
of competitive market forces. The scale was too small to encourage
expansion of existing schools or new entries (since no school could
come into being expressly to serve voucher students). The Milwaukee
public schools had little to fear from a plan of this size. The schools
with the best record of aiding urban minority populations—the paro
chial schools—were not allowed to participate. Participating schools
were given half the per-pupil allotment of the public schools and were
not allowed to charge more, even if both they and parents wanted the
additional services that extra payments would make possible (Lieberman 1993).
These are not the only kind of restrictions placed on schools partici
pating in choice plans. Under its charter school legislation, the State of
Arizona appropriated just 1.6 million dollars for start-up costs in 46
charter schools, much less than what it spends to start a single public
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school (New York Times, March 6, 1996). As a consequence, charter
schools have spent operating money on buildings rather than teachers
or books. A variety of regulations severely restrict access to credit.
Charter schools are not allowed to sell bonds. Since they are chartered
for only five years, they have no access to long-term credit. And they
are not considered to own assets like buildings and supplies, which
cannot therefore be used as collateral for loans. Similar restrictions
apply to charter schools in Minnesota. They are forbidden to use oper
ating funds to purchase land or buildings. Yet they are not permitted to
accept private or outside grants after their start-up period. No other
public schools in the state are prevented by law from accepting corpo
rate or foundation grants (Finn et al. 1996).
Numerous other restrictions have been placed on charter schools.
Most states give local school boards control over charter schools,
including the decision to issue a charter in the first place. In others,
charter schools can be created only by converting an existing public
school after a vote of staff (and in some cases, parents). Such require
ments often result in protracted struggles to win approval of charters.
Indeed, when asked how they would advise state legislators establish
ing guidelines for charter school creation, more respondents to the
ECS-CSC survey mentioned school autonomy than start-up funds.
Respondents recommended that charters be approved by some author
ity other than the local district, that local districts not be allowed to
pressure charter schools into accepting various restrictive arrange
ments, and that charter schools not be bound by local labor-manage
ment agreements (Education Commission of the States and the Center
for School Change 1995).
Like other market-based reforms, charter schools have been vigor
ously opposed by teachers' unions. Union opposition has been credited
with helping to block charter school legislation in Illinois, Ohio, Con
necticut, Washington, and Pennsylvania (Maus-Pugh 1995). The New
Jersey Education Association has come out in support of a charter
school bill that offers protection for school employees. Ballot refer
enda on educational vouchers have been defeated in Colorado and Cal
ifornia; teachers unions and other associations of professional
educators played key roles in these contests.
We do not mean to imply that all opposition to school choice is
either self-interested or ill-considered. On the contrary, legitimate
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questions have been raised about school choice and other market-based
reforms. Our argument is only that there should be no presumption that
opponents are correct. Indeed, it is more than a little puzzling that a
society that owes so much of its prosperity to a comparatively free
market place should be so mistrustful of entrepreneurial activity in
education. The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that when
schools are freed from state regulation and forced to respond to market
forces, personnel policies will change for the better. Given the potential
that such reforms exhibit for attracting better teachers into the nation's
classrooms, continued experimentation with school choice and privati
zation seems fully warranted. The greatest danger we foresee is that
market forces will not be given a fair test, a danger compounded by the
tendency of proponents to oversell the virtues of competition and
promise more than can be achieved. In these circumstances, experi
mental trials of market-based reforms are only too likely to fail, a cir
cumstance that will be used to discredit all such efforts.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits of teacher unionism, see Everts
and Stone (1984).
2. The private sector offers some in-kind benefits unavailable in most public schools, such as
housing and meals for faculty and tuition waivers for their children. To some extent, these benefits
compensate for lower salaries, though their importance is easily overstated. Only about 10 percent
of the faculty in private schools receive tuition waivers at a point in time (McMillen, Rollefson,
and Benson 1991). Housing (and to a lesser extent, meals) are usually provided to residence
supervisors and therefore represent compensation for additional duties. Indeed, if all benefits are
taken into account, public school teachers do better. Only three-quarters of private schools offer
medical insurance to their teachers, compared to nearly all (96 percent) public schools. And while
virtually all public school teachers are covered by a retirement plan, only 54 percent of private
schools provide one.
3. A larger percentage of private school teachers graduated from colleges unrated by Barren's
Profiles, though the implications for teacher quality are unclear. Many of these teachers graduated
from Bible colleges and other little-known schools with a religious affiliation. These colleges have
evidently chosen not to provide information to Barren's editors, possibly because they do not wish
to broaden their applicant base.
4. Most of them teach in the early grades. Fewer than one-half of these instructors have any
students above third grade, and fewer than 16 percent teach any high school classes, even subjects
like art and music.
5. It may be objected that "excellent" does not mean the same thing in the public and private
sectors, perhaps because the job of a public school teacher is more difficult. These intersectoral
differences remain, however, after controlling for a variety of school and community characteris
tics. Even if a comparison of absolute responses is felt to be questionable, it is revealing that pri-
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vate school heads rate their experienced teachers higher relative to new instructors than do public
school principals. Thus, it appears the private sector does a better job of staff development and
selectively retaining the best teachers. Further discussion of these data appears in Ballou and Podgursky (1995b).
6. There is also a widespread perception that class sizes are smaller in the private sector. In
fact, the differences are slight, with private school classes smaller by only one or two students, on
average.
7. The possible responses to each item were "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat
disagree," and strongly disagree." On virtually all items, a majority of teachers expressed agree
ment (or, if the item was worded negatively, disagreement). Thus the most important difference
was whether they agreed strongly or with reservations.
8. A strong egalitarian ethos in many religious schools appears to discourage the use of incen
tive pay. Some administrators have expressed particular concern that differentials based on perfor
mance would threaten the staff's sense of community and shared purpose. On the other hand, the
practices of these schools might be different if there were not a much larger public sector setting
compensation on the basis of teachers' education and experience. It is likely that public sector
policies establish professional norms from which private schools find it difficult to deviate. Perfor
mance-based compensation might be more widespread if education were wholly conducted by
private schools competing in the market place.
9. For example, despite a formal confidentiality agreement between the Lebanon, Connecticut
school district and the teacher's association, a list of awardees' names was circulated (apparently
by unhappy teachers), causing problems with parents and teachers and contributing to the even
tual termination of the merit pay plan (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994).
10. This also causes problems for administrators. Publishing the names of recognized "master
teachers" has sometimes resulted in conflict between principals and parents when the latter insist
that their children be taught by these instructors (Hatry and Greiner 1985).
11. Administrators of religious schools, on the other hand, are much more likely to respond
that they value or even require certification. The reason, however, is revealing. Certified teachers
enhance the school's legitimacy in the eyes of the public or regional accrediting boards, i.e., the
school meets "all the requirements that public schools have to meet." Pedagogical concerns have
rarely been mentioned.
12. It is instructive to contrast programs of this type with one of the largest, most highly publi
cized mentor plans in the public schools, the California mentor teacher program. On paper the
California plan looks promising: mentor teachers are paid an extra $4,000 annually and are pro
vided release time for their extra duties. Through discussions with California educators we have
learned, however, that no provision is made to reduce teachers' work loads on a regular basis (say,
by one course). Teachers seeking release time must prepare lesson plans for a substitute, a task
regarded as sufficiently onerous that many mentors choose to carry out their mentoring activities
after school rather than during regular school hours. Perhaps partly as a result, mentoring has
come to mean something other than supervision and help for beginning teachers. Instead, many
mentors prepare plans to update or otherwise modify the school's curriculum or to introduce other
pedagogical innovations. The final decision to implement these plans rests with the administrator,
who may not adopt them.
13. Probationary teachers are generally entitled to some due process. Timely notice of nonrenewal must be provided. In addition, fourteen states grant probationary teachers the right to a
hearing before dismissal. However, except when nonrenewal occurs on ground that infringe indi
vidual liberty or when probationary teachers have established some property right in their jobs (an
unusual event), contract renewal is a matter of board discretion. No advance hearings or statement
of reasons is required (Valente 1987).
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14. It is interesting that even in those Catholic archdioceses where teachers are represented by
unions, contracts often provide less protection for senior teachers than in the public sector. Thus,
in one Massachusetts archdiocese, seven factors are used to determine who is to be laid off. Only
if two teachers are equal on the other six does seniority prove decisive. These other factors include
annual performance evaluations and ability to teach multiple subjects. Moreover, senior teachers
are not allowed to bump instructors in other buildings, significantly limiting the damage that can
be done.
15. Many of those laid off do not, in fact, find other teaching jobs, as an analysis of data from
the Teacher Follow-Up survey to the 1987-88 SASS shows. Of the 13 percent of the private school
workforce that left teaching after the 1987-88 school year, 7 percent indicated that their reason
was a school staffing action rather than personal choice (Choy et al. 1992). Thus, .9 percent of the
private sector workforce (.13 x .07) was essentially forced out through layoffs.
16. These are not the only objections to school choice. Rural areas will likely be underserved
(though innovations in distance learning improve prospects for delivering services to areas of low
population density). In many communities, transportation costs may limit the extent of the market
and the amount of choice available to parents. Others have raised concerns about the transmission
of values appropriate to a democratic, pluralistic polity (Levin 1989; Hawley 1996). As noted in
the previous chapter, however, there is much disagreement about the values public schools should
impart. Many would dispute the claim that graduates of public as opposed to private schools
exhibit more public virtues or become better citizens (Lieberman 1993).

Appendix 6A
Public and Private School Salary Regressions

The Model
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of base pay plus bonuses.
Bonuses represent additional pay for performance of regular duties. This ex
cludes extra compensation received for doing extra work (e.g., coaching, sum
mer school).
The independent variables in the model fall into four categories: (1) a teach
er's education and experience; (2) overall measures of salary in the district (or
at the school); (3) in-kind compensation and religious affiliation (for private
school teachers); (4) performance incentives.
Teacher's education and experience

There are five levels of education: less than a bachelor's degree, bachelor's
degree, master's degree, special certificate (e.g., 6th year certificate), and doc-'
toral degree. The bachelor's degree is the omitted category. The others enter
the model as dummy variables, except for master's degree, which is interacted
with the salary increment (premium) awarded teachers with a master's degree,
as explained below.
There are three measures of experience: full-time public school experience,
full-time private school experience, and prior part-time experience. For public
school teachers, their full-time public school experience is interacted with a
measure of the salary increment (premium) that their current districts pay for
experience, as explained below. A similar measure is constructed for private
school teachers' experience within that sector. Full-time experience outside the
current sector and part-time experience enter the equation simply as the num
ber of years in question.
School's pay level

The 1990-91 SASS furnishes three variables measuring the overall level of
salaries in the district (or private school): (1) starting salary offered teachers
with a bachelor's degree and no prior experience; (2) starting salary offered
teachers with a master's degree and no prior experience; (3) salary offered
teachers with a master's degree and twenty years' experience. The difference
(2) - (1) (in logs) measures the premium on a master's degree and is interacted
with a binary variable indicating whether the teacher holds a master's degree.
We obtain the returns to experience by assuming equal percentage increases for
each year of experience. We also assume a teacher reaches the top of the salary
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schedule after twenty years. The annual premium on experience is therefore
computed as the difference (3) - (2) (in logs), divided by twenty. The censored
measure of experience is the maximum of within-sector experience and 20, and
is interacted with the premium on experience.
Thus, we have three controls for the salary schedule used by the district (or
private school). The first is starting pay for teachers with bachelor's degrees.
The second is a measure of the extra compensation the district pays to teachers
with a master's degree. The third is a measure of the increment to experience
times a given teacher's within-sector experience. To the extent that teachers do
not receive full credit for prior experience in other districts, the coefficient on
the third variable will be less than one. On the other hand, the imputed return
to holding a master's degree will be too small if schedules fan out with experi
ence (i.e., experienced instructors obtain a larger percentage increase in pay
when they obtain a master's degree). In this case, the coefficient on the MA
variable will exceed one (to compensate). There are other nonlinearities in
schedules, so that our model will, at best, only approximate schedules in actual
use.
In-kind compensation and religious school indicators

There are three measures of in-kind compensation: housing, meals, and tu
ition (for faculty children). Unfortunately, the SASS reports only whether a
teacher receives each form of compensation, not the dollar value. Thus, each
enters as a binary indicator. In the private school equation, we use also include
two dummy variables indicating whether the school is Catholic or of another
religious affiliation. Different intercepts capture the degree to which different
types of schools might deviate from their stated policy. Such deviations are
common. As explained in chapter 6, Catholic parishes often set salaries in their
grammar schools at a lower level than recommended by the diocesan schedule.
Performance-related bonuses

There are four incentives: (1) serving as a mentor/master teacher; (2) teach
ing in a shortage field (e.g., math or science); (3) teaching in an undesirable lo
cation (e.g., inner city school); (4) merit pay. Since these are intradistrict
bonuses, the undesirable location premium is defined only for public schools
(since most private schools are their own district and have only one location).
Being a mentor/master teacher may involve extra duties, so that to some extent
the extra pay is for extra work.
Awards may be given as cash bonuses, as advances on the salary schedule,
or in other unspecified forms. Unfortunately, the data do not include the mag
nitude of these awards. Only binary indicators are available. Thus, the coeffi-
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cient on a binary indicator for merit pay recipients becomes an estimate of the
average size of a merit award (as a percentage of pay).
In fact, the situation is somewhat more complicated than this. There are two
relevant binary variables for each type of incentive. The first indicates whether
the school offers such a bonus (e.g., has a merit pay plan). The second indicates
whether the teacher "receives the incentive." Presumably this means the teach
er is receiving a bonus, not simply that the teacher is a participant in the plan
(and therefore responding to the incentive). However, there may be teachers
who gave the question the latter interpretation.
In addition, there are some discrepancies in the way these variables are de
fined at the school level and at the teacher level. For example, the school is
asked "Is there a formal program to help beginning teachers (such as a master
or mentor teacher program) in use in this school?" The teacher is asked whether
he or she receives the following pay incentive: "additional pay for assuming
additional responsibilities as a master or mentor teacher (e.g., supervising new
teachers)." Ambiguity arises because some schools may assign teachers to help
new instructors without calling them mentors or master teachers, and because
some schools with master or mentor teacher programs assign them duties other
than supervision of new teachers (e.g., curriculum development).
Ambiguities also arise with respect to the other incentive plans. Schools (or
districts) are asked whether they have a plan, questions that either explicitly or
implicitly refer to the current year. Teachers are asked whether they receive
such an incentive. Thus, a teacher hired in a shortage field who was advanced
on the salary schedule at the time of hire would presumably indicate (even sev
eral years later) that he was receiving the incentive, since it had been built into
his base. But if the school had subsequently discontinued the policy, it would
indicate that it had no such plan. Similar discrepancies could arise for merit pay
if a teacher was receiving a merit bonus for performance the previous year, but
the plan itself had been discontinued (not an uncommon event).
These distinctions are of some importance, since there are, in fact, many dis
crepancies between the answers given by schools and by the teachers who work
in them. Many teachers claiming to receive these incentives are employed in
schools that say they do not offer them. These discrepancies may be the result
of coding errors or mistakes either on the teacher's part or the part of the district
office, or they may represent accurate responses which differ for the reasons
stated above. Due to these ambiguities, we introduce three sets of variables
capturing the effect of incentive plans on a teacher's pay.
First, for each incentive we introduce a dummy variable indicating whether
the district or school has a plan or policy of that type. Note that this variable
applies to all teachers at that school, not just those who receive the bonus. This
is a background control for any factors that cause such schools to deviate from
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what the model would otherwise predict salaries to be. Thus, our estimate of
the average size of a bonus does not pick up mere school effects.
Second, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the teacher re
ports receiving the incentive. And third, we interact this indicator with the first,
giving us a dummy variable for those teachers who say they receive the incen
tive from districts that say they offer it. The average bonus for these recipients
will be the sum of the coefficients on the second and third dummy variables
(for each incentive plan). The average bonus (if that is what it is) for recipients
in schools that do not offer these plans is the coefficient on the second indicator
variable.
Data
Data were obtained from the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey. Sepa
rate estimates were obtained for public and for private schools. Among the lat
ter, only schools that used a salary schedule were retained in the estimation
sample. (Those that did not answered a slightly different set of questions. It is
possible to overlook the differences and pool the two sets of private schools by
making some adjustments to variable definitions; when this is done, very sim
ilar results are obtained).
Only full-time teachers were used, excluding both part-time employees and
teachers with part-time administrative responsibilities. Unpaid volunteers were
dropped. All remaining teachers earned annual salaries of at least $5,000. The
private school sample also excludes teachers who are members of religious or
ders, whose compensation is often not market-based.
Because the model combines variables from different components of the
survey, teachers whose schools or districts failed to respond to the survey were
also dropped from the estimation sample.
Results
Results are presented in appendix table 6A. 1. The coefficients on incentive
variables are frequently insignificant in the public sector equations. Some of
those that are significant have a perverse sign (e.g., teaching in an undesirable
location). The average merit pay bonus is about 2 percent of pay. Mentor teach
ers receive even less, about 1 percent. (When the dependent variable is defined
to include extra pay received for extra duties during the school year, the coef
ficient on mentoring rises to about 2 percent. Other incentive coefficients are
not affected.)
In the private sector, incentives are larger and more consistently significant,
despite the smaller sample size. Merit pay increases salaries by nearly 12 per
cent on average. Mentor teachers earn an extra 4 percent. (When the dependent
variable includes extra pay for extra duties, these coefficients rise to 14 percent
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and 5 percent, respectively.) In both the public and private sectors, bonuses for
teaching in a shortage field are either very small (<2 percent) or estimated so
imprecisely that they fail conventional significance tests.
We have also reestimated the model deleting the binary indicators for teach
ers who claimed to receive incentives in schools that did not offer them; i.e. we
assumed such responses were errors and coded these persons as non-recipients.
Results were virtually identical to those obtained above.
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Appendix Table 6A.1. Salary Regressions
Dependent variable: log of base
pay plus bonuses
Starting pay
Catholic school
Other religious school
No bachelor's degree
Premium for master's x MA
Special certificate (e.g., sixth year)
Doctoral degree
Premium for experience x experience <20
Prior public school experience
Prior private school experience
Prior part-time experience
Teacher receives housing
Teacher receives meals
Teacher receives tuition reduction
School has mentor plan
School has merit pay plan
School pays for undesirable location
School pays for shortage fields
Teacher receives mentor pay
Teacher receives shortage pay
Teacher receives location pay
Teacher receives merit pay
Mentor pay: receives x school has plan
Shortage pay: receives x school has plan
Location pay: receives x school has plan
Merit pay: receives x school has plan
R- squared
Regression MSB
Number of observations
SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey, 1990-91.

Public
1.062 (.01 5)
....
—.076 (.011)
1.091 (.030)
.034 (.007)
.080 (.014)
.916 (.005)
....
.006 (.001)
.007 (.001)
....
—-.003 (.004)
-.020 (.003)
.005 (.027)
-.015 (.005)
.013 (.007)
-.000 (.013)
.011 (.050)
-.024 (.009)
-.006 (.008)
.007 (.006)
-.068 (.050)
.043 (.012)
.75
.021
38,069

Private
.824 (.030)
-.062 (.015)
-.078 (.017)
-.230(.050)
.7560105)
.022 (.022)
.1370040)
.861 (.033)
.007 (.001)
.007 (.002)
-.004 (.036)
.015 (.019)
.005 (.012)
.001 (.008)
.014 (.014)
.0160015)
.019 (.022)
.083 (.061)
.010 (.027)
.018 (.020)
.166(377)
.092 (.025)
.68
.039
3,576

CHAPTER

Conclusion
The argument of this book can be summarized in the following five
propositions.
1. Higher teacher salaries have had little if any discernible impact
on the quality of newly recruited teachers.
Using such indicators as the quality of the college from which teach
ers graduated and the degree of difficulty and rigor in their undergradu
ate major, we find essentially no relationship between salary growth
and the qualifications of new teachers compared to experienced teach
ers in the same state. We have put the data through a variety of tests to
see whether our negative findings might be due to various biases. None
of these tests has changed our conclusion. While it remains possible
that weaknesses in the data or faulty analytical techniques have caused
us to miss improvement that took place, it seems surprising that a
response to higher pay would be so difficult to detect, and that there
would be no obvious connection between the amount teacher pay rose
and the improvement in the quality of a state's new teachers.
2. The failure of this policy can be traced, in part, to structural fea
tures of the teacher labor market.
Teacher salaries are not differentiated on the basis of performance.
When teacher pay rises, it rises for all teachers. As a result, quit rates
fall and jobs become more difficult to find. The fact that prospective
teachers must invest in occupation-specific training that has no value
outside public education makes them sensitive to declining job pros
pects. This effect is greatest for those with the most attractive options
outside teaching, who incur the greatest loss if they train to become
teachers and cannot find a teaching job. By contrast, persons with no
professional prospects outside education will scarcely be deterred by a
decline in job opportunities.
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3. Recruitment of better teachers is further impeded by the fact that
public schools show no preference for applicants who have strong aca
demic records.
Even a declining job market might not discourage bright applicants
from pursuing teaching careers if they could be confident that their
chances of obtaining jobs remained good. Unfortunately, there seem to
be no grounds for such confidence. Public schools are no more likely to
hire these candidates than those with far weaker academic records.
4. A variety of reforms have been proposed that might lower entry
barriers and improve job prospects of more capable prospective teach
ers.
Differentiating salaries on the basis of performance (or measured
competencies) could provide encouragement to better teachers without
stimulating a general increase in teacher supply. Licensing require
ments could be relaxed, particularly for individuals who demonstrate
promise in other ways. Standards could be raised for teachers or, alter
natively, for students, leading schools to value instructors with stronger
cognitive skills. Teacher tenure and other job protections could be
weakened, making it easier for administrators to dismiss ineffective
teachers. Such reforms face a host of practical and political difficulties,
not least the opposition of powerful entrenched interests that benefit
from the way teachers are currently trained, licensed, and employed.
5. To judge from the practices of private schools, market-based
reforms would improve the quality of the teaching workforce.
Private schools place more emphasis on academics and the recruit
ment of faculty who have strong academic records. They are more
likely to differentiate salaries on the basis of performance and to dis
miss ineffective teachers. While there remain many unanswered ques
tions about school choice, the record so far would seem to encourage
further experimentation. Entrepreneurs appear ready to provide ser
vices to a wide variety of students, not just the most affluent or advan
taged. Unfortunately, opposition to market-based reforms is intense.
This opposition has influenced charter school legislation and the
design of other choice plans, with the unfortunate consequence that
market-based reform may not receive a fair trial.
It is customary at the conclusion of a work of this kind for the
authors to present their policy recommendations, a set of proposals that
would, in their view, correct the problems they have been at pains to
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identify. We offer no such list. There are a great many proposals on the
table already. Instead, we close by highlighting those reforms now
underway that seem to offer the best opportunity of improving the way
the teacher labor market functions.
On the supply side of the market, licensing requirements should be
relaxed so that promising applicants can seek jobs without first invest
ing a year in the acquisition of a credential they may never use or use
only a short while. This policy is already a feature of alternative certifi
cation programs established to recruit minority teachers and instructors
in shortage areas. Many private schools that prefer their teachers to be
certified also hire instructors who lack this credential, allowing them to
complete the necessary course work once they have started teaching.
Induction and internship programs provide on-the-job assistance to
beginning teachers. Given that such policies are widely and success
fully followed in the private sector, we see no justification for current
licensing requirements. At a minimum, alternative certification pro
grams should be expanded to serve the more general purpose of
recruiting better teachers all around.
Still, such changes may not accomplish much if school districts con
tinue to prefer applicants with traditional training and to overlook noneducation majors with strong academic backgrounds. Altering
behavior on the demand side of the market will require more radical
reforms. For reasons detailed in chapter 5, we are skeptical that current
efforts to enhance public schools' accountability will have much effect
on the way teaching applicants are screened. We are more optimistic
about reforms—like the charter school movement—that create schools
that must compete for students, run by entrepreneurs less likely to be
bound by traditional views. Unfortunately, reforms attempting to create
a competitive market in educational services are strongly opposed by
vested interests within the professional education community, raising
the possibility that charter schools will become isolated pockets of
quality while business goes on as usual in the schools attended by the
great majority of the nation's children.
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